• Changhong Fishery Ltd. v. Jinghai Fishery Ltd.

    2004-03-16

    QINGDAO MARITIME COURT PEOPLE’S COURT OF CHINA CIVIL JUDGMENT No.Qing-Hai-fa-Zai- 2(2001) Plaintiff for Trial of First Instance : (plaintiff for short) Changhong Fishery Ltd., Zeku Town, Wendeng City, Shandong Province, China. Domicile: Changhuikou Village, Zeku Town, Wendeng City. Legal Representative: Jiang Haoyao, manager. Agent ad litem: Yin Longfei, lawyer of the Legal Service Centre, Weihai City, Shandong Province. Agent ad litem: Fan Kaifeng, lawyer of the Legal Service Centre, Weihai City, Shandong Province. Defendant for Trial of First Instance (defendant for short): Jinghai Fishery Ltd., Rongcheng City, Shandong Province, China. Domicile: Jinghai Town, Rongcheng City. Legal Representative: Xiang Weiyuan, Board Chairman. Agent ad litem: Zhang Keliang, adviser to Jinghai Fishery Ltd. Agent ad litem: Guo Junling, employee of Jinghai Fishery Ltd. The cases concerning a ship collision dispute between the plaintiff Changhong Fishery Ltd., Zeku Town, Wendeng City, Shandong Province and the defendant Jinghai Fishery Ltd., Rongcheng City, Shandong Province was adjudicated by Qingdao Maritime Court which made the Civil Judgment of No.Qing-Hai-fa-Hai-shi-Cu- 49(1998) on Dec. 4, 1998. The plaintiff did not accept the judgment of the first instance and appealed to the Higher People’s Court of Shandong Province (the Higher Court for short). The Higher Court made the civil judgment of No. Lu-Jing-Zhong-114(1999). The plaintiff still did not accept the judgment and appealed to the Supreme People’s Court which instructed the Higher Court to review the case. The Higher Court made the civil award No.Lu-Jing-Jian- 91(1999), in which it held that the judgment of the court of first instance was mistaken and recalled the judgments of No.Qing-Hai-fa-Hai-shi-Cu- 49(1998) and No.Lu-Jing-Zhong- 114(1999). The case was turned back to Qingdao Maritime Court (this Court for short) for rehearing. This Court duly organized another collegial bench and held public trials. Jiang Haoyao, the legal representative of the plaintiff, Yin Longfei, Fan Kaifeng, the agents ad litem of the plaintiff, Zhang Keliang, Guo Junling, the agents ad litem of the defendant, appeared at the trails for the hearing of the case. The case has now been concluded. After the rehearing, the following facts were affirmed: the plaintiff’s fishing boats “Lu-Wen-Yu-2385” and “Lu-Wen-Yu-2386”(hereinafter referred to as 2385 and 2386), were made of wood on Feb. 20, 1995. The rated power was 29 kilowatts, the gross tonnage was 20 tons, the length was 17.2 meters, the width was 3.80 meters and the depth was 1.40 meters. The defendant’s fishing boats “Lu-Rong-Yu-1463” and “Lu-Rong-Yu-1464” (hereinafter referred to as 1463 and 1464) were made of steel on Apr. 1, 1994. The length of the ship was 31.26 meters, the width was 5.40 meters, the depth was 1.40 meters, the rated power was 163.9 kilowatts and the gross tonnage was 84.0 tons. On Jan. 10, 1998, the pair boats 2385 and 2386 went to sea from Changhuikou Dock at Zhangjiagang Town, Wendeng City for fishing. At about 16:00, Jan. 17, the boats returned to the base from 87/9 fishing zone because of the strong wind, where the compass course was 340º. At that time, the northeastern wind force was force 6-7 and the visibility was good. The head boat 2385 sailed in front of the second one , being about 0.5 sea mile apart. Both boats exhibited the sailing lights according to the rules. Qi Zhijiang, the captain of 2385, proved that Mao Cunjiang, the captain of the head boat, found the overtaking boat and told this to Qi through interphone. Mao Cunjiang warned Qi: be careful of the twin large boats sailing after your starboard. Qi Zhijiang opened the right window of the rudder house, and found that the twin large boats were sailing behind. Then, he confirmed this to the head boat. When he turned portside, the twin large boat sailed toward the head boat and the second boat. At the time the first large boat sailed by 2385, the lights on 2385 were still on. But when the second large boat sailed by, the lights were invisible. After the second boat called through interphone several times but not answered, it was realized that maritime accident had happened to the head boat. So they immediately waked the crew of 2386 and sailed to the spot of accident, only to find that the injuring boat had sailed away to the north. The stern of 2385 had been flooded, the rudder house came out of the sea by about 2-3 feet. They searched for about 2 hours, but did not find any missing person in the water, only to find a piece of life jacket, a door and some pieces of torn board. No other boats were there, except 1463 and 1464 in the sea area near the accident spot. 2386 returned to the dock at 09:00, Jan. 18, and 2385 sank. Five seamen were missing and one survived. The plaintiff asked the defendant to compensate for the following losses: (1) hull loss of RMB 137,500 Yuan, equipment loss of RMB 76,450 Yuan, diesel oil loss of RMB 2,350 Yuan, fishing loss of RMB 27,104.70 Yuan, indirect loss for two months of RMB 160,920 Yuan, loss of interest from Mar. 18, 1998 to Apr. 10, 2001 RMB 115,636.86 Yuan, (2) attorney fee of RMB 72,120 Yuan, (3) traveling expenses plus communication fee and the photocopy fee of RMB 13,166.90 Yuan, (4) personal belongings of the five lost seamen of RMB 5,000 Yuan, (5) death compensation already paid to the close relatives of the lost seamen RMB 334,295 Yuan, (6) the legal cost of the case No.Qing-Hai-fa-Hai-shi-Cu- 50-54(1998) totaling RMB 9,384 Yuan. The case sent back by the Higher Court for retrial was No.Qing-Hai-fa-Hai-shi-Cu-49(1998), concerning compensation for damage arising from ship collision dispute. Therefore, this Court heard the case concerning the plaintiff’s claims about the boat and the damage to the boat, not the one concerning the claims about the lost seamen and the damages connected therewith. Because of the dismissal of the plaintiff’s lawsuit petition, the court of first instance and the appeal court did not conduct investigation and verification of the damage. The case had been investigated and verified in the retrial: the hull loss was RMB 110,000 Yuan, the equipment loss was RMB 29,925.60 Yuan, the diesel oil loss was RMB 1,000 Yuan, the fishing loss was RMB 8,350 Yuan, and the indirect damage RMB 75,000 Yuan. On Jan. 16, 1998, 1463 and 1464 went to sea from Shawo port at Jinghai to 118/4 fishing zone. At about 06:00, Jan. 17, 1464 towed by 1463, returned to the base. The towing line was made of steel and the length was about 100m. The course was 340º. After 2 hours’ hauling, the towing line was broken. An hour later, the hauling resumed. At about 04:00, Jan. 18, the ship sailed 6-7 sea miles southeast from Sushan Island. Ren Guangqi, the sailor of 2385, climbing to 1464, was too cold to speak. According to the seamen of 1464, Ren Guangqi wrote down the words: “I was infomed that 2385 had a maritime accident at Changhuikuo port. About 10 minutes later, I saw a big iron-shelled boat and climbed up there ,where I happened to meet two warm-hearted people who rescued me”. At 05:30, Jan. 18, 1463 and 1464 returned to the port. On the morning of Jan. 18, the Shawo station of the Rongcheng City Police Bureau and Rongcheng Fishing Supervision and Administration Station investigated Ren Guangqi separately. In both of the investigation notes, Ren Guangqi proved that at 03:00 Jan. 18, he found that the boat rolled suddenly when he was off duty in bed, then he ran out from the bed. Because of the rapid sinking of the boat, the cabin was full of water. Ren Guangqi was bitten to the water by the storm (another note said that he himself hurried to the water), after he saw a big iron-shelled boat sailing slowly, he climbed on 1464 through the shipboard when the wave pushed him to it. After Ren Guangqi came back to the city of Wendeng, the Changhuiko Frontier Defence Police Station of Zeku town of Wendeng City investigated him at 15:20 hrs of Jan.18. Ren Guangqi made such witness: “I was still in bed when the boat rolled violently. I fled from the bed and at the first sight I saw the lights of the second boat, the stern of our boat was out of sight. I could only see the rudder house. No other person was in sight. I found a big iron-shelled boat drifting and fluctuating. Then I held the shipboard and climbed to the iron-shelled boat. After boarding 1464, I found the hull of 2385 was submerged into the sea about 1 meter deep. No other boat was in the spot.” Zhang Yiya, the engine driver of 1464, proved that “when Ren Guangqi came in, he could not say a word. We asked him to put off his wet clothes. He was in three woolen sweaters and two cotton sweaters, only a small part of the last one remaind dry.” Zhang Yiya changed for dry clothes for Ren Guangqi and gave him a glass of drink as well as a smoke. It was about after ten minutes at 00:04 that Ren Guangqi could speak. When the Fishing Police of Rongcheng City investigated the seamen on duty in 1463 and 1464, they all proved that no other boat sailed around their boat except a pair of boats on their left. When the case was reheard, this Court investigated Ren Guangqi and he proved that “2385 sank with hull upward. He said: “When I got on 1464, my hair was dry and I found 2385 sink so quickly while it was rolling. I did not find anyone crying for help in the rudder house and the rudder house did not roll in the same way as the front part of the boat. At that time the stern of the boat had already disappeared”. On Aug. 14, 1998, Qingdao Maritime Court entrusted CCS Qingdao (CCS) for the appraisal of the collision. The items for the appraisal were: 1.Whether the hole in 1464 was caused by the collision with 2385? if it was so , then which part of 2385 made the hole? 2. Whether there was a touch and what was the extent of the collision according to the on-the-spot photos and the scene of the accident. On Aug. 19, CCS made out the appraisal (at the time the maritime accident had taken place for eight months). Through technical analysis, the surveyor considered that the hole of 1464 was hit by sharp-edged steel material. Such factors as the size, the shape and the height of the steel material in 2385 were difficult to make the hole. According to the iron mark, the hole was made before the scraping of the paint. The check-out conclusion was that:(1)1464 and 2385 had a collision, which resulted in the scraping of the paint. (2)The collision between the two boats could not result in the sinking of 2385 and the damage to the hull structure. Yet, the surveyor stated that amendments to the said technical analysis could not be excluded should any potential, concealed or undiscovered damage come to light in the future. On Apr. 12, 2001, Shidao Observatory Station proved that: on Jan. 17, 1998, the maximum wind speed was 15.4m/s, the wind direction was northward; on Jan. 18, the maximum wind speed was 16.5m/s, the wind direction was north northwest. It snowed in those two days (13.9m/s-17.1m/s, grade 7 ). On Apr. 18, 2001, Shidao Observatory Station analyzed the concrete data. Before 24:00 Jan. 17, the wind force was 6-7 and the wind direction was north to northeast around Sushan Island. On Jan. 18, from 00:00 to 4:00, the wind direction was north to northeast and the wind force was 7-8. The flurry force was 9-10. From 5:00 to 12:00, the wind direction was north to northeast and was force 6-7,while the flurry was force 8. According to the tide table of Shidao in the year 1998, the height of the tide was 064cm. on Jan. 18, 1998, and at 5:23 Jan. 18, 1998, the height of the tide was 253cm. All this proved that it was tide flow when the maritime accident happened. Referring to the ocean current on the chart, around Sushan island, the direction of the flow was 238ºand the velocity of the flow was 0.7 sea mile. The spot of the collision was 79/6 fishing zone, 6-7 sea miles in the southeast of Sushan Island. It was at about 3:50 that the maritime accident took place. The track course of 2385 was about 328º. It took 11 hours and 50 minutes for the boat to sail 46 sea miles from the accident spot to the base, about 3.9 sea miles in one hour. 1463 towed 1464 whose track course was 335º. It took 50 minutes and 21 hours to sail 133 sea miles from the accident spot to the base, about 6.1 sea miles in one hour. The sailing situation of 2385 and that of 1463 and 1464 as shown in the diagram, proved that the course angle of 2385 and that of 1463 and 1464 was 7º.The two pair boats were in overtaking situation. 2385 was the overtaken boat (the stand-on boat). 1463 and 1464 were the overtaking baots (the give-way boats). The pair boats 1463 and1464 overtook from the portside and collided with 2385. The first instance court considered that though 1464 had scraping mark with the other boat, the collision did not result in the sinking of 2385. When 1463 was sailing while towing 1464, the course was 340ºand the speed was six knots. It was impossible for 1463, towing 1464, to overtake and collide with 2385 whose course was 340º, and speed was 4 knots. It was also impossible that 1464 sailed in between 2385 and 2386. The plaintiff protested that 1463 collided 2385 and made it sink. This opinion could not be accepted because it had no sufficient evidence to support. Therefore, this court shall dismiss the plaintiff’s claim about the compensation for the loss. The legal cost of the case at RMB 8,561 Yuan shall be borne by the plaintiff. The plaintiff did not accept the judgment of the first instance and appealed. The trail by the court of second instance held that CCS, as the legitimate authority for survey of vessels in china, entrusted by this court, measured 1464 and the hole at the same time. They studied the structure of 2386,the twin boat of 2385, and studied the on-the-spot photos of 1464 submitted by the appellant. The conclusion was that it was a chafing and this could not damage 2385. The problem about the hole of 1464 had been mentioned in the ship appraisal report. As to the broken wood pieces and that no other ship was on the spot, these could not negate the appraisal conclusion. Especially, in the second trial, because both the appellant and the appellee agreed to the conclusion, the conclusion of CCS could be taken as the basis for judgment. When Ren Guangqi, the only survivor of 2385, got aboard 1464, he did not identify 1464 as the injuring boat. When investigated by Rongcheng Fishing Organization and the Frontier Defence Station, he did not identify it either in the statement he gave to 1464. But, when he was taken back to Wendeng City and investigated by the Frontier Defence Station, he identified 1464 as the injuring boat. This court doesn’t adopt his words because he changed his original statement without any other proof. According to these, the appeal was turned down and the original judgment was maintained. The legal cost of the case at RMB 8,561 Yuan shall be borne by the plaintiff. To sum up the previous investigation, this Court affirmed that: Ren Guangqi was dry in the hair and was not all soaked in his clothing when he came to the room of the engine driver Zhang Yiya. All this proved that Ren Guangqi did not jump into the sea, but was beaten to 1464 by the billow. If in so great storms, the billow could have beaten Ren Guangqi to 1464 and at the same time 1463 and 1464 were sailing 180m per minute, he should have been injured, and his whole body shouldn’t be dry. Just because Ren Guangqi had not the slightest injury, his hair was not wet, and his clothes weren’t all wet, it proved that Ren Guangqi climbed to 1464 when the two boats collided together. 2385 sank with the hull upward. This could get rid of the possibility that the billow overturned 2385. Where a boat was sunk entirely, there could not possibly be any survivor. The sinking was not understood as that the hull was burst into much water. 2385 burst into water to sink upward. Ren Guangqi could survive while he was sleeping, the other seamen should have survived too. The fact that the other 5 seamen in the case couldn’t survive proved that the sinking of 2385 was not due to the effect of the storms, but due to the water beaten into the boat by the storm. If the sinking of 2385 was due to the effect of the storm, the other seamen should have survived as Ren Guangqi did at least. They should have fled out of the cabin to survive and Ren Guangqi should have heard the cry for help. However, Ren Guangqi, the only survivor, proved that he could see nobody running out of the cabin and could hear no cry for help. Such result proved that 2385 and other seamen were facing or restrained by uncontrollable and invincible limitations to survive. Therefore, the serious result was the sinking of the boat and the death of the 5 seamen. This analysis eliminated the possibility that the sinking of 2385 was due to the effect of the water beaten into the boat by the storm. Except this, under such situation, only the effect of the collision with another boat could have sunk 2385. According to the findings of the investigation by this court, at the time when the pair boat 1463 and 1464 collided with 2385, Ren Guangqi climbed up to 1464, while 2385 sank into the sea due to the collision. Yet, the defendant claimed that the two boats’ chafing couldn’t result in the sinking of 2385. Still, the appraisal report proved that it couldn’t result in the sinking of 2385. Therefore, both the trail of first instance and second instance made the judgments according to the impossibility of the sinking of 2385 by the chafing (from the uncertainty of the accident appraisal to the certainty of the judgment). On earth, whether or not the chafing could result in the sinking of 2385? This court considered that if the sinking of 2385 was not due to the pair boats 1463 and 1464, there surely was another boat around the accident spot, and, after collision with 2385, 2385 collided with the pair boats. According to the analysis of the collision situation described by the plaintiff and the defendant, the boat collided with 2385 was only in front beam of 2385 or before the starboard side. It was impossible that the boat was behind the portside or the starboard side of the pair boats 1463 and 1464.The pair boats 1463 and 1464 sailed for 185m in one minute and the towing length between the two boats was 100m. It only took 40 seconds for the towing length to pass the sea area. In order to prove there was another boat which collided with 2385(except 1463 and 1464) before the pair boats 1463 and 1464 collided with it, it must be proved that there was a boat collided with 2385 and the boat was within 100m before the starboard of 1464. Otherwise, though there was a boat collided with 2385, 2385 couldn’t collide with 1464. The pair boats 1463 and 1464 could have sailed away from the sea area before 2385 sailed to the accident spot. Both the plaintiff and the defendant in this case proved that except the four boats, there were no other boats, and the defendant proved that there was a boat sailing along before his boat’s portside, and no boat sailed in starboard side. All this proved that 2385 had no collision with other boats until collided with the pair boats 1463 and 1464. The pair boats 1463 and 1464 were the injuring boats. This could result in the sinking of 2385 and the loss of its seamen. This Court investigated the sailing situation and data submitted by the plaintiff and the defendant by the diagram, which proved that 1463 and 1464 were the overtaking boats (the give-way boat), 2385 was the overtaken boat (the stand-on boat). In accordance with provisions in Article 13 of Convention of the International Regulations for Preventing Collision at Sea (1972)(the Rule in short), each ship should give way to the overtaken ship when it overtook the other ship. The pair boats 1463 and 1464 should have given way to 2385. In this case, when investigated by the responsible department, the seamen on duty of the overtaking boat said that they could only see one pair of boats sailing in the same direction along the portside, and couldn’t find a stand-on boat sailing in front of or along the starboard. What was more important was that when investigated by the responsible department, all the seamen on duty on 1463 and 1464 proved that they had no sense of the collision and did not find a person aboard their own boat. All this proved that the seamen on duty on 1463 and 1464 seriously neglected their duty of keeping proper outlook. A pair of towing ships, in accordance with the Rule, shall exhibit the sailing lights at night and whistle the bugle to other ships for warning. Thus, other ships could avoid the collision with the towed ship or the tow line when they sailed across the stern of the ship. The pair boats 1463 and 1464 did not exhibit the sailing lights in accordance with the Rule, on the contrary, they violated the Rule. All this misled the coming boat to neglect its proper attention and to make the normal and timely avoidance. This was what resulted in the collision between 2385 and the pair boats 1463 and 1464. This was also one of the reasons why 2385 collided with the pair boats 1463 and 1464. The pair boats 1463 and 1464 were the overtaking boats, and in the course of overtaking, collided with 2385. According to the proofs submitted by the parties to the trials of first instance and second instance, the pair boats 1463 and 1464, as the give-way boats, did not whistle a burgle or exhibit the lights, not only when they overtook the other boats, but also at the time of the close quarters situation with the two boats had taken shape. The pair boats 1463 and 1464 did not make it clear that they were going to overtake and exceed 2385 or warn 2385 thereof. The fact was that they overtook and exceeded 2385 in silence. After the imminent danger had taken shape, at the time when the two boats sailed close, 1463 and 1464 still sailed at the former course and the former speed, without any attention to the situation of imminent danger and the threatening accident of collision. All this resulted in the collision of the two boats. In the collision accident, the main reason of the collision was that the pair boats 1463 and 1464 did not sail at safety speed, or, in accordance with the Rule, the overtaking boat shall give way at a large angle. The defendant shall bear the main legal liability for the collision accident. In the course of the collision, though 2385 belonging to the plaintiff was the privileged boat (the stand-on boat), in order to have a proper understanding of and a positive response to the imminent situation, it should look attentively at the coming boat and the situation around, keep highly visual and audible sense to the surroundings, and keep a normal outlook. Especially, after the imminent situation and the danger of collision had been shaped, in order to avoid the collision and the worsening of the damage, the privileged boat should take active and positive measures to avoid collision. If necessary, the privileged boat should even violate the Rule to rescue herself and the other boat. In this case, though the evidence proved that before the collision occurred , 2385 had found the pair boats 1463 and 1464 overtaking from behind, yet no evidence could prove that before the urgent situation took shape, whether 2385 had taken any measures for avoiding the collision. Perhaps, 2385 could not submit such evidence. Nevertheless, in this case, through the analysis of the result that 2385 sank and five seamen died, it was likely that 2385 did not take any measures to avoid the collision, or, it did not get an obvious and expected result even if such measures had been taken. Therefore, the serious result was that 2385 sank and the seamen lost their lives. The plaintiff shall bear relevant legal liability for the collision. According to the first item of article 14 of Regulations for Ocean Fishery Production Safety Administration of Shandong Province, when the wind is over force 6 , fishing boats under 60 horsepower shall not set sail to sea; if the wind force is over 7, fishing boats under 400 horsepower shall not sail out, and, if over 8, no fishing boats may sail out by all means. Shidao Observatory Station proved that on Jan. 18, in Sushan sea area, the northeastern wind was force 7-8, and the flurry was force 9-10. According to what this court had investigated and analyzed, 2385 should not sink by the hit of the storm. The facts affirmed by the two parties proved that 2385 sank after colliding with the pair boats. The defendant’s allegation that 2385 sank under the influence of the storm could not get the support of this court because the defendant was unable to submit sufficient evidence. The survey report was the scientific, objective analysis and the conclusive opinion made by the appraiser who made it out on the expert problems in a case with his expert knowledge and professional experience. In this case, to regard the result of the examination and consultation as the decisive factors for the appraiser to judge whether 1464 could collide 2385 and sink it, only on the basis of the fact that whether the scrape on the photo could result in the damage of the hull structure of 2385 is obviously not objective nor comprehensive. In this case, there were so many factors and issues which should be examined and inquired into including the evidence submitted by the parties, the findings of the investigation by this court and CCS, and including those not submitted but should be collected by this court. In addition, the facts about the weather, storm, tide, and the situation of the accident spot should also be taken into consideration. It is incorrect and one-sided to draw a comprehensive conclusion only on the basis of independent, isolated factors of the case. What was more important was that it was incorrect to take the problem of whether any part of 2385 could make the hole on 1464 as the sole basis on which to judge whether the pair boats 1463 and 1464 could collide and sink 2385. Well-founded and truthful conclusion should be drawn from comprehensive and objective understanding of the case. The Survey Report affirmed that 1464 collided 2385, meanwhile, the report also said the collision could hardly result in the hull damage of 2385. A conclusion is to make an appraisal on the fact. The words and the expressions as “possible” and “impossible” should not be used in a conclusion. Therefore, this court does not adopt the uncertain conclusion. This Court decides that under the provisions of Article 117 of the General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China, and Article 169 of Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China: 1.The plaintiff shall bear 20% legal liability for the collision. The defendant shall bear 80% legal liability for the collision. 2.The defendant shall compensate the plaintiff for the total sum of RMB 179,420.48 Yuan and the interest in respect of the collision (according to the corresponding bank interest rate of China, where the bank interest shall be paid from Jan. 18, 1998 to the day on which the defendant fulfills the compensation after the judgment becomes effective). 3.The plaintiff ’s other claims shall be dismissed. 4.The legal cost of the first instance trail is RMB 8561 Yuan, of which the defendant shall bear RMB 5098 Yuan and the plaintiff shall bear RMB 3463 Yuan. The defendant shall pay off to the plaintiff in ten days after the judgment becomes effective. If overdue, the defendant shall pay off double to the plaintiff according to the rules of law. If any party refuses to accept this judgment, it may submit its appeal petition to this court within 15 days upon service of this judgment, together with a sufficient number of duplicates for each member of the opposing party to have one copy, and the appeal shall be filed with the Higher People’s Court of Shandong Province. Presiding Judge: Pan Xinsu Judge: Fen Zhili Deputy Judge: Zhou Daina Court Clerk: Wang Jingyuan Certified true copy Date: December 28, 2001
  • JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS IMP.&EXP. (GROUP) CORP. v. JIANGSU GLOBE FOREIGN TRADE TRANSPORTION CO.,BRILLIANT INTERNATIONAL CORP. USA

    2004-03-16

    WUHAN MARITIME COURT OF PEOPLES’ REPUBLIC OF CHINA CIVIL JUDGMENT No.WU-HAI-FA-SHANG 80(1999) PLAINTIFF: JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS IMP.&EXP. (GROUP) CORP. DOMICILE: No.100 JIANYE ROAD, NANJING, JIANGSU PROVINCE, CHINA LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE: Yang Yuanfu, Board Chairman AGENT AD LITEM: ZhangTing, attorney of Nanjing Jinda Law Firm (specially authorized) AGENT AD LITEM: Zhou Yanting, Employee of JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS IMP.&EXP. (GROUP) CORP., DEFENDENT: JIANGSU GLOBE FOREIGN TRADE TRANSPORTION CO. DOMICILE: RM 7, 12A FL, CHANGJIANG TRADE BLDG, 99 CHANGJIANG ROAD, NANJING, JIANGSU PROVINCE, CHINA LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE: Xu Gang, General Manager. AGENT AD LITEM: Xie Hongyan, Employee of JIANGSU GLOBE FOREIGN TRADE TRANSPORTION CO. AGENT AD LITEM: Guo Chunfeng, attorney of Shandong Haishi Law Office (specially authorized) DEFENDENT: BRILLIANT INTERNATIONAL CORP. USA DOMICILE: Empire State Building, Suite 4205 350 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10118, USA LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE: Mr. Lemin Li, Board Chairman AGENT AD LITEM: Guo Chunfeng, attorney of Shandong Haishi Law Office (specially authorized) The plaintiff JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS IMP.&EXP. (GROUP) CORP.(hereinafter " JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL "), brought before this court a lawsuit on 30 July, 1999 against the defendants JIANGSU GLOBE FOREIGN TRADE TRANSPORTION CO. (hereinafter "JIANGSU GLOBE") and BRILLIANT INTERNATIONAL CORP. USA (hereinafter " BRILLIANT USA"), for a dispute arising out of a contract of carriage of goods by sea. In this case, the place where the B/L was issued, the place where JIANGSU GLOBE was domiciled and the place of shipment were all in Nanjing, China, this court therefore has jurisdiction over this cases based on the principle of the place where the contract was performed and the place of the defendant’s domicile. After accepting the case, in accordance with the Civil Procedure Law of the PRC ,this court organized a collegial panel on 10 August, of which Xu Zemin was the presiding judge. Wang Jianxin was the assistant judge and Li Xuhai, the judicial assessor (who was later substituted by Zhang Lin, the assistant judge during the second hearing). Then this court served upon the plaintiff the Notification of Acceptance on 10 August and served upon the defendant JIANGSU GLOBE the Response to Action on 17 August. On 3 September, Lemin Li, the legal representative of the defendant BRILLIANT USA, through the contact of the defendant JIANGSU GLOBE, personally came to this court to sign the Response to Action. After the two pubic hearings on 21 December, 1999 and 29 October, 1999 with the participation of Zhang Ting and Zhou Yanting on behalf of the plaintiff JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL, Xie Hongyan and Guo Chunfeng on behalf of the defendant JIANGSU GLOBE and Guo Chunfeng on behalf of the defendant BRILLIANT USA, the trial of this case has now been concluded The plaintiff JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL claimed that: During the time from July through December of 1998, the plaintiff entrusted the defendant JIANGSU GLOBE to ship a number of bags and suitcases separately under 4 Bs/L for the destination of Miami, USA, the total price being US$15542.75 where JIANGSU GLOBE, on behalf of BRILLIANT USA, signed/ issued to the plaintiff 4 sets of original straight Bs/L respectively on 9 August, 26 August, 6 October and 18 December . According to the Bs/L, the shipper was JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL and consignee was M/S. CHINA (USA) INC. (hereinafter reffered to as "M/S INC") However, the two defendants, after the shipment, delivered the goods to the named consignee without collecting the original Bs/L , which resulted in the plaintiff’s failure to collect payments. The plaintiff hereby claimed against the two defendants for joint and several liability on the loss and damage in the sum of US$ 150,542.75 (equivalent to RMB 1,249,504.83) together with the interest thereon. In order to support its claim, the plaintiff JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL presented to this court the following evidence: 1.The shipment particulars, Customs declarations, packing lists and commercial invoices for goods under Bs/L No. 522109-98, 522168-98, 522123-98 and 522136-98 in order to prove the facts that the shipper was JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL and the total value of the goods was US$ 150,542.75. However, JANGSU GLOBE and BRILLIANT USA defended that the form of settlement of exchange showed in the Customs declarations was D/P, being inconsistent with that on the records filed by the Customs —D/A, and that the amounts shown in the invoices were inconsistent with that disclosed by the consignee M/S INC. (only the amount under B/L No.522136-98 was true ). BRILLIANT USA stated that his Company would provide relevant evidence for such defense. The collegial panel held that the said evidence was admissible except the one in relation to the settlement of exchange and the value of goods which shall be further cross-examined after the submission of evidence by BRILLIANT USA. 2. The original Bs/L for the four lots of cargo issued by JIANGSU GLOBE on behalf of BRILLIANT USA (three copies for each lot). They proved the facts that the shipper of the said goods was JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL; the consignee and notify party was M/S INC; JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL was the legal holder of the original Bs/L. 3. The invoices for agency fees in relation to the said goods issued to JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL by JIANGSU GLOBE in order to prove the facts that JIANGSU GLOBE had collected the agency fees and become the actual agent of the shipment of the said four lots of cargo. JIANGSU GLOBE and BRILLIANT USA did not challenge the truthfulness of the above original Bs/L and the invoices for agency fees for the said cargo.. The collegial panel held that the above two evidences shall be admissible since neither party challenged them and that BRILLANT USA was the carrier under the Bs/L for the said goods; JIANGSU GLOBE was the shipping agent of JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL and the agent issuing the Bs/L on behalf of BRILLANT USA as well; JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL was the legal holder of the original Bs/L for the said goods. M/S INC. was the named consignee of the straight Bs/L. 4. 15 faxes between JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL and JIANGSU GLOBE and BRILLANT USA, from March 10 through June 30 of 1999. They showed the facts that JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL did request to preserve the goods and that the two defendants, though being aware of the plaintiff’s wish of preservation, fraudulently concealed the fact that the goods had been delivered to the consignee, which finally led the plaintiff to misunderstand that the goods were still under their own control. JIANGSU GLOBE and BRILLIANT USA, though didn’t challenge the truthfulness of the above said fax messages, yet defended that such evidence could not support the fact that JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL requested BRILLIANT USA to preserve the goods before the delivery thereof and that JIANGSU GLOBE and BRILLIANT USA cheated JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL. The collegial panel held that the above faxes could be admissible as the evidence to determine the facts. The defendant JAINGSU GLOBE argued that: JIANGSU GLOBE was a legally registered international forwarding company. In the process of shipment, JIANGSU GLOBE had acted as the agent for canvessing cargo and signing Bs/L, which could be proved by Evidence No. 2, and No.3 (i.e. 4 sets of original Bs/L and the invoices for agency fee) submitted by JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL. Therefore JIANGSU GLOBE should not be responsible for the plaintiff’s loss and damage and the claim should be dismissed. The defendant JIANGSU GLOBE made no submission of other evidence. The defendant BRILLIANT USA defended that: JIANGSU GLOBE was the agent of BRILLIANT USA for canvassing cargo and signing Bs/L. When the goods arrived at Miami, USA, the named consignee requested to take delivery by means of L/G because they had not received the original Bs/L. JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL had never made a request for the preservation of the goods before delivering to the consignee. After the delivery, the consignee effected part of payment for the goods to JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL. In pursuance with the overleaf clauses of the Bs/L and Article 269 of the Maritime Code of the P.R.C, this case shall be subject to COGSA 1936 and the relevant laws of USA. In accordance with the laws of USA (including legal precedents), the straight B/L shall be non-negotiable and the obligation of delivery shall be deemed to have completed after the carrier had delivered the goods to the named consignee, who needed not present the original B/L. Therefore, it was unsupportable for the plaintiff to claim against BRILLIANT USA for the damage arising from releasing goods without the original Bs/L and the claim should be dismissed. In order to rebut the claim, the defendant BRILLIANT USA submitted the evidence as follows: 1.A fax from JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL to JIANGSU GLOBE on February 23, 1999 stating that JIANGSU GLOBE was requested to checked the arrival of the goods and the costs of carriage to Los Angeles per shipment. The above fax proved the fact that JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL had not made the request for the preservation of the goods before March 5 when BRILLIANT USA delivered the goods to M/S INC. 2.A fax from JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL to JIANGSU GLOBE dated March 3, 1999 stating that the consignee took delivery of goods without presenting the original Bs/L and JIANGSU GLOBE should be liable for the loss and damage incurred therefrom. The fax proved that JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL was aware that the consignee had taken delivery of the goods on March 8, 1999. JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL didn’t challenge the above 2 faxes and stated that they had learned about the delivery from the market. The collegial panel held that the above 2 faxes could be used as evidence to determine the facts. 3. The Ls/G issued to BRILLIANT USA by the consignee M/S INC. at the time of delivery. This Ls/G proved that BRILLIANT USA went through the formalities for the delivery with the consignee respectively on November 16, December 4 of 1998 and January 29 and March 5 of 1999. JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL defended on 2 points:1) the truthfulness of Ls/G could not be determined: 2) such evidence, if truthful, could only prove the fact that BRILLIANT USA, when delivering the goods without being presented the original Bs/L, did have the knowledge that JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL could suffer the loss and damage arising therefrom. Based on Evidence 2 as listed above, the collegial panel held that it was unnecessary to determine the truthfulness of 4 Ls/G since BRILLIANT USA had proved to have delivered the goods to the consignee at least by March 8, 1999 and that delivering goods without presentation of the original Bs/L could not be affected by whether BRILLIANT USA had obtained the Ls/G issued by M/S INC. 4. Information on payments provided to BRILLIANT USA by M/S INC., proving that during the period from October 6, 1998 to April 13,1999, M/S INC made 9 payments to JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL and its affiliate JSL INTERNATIONAL, among which 2 payments were directly to JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL .They proved that the consignee did make partial payment to JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL. JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL defended that it was impossible to determine which payments were for the said goods though all payments were made after the delivery, because the consignee still had the balance due to pay JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL arising from their long-term business relationship , and BRILLIANT USA also failed to make such specification. Among all of the above payments, 4 payments were for JSL INTERNATIONAL, and 2 for goods under Bs/L No. 522156-98 and 522158-98, which were irrelevant to this case. JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL then provided 2 items of supplementary evidence. Evidence No.1. Information on Payment by M/S INC. issued by JSL INTERNATIONAL. It proved that the 4 payment, which had been made to JSL by M/S INC., were for the balance between JSL and M/S, and had no relevance with the goods of JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL; Evidence No.2. The explanation on remittance made by the consignee. It proved that the 2 payments made to JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL by M/S INC. were for other goods previously delivered. The collegial panel held that the above evidence submitted by BRILLIANT USA could not be admissible since it was not clear enough to prove that their payments were for said goods , and that the truthfulness of the supplementary evidence submitted by JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL could not be determined. Therefore, the court didn’t accept the evidence presented by BRILLIANT USA purporting to prove that the consignee M/S INC had paid for the four lots of cargoes. 5 The commercial invoices for the said goods issued by JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL to M/S INC. which recorded the term of the settlement of exchange: D/A 120 days or 30 days. These invoices proved that JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL changed the original settlement of exchange D/P into D/A when collecting money after the shipment , and JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL did not submit the Bs/L to M/S INC and breached the contractual obligation which resulted in non-payment. These invoices also proved that the amount stated in the invoices submitted by JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL was different from that held by M/S INC.—the amount on each invoice of the former was US$ 2,000 which was more than that of the latter except the invoice under B/L NO. 522136-98. 6.A photocopy of Customs declaration obtained from the Customs by BRILLIANT USA to prove that the Customs declaration submitted by JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL was inconsistent with that filed by the Customs, in which the method of payment was D/A instead of D/P. JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL did not stand against the above 2 items of evidence, and submitted the photocopies of Customs declarations for the said goods obtained from the Customs and stated that the original Bs/L were directly sent to JSL International, an affiliate in USA, which was entrusted to notify the consignee to make the payment. But the consignee failed to make payments and the original Bs/L could not be delivered. The collegial panel certified the truthfulness of the above 2 items of evidence and confirmed that the contractual method of payment agreed by and between JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL and M/S INC. was D/A 120 days or 30 days. But later on it was changed into D/P by JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL; the total sum of US$ 150,542.75 of the said goods as shown in the commercial invoices submitted by JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL were certified to be true. After the production of evidence, cross-examination and certification and, in combination with the statements of both parties, this court found out the facts as follows: 1. In July, September and December of 1998, JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL, in order to perform the sales contract, entrusted JIANGSU GLOBE to ship four cargoes of bags and suitcases separately. After being entrusted, JIANGSU GLOBE went through the formalities for booking, declaration and delivery. The serial numbers of transportation for the said goods were 522109-98, 522168-98, 522123-98 and 522136-98. The price term was FOB China. The total amount was US$ 150,542.75. The contractual payment term was D/A 120days or 30 days. 2. JIANGSU GLOBE, on behalf of BRILLIANT USA, signed/ issued to JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL 4 sets of original straight Bs/L with order of carrier BRILLIANT USA respectively on August 9, August 26, October 6 and December 18, and delivered such Bs/L to JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL. The Bs/L showed: the ports of loading were NINGBO, NANJING and NANTONG; the port of discharge was Miami, Florida, USA; freight was payable at destination; the consignee and notify party was M/S INC. USA. The said goods arrived at Miami respectively on September 2, October 29, November 1, 1998 and February 10 of 1999. 3.The original Bs/L were sent by JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL directly to JSL International, an affiliate in USA, which was entrusted to notify the consignee to make the presentation for payment. However, the consignee claimed that he had not received the original Bs/L when he took delivery of the goods. On November 16 and December 4 of 1998 and January 29 and March 5 of 1999, the consignee took delivery of the goods after issuing Ls/G to BRILLIANT USA and completing payments of freight. 4. After the shipment, JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL, checked with JIANGSU GLOBE about the arrival of the goods and the costs of carriage to Los Angeles on February 23,1999, but did not make a definite request for stopping delivery. On March 8 1999, JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL notified JIANGSU GLOBE by fax that he was aware that the consignee had taken delivery of the goods and JIANGSU GLOBE should be liable for delivering goods without the presentation of Bs/L. On June 16, JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL requested JIANGSU GLOBE to notify BRILLIANT USA to ship the goods to Los Angeles and deliver them to EUGENE INTERNATIONAL. However, Brilliant USA refused to do so. 5. All Bs/L for the said goods stated: the B/L for the goods shipped from or to ports of USA shall be subject to COSGA 1936, otherwise, the B/L shall be subject to Hague Rules or Hague Visby Rules which had been enacted into law by the country of shipment. if there was no such enacted law as mentioned above, the B/L shall be subject to Hague Rules. During the proceeding, BRILLIANT USA submitted to this court COSGA 1936, Uniform Commercial Code of America and an Affidavit Opinion on the stipulations of the laws of USA on straight Bs/L by John D. Kimball, an attorney of the Law Firm Healy&Baillie and an Adjunct Professor of law at New York University School of Law which had been notarized by the notary office of USA and authenticated by the Consulate General of the PRC in New York. In pursuance with the relevant laws and precedents, it was concluded in the Affidavit OPINION that: “Where the Carrier delivered goods to the Consignee under straight bills of lading which contained no contractual terms requiring the Consignee to surrender the original B/L and without notice from the Shipper instructing the Carrier not to deliver the goods, such delivery shall be deemed to be an act of the Carrier to fulfill its obligations under the terms of the B/L between the Carrier and the Shipper, and is not in breach of the B/L terms or any of its obligations under United States Law.” JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL did not question the aunthenticity of COSGA 1936, but argued that Uniform Commercial Code of America should not be applied since it was not a legal document the parties chose to comply with , and the Affidavit Opinion, as personal opinion, could only be used as reference. The collegial panel confirmed the authenticity of COGSA 1936 and verified the contents of Uniform Commercial Code of America since it was included in China Laws and Regulations Collection Data Base (2001 State) which had been examined and approved by the Legal Work Committee of the NPC(National People’s Congress)Standing Committee of the PRC. The Affidavit Opinion could be used to explain the viewpoint of the laws of USA with respect to the dispute in question. The main issues of this case were: 1: Whether JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL shall be responsible for the non-payment since it changed the settlement of exchange and failed to deliver the Bs/L to the consignee; 2. Whether the fact that JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL made a request for preserving the goods could stand; 3. What law shall be applied to the dispute resulted from delivery of goods without original Bs/L. For issue No.1, JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL claimed: The sales contract and the carriage contract were two independent contracts. Delivery against the original Bs/L was an international practice. If the carrier was in breach of such practice, the risk of non-payment would inevitably occur, no matter what method of payment was adopted. It was just because the carrier delivered the goods without having the original Bs/L surrended that JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL lost its control over the goods, even with the original Bs/L in hand, which finally resulted in the non-payment by the consignee M/S INC. However, BRILLIANT USA and JIANGSU GLOBE defended thus: D/P means that the importer cannot obtain the B/L from the collecting bank until the payment has been made, while D/A 120 days or 30days means that the importer may obtain the B/L before the payment will be made after 120 days or 30days when the time limit of the draft is due, which involves commercial risks. However, JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL changed D/A into D/P without being agreed upon ,thus M/S INC. could not obtain the Bs/L, which finally led to a dispute over the sales contract. The failure of JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL in settlement was due to the dispute over the sales contract and not involving the carrier. The collegial panel held: Although D/A 120 days or 30days was a kind of settlement involving commercial risks, JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL was entitled to change the method of settlement and undertake the liability incurred therefrom. Even if M/S INC. had refused to undertake the obligation of taking delivery under the contract, JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL was still entitled to the right of disposing of the goods. The change of the method of settlement, as a way of lessening risks, was not the cause of non-payment. Therefore, JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL should not be liable for the loss of non-payment. As to issue NO.2, JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL claimsed: 15 faxes between JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL and JIANGSU GLOBE, BRILLIANT USA were able to prove the fact that JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL did request to preserve the goods. The two defendants, though being aware of the plaintiff’s wish of preservation of the goods, yet concealed the fact that the goods had been delivered to the consignee, which finally mislead the plaintiff to misunderstand that the goods were still under their control. However, BRILLIANT USA and JIANGSU GLOBE defended: JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL did not request to change the consignee until the goods had been delivered. JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL had been inquiring JIANGSU GLOBE about the arrival of the goods. However, JIANGSU GLOBE, when making feedback, conveyed an inaccurate information about time due to the failure of BRILLIANT USA to give prompt information, which finally led to the misunderstanding. JIANGSU GLOBE disclosed that the goods were in the custody warehouse of the Customs rather than in the warehouse of the carrier. After going through the formalities for delivery, the consignee did not take a prompt delivery, but left the goods in the custody warehouse of the Customs. When JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL requested to change the consignee, BRILLIANT USA, in consideration of the long-term trade relations, did consider to render assistance in returning the goods and claimed for the warehouse charge incurred. However, they decided to give up such an effort on 8 March, 1999, when JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL, after being aware of the delivery of the goods, requested them through a letter to be responsible for the liabilities for delivering the goods without original Bs/L. The collegial panel held: JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL was not able to prove that it made the request for preservation before BRILLIANT USA had delivered the goods( at least before 8 March, 1999). In the fax sent to JIANGSU GLOBE on February 23, 1999 by JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL, the latter did not make a clear request to M/S INC. for stopping delivery.From March 10 to June 30 when the two parties exchanged information through fax, BRILLIANT USA had been dealing with the consignee about the delivery of goods. Although JIANGSU GLOBE failed to give a prompt and accurate notification, yet this could not change the fact that BRILLIANT USA had completed the delivery; nor could it determine that the request for preservation made by JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL could be retroacted to the time before the delivery; and it was also impossible to take such request as having been made before the delivery. Therefore, the allegation of JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL that the request for preservation of the goods was made before the delivery could not sustain.. For issue No. 3, JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL claimed: Hague Rules, Hague Visby Rules and COGSA 1936 as the applicable laws agreed upon by both parties in the Bs/L were not in conflict with the laws of China in terms of the basic principles and should be applied to this case. It was not stipulated in the above rules and laws that “ the carrier may deliver goods without presentation of original Bs/L” or “the straight B/L was not a B/L”. In this case, the Bs/L were signed/ issued by one Chinese legal person to another within China, thus the places where the contract was signed and performed, where damage was caused had the closest connection with China. Therefore, the law of China, as the law of the place with closest connection should be applied, when the law chosen by the parties were inadequate to solve the dispute. In accordance with the Maritime Code of th P.R. C, the carrier, when delivering goods, shall ensure the consignee was the right one and the B/L was the original. The laws of USA , such as Uniform Commercial Code of America, as was not chosen by the parties, should not be applied. However, BRILLIANT USA and JIANGSU GLOBE defended: JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL should have had full knowledge of the applicable laws as agreed upon in the Bs/L, since he had for many times accepted the standard Bs/L issued by BRILLIANT USA during the long-term trade relations. In accordance with the overleaf clauses of the Bs/L, the validity of the Bs/L should be subject to COGSA 1936 or Hague Rules 1924, or Hague/ Visby Rules 1968 applied in the country where the goods were loaded. Since China has not joined Hague Rules 1924, nor Hague/ Visby Rules 1968, this case should only be subject to COGSA 1936. Such term was also in compliance with Article 269 of the Maritime Code of the P.R. C:“the parties to a contract involving foreign interests may choose the law applicable to the contract”. Since it was not expressly stipulated in COGSA 1936, as to how to deliver goods under the straight B/L, this case should be subject to the common law of USA, such as The Bill of Lading Act 1916, or the Uniform Commercial Code of America. In this case the destination port of the said goods was in USA, the consignee and the carrier were both American companies and the delivery took place in USA. Therefore, the laws of USA which directly affected the contract should be taken as the law of the closest connection. Even if the Bs/L did not contain such agreement as the application of law as above, the law of USA should still be applied in accordance with Article 269 of the Maritime Code of the P.R.C:“if the parties to a contract had not made a choice, the law of the country to which the contract was most closely connected shall be applied.” The collegial panel held: The paramount clause of the B/L was one regarding the choice of law applicable to the B/L, which was valid in accordance with Article 269 of the Maritime Code of the P.R. C. In pursuance with this clause, the B/L shall have effect subject to the provisions of the “Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1936”(“COGSA”)of the United States of America in respect of carriage of goods from ports in the United States. Otherwise, this B/L shall have effect subject to the provisons of the Hague Rules or Hague /Visby Rules.Since the destination Port of the said goods was in USA, this case shall be subject to COSGA 1936. In view of the above, the court held: A B/L is a document which serves as an evidence of the contract of carriage as agreed by the shipper and the carrier and both parties should undertake the obligations under the B/L. The issue of delivering goods without original Bs/L should be categorized as a contractual dispute. It was in compliance with the law of China for the parties to choose COSGA 1936 as the applicable law in the paramount clause of the B/L. The main issue of this case was whether the carrier had the right to deliver the goods to the named consignee without presentation of original B/L. However, there was no relevant stipulations in COSGA 1936 for solving such problem. Since the law chosen by the parties could only regulate part of the legal relations rather than the full content of the contract, it should be deemed that the parties failed to make the right choice of law to apply to the issue in question. In accordance with Article 269 of the Maritime Code of the P.R. C., when the parties to a contract fail to make such choice, the applicable law shall be determined upon the principle of the closest connection. The principle of the closest connection lays emphasis on the connection between the legal relationship and the place in question, and determines the applicable law through the factors of connection. All factors of connection relating to a specific issue shall be taken into consideration when determining the applicable law and only the law that has the closest connection with the contract can be chosen. In this case, the factors of connection for the contract of carriage of goods by sea mainly included the place where the contract was signed, the place where the contract was performed (including the place of shipment and the place of destination), the place of business and the place of the subject mstter, while the main issue in dispute in this case was the legal consequences of the act of delivery of goods by the carrier in the process of the international carriage of goods by sea, which took place in the port of USA, rather than the place where the B/L was signed/issued or the place of shipment. As the carrier’s act of delivery at the place of destination was directly governed by the law of the place where the act was done ,so its connection with the law of USA where the delivery was carried out was more relevant and more substantial than its connection with the law of China where the contract was signed or the place of shipment was located. Therefore the law of the place where the act was done was the most effective law that governed the issue. On the contrary, the law of China where the contract was signed should not be taken as the law with the closest connection. On the other hand, the parties to the contract had chosen the standard form contract (the B/L) provided by the carrier, so it must be in compliance with the law of the place where the carrier’s business office was located . Since the place of destination, the place of the subject matter and the place where the carrier’s business office was located were all in USA, this case should be subject to the law of USA. Therefore, the allegation of Brilliant USA that this case shall be subject to such relevant laws of USA as Uniform Commercial Code of America shall be supported. As to The Affidavit Opinion on the stipulations of the laws of USA on the straight Bs/L by John D.Kimball, the lawyer of the Law Firm Healy & Baillie and an Adjunct Professor of Law at the New York University School of Law , though his personal opinion on the application of law as it was, it did provide the relevant laws of USA. Since it had been notarized by the notary public of USA and authenticated by the Consulate General of China in New York, as being in conformity with the Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court of the PRC Regarding Several Issues on Enforcement of General Principles of the Civil Law , the truthfulness and validity of the relevant laws it provided could be determined. The affidavit opinion based on the relevant laws and precedents, gave explanations on the relevant stipulations on the straight B/L in Uniform Commercial Code of America. Furthermore, the legislative body of the state of Florida, the place of destination had accepted Uniform Commercial Code of America as the law of the state. Jiangsu Light Industry, however, failed to produce the contrary evidence to exclude the application of the Uniform Commercial Code of America. Therefore, the affidavit opinion could be used as the legal opinion for reference in resolving the dispute in question,and this case shall be subject to the Uniform Commercial Code of America. On the 4 sets of straight Bs/L, it was stated that the consignee was M/S INC. Such Bs/L, in accordance with Article7-104(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code of America, should be non-negotiable. It was stipulated in Article 7-303(1)-C of the Uniform Commercial Code of America:Unless the bill of lading otherwise provides, the carrier may deliver the goods to a person or destination other than that stated in the bill or may otherwise dispose of the goods on instructions from the consignee on a non-negotiable bill in the absence of contrary instructions from the consignor ,if the goods have arrived at the billed destination or if the consignee is in possession of the bill. That means the carrier may deliver the goods to the named consignee after the arrival at the destination if the shipper had made no contrary order before such delivery. Since the plaintiff had neither included in the straight B/L the term of “delivery against the original B/L” ,nor made a prompt request for stopping the delivery before BRILLIANT USA delivered the goods to the named consignee, it shall be deemed due and lawful for BRILLIANT USA to deliver the goods to the named consignee. Therefore, BRILLIANT USA shall not be responsible for the loss and damage claimed by the plaintiff. The relationship between the defendant JIANGSU GLOBE and the plaintiff Jiangsu Light Industrial was legally bound by the Agency Agreement. As the agent, JIANGSU GLOBE had duly performed its obligation by completing such formalities in relation to the carriage as booking, declaration, shipping and presentation of Bs/L that were entrusted by JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL. Since its act as an agent had no direct causation for the loss and damage of JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL, JIANGSU GLOBE shall not be responsible for indemnification. The act of JIANGSU GLOBE in canvassing cargo and issuing Bs/L on behalf of BRILLIANT USA was within the scope of its authority , which had no adverse effect on the loss and damage of JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL. Therefore JIANGSU GLOBE shall also not be responsible for the loss and damage. In view of the above, the claim of the plaintiff JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL against the defendant JIANGSU GLOBE shall not be supported. In accordance with Article 269 of the Maritime Code of the PRC. Article 63.1 and 63.2 of the General Principles of Civil Law of the PR C., Article 7.1.4.2, 7.3.3.1.C of the Uniform Commercial Code of America and Article5.1, Article 128 of the Civil Procedure Law of the PRC. The judgment is renderedit by this court as follows: 1.the claim of the plaintiff JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS IMP./EXP. (GROUP) CO. against the defendant BRILLIANT INTERNATIONAL CO. USA shall be dismissed; 2.the claim of the plaintiff JIANGSU INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS IMP/EXP (GROUP) CO. against the defendant JIANGSU GLOBE INTERNATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE TRANSPORTATION CO. shall be dismissed. The legal cost in the sum of RMB16,300 and other litigation fees in the sum of RMB 4,890, being RMB 21,190 in total ,shall be borne by the plaintiff JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS IMP./EXP. (GROUP) CO.. If refusing to accept this judgement, the plaintiff JIANGSU LIGHT INDUSTRIAL , the defendant JIANGSU GLOBE may within 15 days after the service of this judgment, and the defendant BRILLIANT USA may within 30 days after the service of this judgment, file an appeal with the Higher People’s Court of Hubei Province. The appeal petition shall be submitted to this court and copies of it shall be provided according to the number of persons in the opposing party. Presiding Judge:Xu Zemin Acting Judge: Wang Jianxin Acting Judge : Zhang Lin T December 25, 2001 Certified true copy Clerk: Zhang Yu
  • Chongqing Pacific International Forwarding Co., Ltd v. Tongliang County Import & Export Co. Ltd., Chongqing Municipality.

    2004-03-16

    WUHAN MARITIME COURT PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA CIVIL JUDGMENT NO. WU HAI FA YU SHANG ZHI 07(2001) Plaintiff : Chongqing Pacific International Forwarding Co., Ltd. Domicile : 15 floor, Jinguanyin Mansion, Te No. 1, No. 2, Jinxinxi Road, Jiangbei, Chongqing Municipality Legal Representative : Yao Xiao-Li , General Manager Agents ad litem : Zhang Chao-Hui, Attorney at Law of Chongqing Jianwu Law Office Tang Bin, Attorney at Law of Chongqing Jianwu Law Office Defendant: : Tongliang County Import & Export Co. Ltd., Chongqing Municipality Domicile : No. 226, Jiefangdong Road, Bachuan Town, Tongliang County, Chongqing Municipality Legal Representative : Zhu Hua-liang , General Manager Agent ad litem : Xu Dong, Clerk of Tongliang County Import & Export Co. LtdSun Nian, Clerk of Tongliang County Import & Export Co. Ltd The suit brought by this court by the plaintiff Chongqing Pacific International Forwarding Co., Ltd. (hereinafter called the plaintiff) against the defendant Tongliang County Import & Export Co., Ltd. of Chongqing Municipality (hereinafter called the defendant) about the dispute in the payment of freight arising from the contract of carriage of goods by sea was heard in open session by a sole judge of this court. The agent ad litem of the plaintiff and the defendant joined the court hearing. Now the cases has been concluded. The plaintiff alleged: From December 1999 to February 2000, the plaintiff was entrusted by the defendant to act as his agent to export 7 containers of barium chloride and 3 containers of preserved Szechuan pickle, so the defendant should pay the freight of RMB 117,324.00. After the plaintiff performed the contract completely and timely, although the plaintiff pressed the defendant to pay the above-mentioned freight many times, the defendant refused to pay it by seeking various excuses. Therefore, the plaintiff requested the court to adjudge that the defendant pay the default freight of RMB 117,324.00, plus the interest and the court fee. The plaintiff submitted the following evidence for supporting the alleged facts: 1. The B/L NO. CSHNG270083 issued by China Shipping Container Lines Co., Ltd. on 9 December 1999 and the Freight Invoice under this B/L, which proved that the plaintiff acted as the defendant’s agent to transport 2×20’ containers of preserved Szechuan pickle and the default freight. 2. The B/L NO. CSHYK270094 issued by China Shipping Container Lines Co., Ltd. on 16 December 1999 and the Freight Invoice under this B/L, which proved that the plaintiff acted as the defendant’s agent to transport 1×20’ container of barium chloride and the default freight. 3. The B/L NO. CCQAW310009 issued by PCS SHIPPING LTD. on 6 January, 2000 and the Freight Invoice under this B/L, which proved that the plaintiff acted as the actual shipper namely the defendant,s agent to transport 3×20’ containers and the default freight. 4. The B/L NO. CSHYK270001 issued by China Shipping Container Lines Co., Ltd. on 26 January 2000 and the Freight Invoice under this B/L, which proved that the plaintiff acted as the defendant’s agent to transport 3×20’ containers of barium chloride and the default freight. 5. The B/L NO. COSU432811624 issued by China Shipping Container Lines Co., Ltd. on 18 February 2000 and the Freight Invoice under this B/L, which proved that the plaintiff acted as the defendant’s agent to transport 1×20’ container of preserved Szechuan pickle and the default freight. 6. The fair copy of the original B/L sent by the plaintiff to the defendant for the second time and confirmed by the defendant before issuing the original B/L of PCS SHIPPING LTD. NO. CCQAW310009 on 6 January 2000. It proved that the B/L was issued according to the defendant’s instruction. 7. The Certificate of Authorization filled in by the plaintiff’s clerk Zhang Jian-Bin on 3 January, 2000, which proved that the defendant entrusted the plaintiff to forward the cargo under the B/L NO. CCQAW310009 dated 6 January, 2000. 8. The Declaration Form for Export Cargo(for drawback purpose) submitted to Wusong Customs at the port of export of the goods by the plaintiff in the name of the defendant, which proved that the defendant was the managing company and shipper company of the cargo under Customs No. 070000042 transported by the plaintiff. 9. The fax sent by the defendant’s clerk Xu Dong-Fa to the plaintiff’s clerk Yang Liu on 9 May, 2000 showing “ the request to return the Declaration Form No. 0000042 for 3×20’ containers of barium chloride carried to Antwerp on 6 January, 2000”, which proved that the actual shipper of the cargo under the B/L No. CCQAW310009 issued on 6 January, 2000 was the defendant. 10. The fax sent by the defendant’s clerk Xu Dong-Fa to the plaintiff’s clerk Zhang Jian-Bin on 25 February, 2000 showing the shipment of 3×20’ containers of barium chloride to Antwerp on 6 January”, “delay in delivery” and “please explain the reasons and suggest the solution”, which proved that the actual shipper of the cargo under the B/L No. CCQAW310009 issued on 6 January, 2000 was the defendant. 11. The register list signed by the defendant’s clerk Yuan Xing-Hua upon the receipt of the original B/L sent by the plainst on 6 January, 2000, which proved that the plaintiff delivered the B/L No.CCQAW310009 to the actual shipper namely the defendant. 12. The fair copy of the original B/L which the plaintiff sent to the defendant for the first time by fax and the defendant faxed back to the plaintiff after revised the title under the Notice Party to “CENTRE” by the defendant’s clerk Ye Zhi-Ming and confirmed with his signature, which proved that according to the actual shipper namely the defendant’s revision, confirmation and instruction, the plaintiff made out the fair copy of original B/L again and gave it to the defendant for final confirmation. The defendant didn’t make his answer in writing. However, during the court hearing he defended: the plaintiff had violated the provisions of the “Agreement on Containerized Shipment” concluded by both parties, damaged the defendant’s cargo during the carriage, and hadn’t resolved the problem until this day (the day of court hearing), so the defendant didn’t pay the freight for the time being. The defendant submitted the following evidence to support his defence: 1. The “agreement on containerized shipment” concluded by the plaintiff and the defendant on 1 July, 1999, which proved the relationship of contract of carriage of goods by sea between the plaintiff as the carrier and the defendant as the shipper. 2. The letter sent by the defendant to the plaintiff on 6 December, 2000, regarding the suggested solutions to cargo damage”, which proved that as to the cargo damage under the B/L No. CSHNG270083 carried on 9 December, 1999 and other cargo damage irrelevant to this case, the defendant had made the claim to the plaintiff. 3. The response made by the plaintiff after the plaintiff received the defendant’s letter regarding “ the suggested solutions to cargo damage”, which proved that as to the cargo damage under the B/L No. CSHNG270083 carried on 9 December, 1999 and other cargo damage irrelevant to this case, the plaintiff had made suggestions for solution. 4. The counterfoil of transferring cheque No. 00372339 of the Commercial Bank (Yu) (copy) used for paying the freight in early January, 2000. During the time of the trial, the plaintiff and the defendant cross-examined the relevant evidence. With regard to the plaintiff’s evidence, the defendant put forward the cross-examination opinion as follows: The shipper was “KINGBRIDGE CO., LTD.” rather than the defendant as stated in the plaintiff’s Evidence No. 3, and the consignee was “TO ORDER”, instead of the defendant, so this evidence wasn’t related to the plaintiff. Although the plaintiff’s Evidence No.6 bore the defendant’s common seal, yet the shipper was “KINGBRIDGE LTD.”, rather than the defendant. The plaintiff’s Evidence No.7 was only the memorandum of the plaintiff’s clerk, on which the defendant didn’t sign his name or affix the defendant’s commom seal for confirmation. The shipper for export cargo stated in the plaintiff’s Evidence No.8 was the defendant, but the shipper stated in the plaintiff’s Evidence No.3 wasn’t the defendant, so, the export cargo stated in the plaintiff’s Evidence No. 8 and Evidence No.3 weren’t the same batch of cargo. The defendant only entrusted the plaintiff to transport one batch of cargo on 6 January, 2000, which was recorded on the plaintiff’s Evidence No. 8 rather than No. 3. Furthermore, the plaintiff’s Evidence No.8 and No.3 couldn’’t prove that the defendant didn’t pay the freight, because there were frequent business activities between the defendant and the plaintiff; the defendant paid the relevant fees by way of installment. However, the defendant had no objection to other evidence. As to the defendant’s evidence, the plaintiff put forward his cross-examination opinion as follows: Other cargo damages recorded in the defendant’s Evidence No.2 were not verified by both parties, and not related to this case either, except that the carried under B/L No. CSHNG270083 on 9 December, 1999 was relevant to this case, so, the defendant should not refuse to pay the freight requested by the plaintiff by reason of the cargo damage being not verified by both parties and irrelevant to this case. The reason why “KINGBRIDGE LTD.” was stated in the plaintiff’s Evidence No.3 was that the shipper stated in the B/L being verified by the plaintiff’s Evidence No. 6 and No.12 was so stated according to the defendant’s instruction and confirmed by the defendant for two times, so the actual shipper of that cargo was the defendant. The defendant admitted that he entrusted the plaintiff to forward a batch of cargo only one time on 6 January, 2000, in fact, the plaintiff did forward cargo for the defendant only one time on 6 January 2000. Therefore, it wasn’t consistent with the fact that the defendant said the cargo stated in the plaintiff’s Evidence No. 8 and No.3 were not the same batch of cargo. Meanwhile, the defendant didn’t provide any evidences to support his opinion, on the contrary, all of the plaintiff’s Evidence No.6 through 12 proved that they were the same batch of cargo. Moreover, both parties confirmed that the defendant entrusted the plaintiff to ship the cargo once on 6 January, 2000, which also proved that they were the same batch of cargo and the actual shipper was the defendant. The defendant alleged that the freight had been paid, but he didn’t provide any evidences to support this allegation up to this day. Although the defendant had submitted Evidence No.4, it couldn’t prove that the defendant had actually paid the freight to the plaintiff. On the basis of the evidences provided by the plaintiff and the defendant, with the cross-examination opinions of the plaintiff and the defendant, this court determined the following facts: 1. The plaintiff concluded the “Agreement on Containerized Carriage” with the defendant on 1 July, 1999. This Agreement provided: Party A (namely the defendant) shall fill up the Letter of Entrustment and provide the complete set of documents and papers before consignment, and deliver the cargo according to Party B’s request. After accepting the entrustment of Party A, Party B should declare the cargo to the customs as soon as possible, and shall book space for the cargo, and ship the cargo in time after loading the cargo into the containers in good order and condition. The freight for the whole voyage shall be collected as per Party B’s confirmation. Before shipment, the freight shall be confirmed by both parties through fax, where Party B shall fax the B/L to Party A for confirmation, and Party A shall pay up the freight within 40 days after receiving the freight bills from Party B. The evidence supporting this fact was Evidence No.1 provided by the defendant, over which the plaintiff had no objection during the court hearing. 2. After the agreement was concluded, the plaintiff accepted the defendant’s entrustment. The plaintiff acted as the defendant’s agent to carry 2×20’ containers of preserved Szechuan pickles from Chongqing to Japan against the freight of RMB 14, 414.00 on 9 December, 1999; the plaintiff acted as the defendant’s agent to carry 1×20’ container of barium chloride from Chongqing to Nagoya, Japan against the freight of RMB 9,260.00 on 6 December, 1999; to carry 3×20’ containers of barium chloride from Chongqing to Yokohana, Japan against the freight of RMB 27,520.00 on 26 January, 2000; to carry 1×20’ container of preserved Szechuan pickles from Chongqing to Japan with the freight of RMB 7,485.00 on 18 February, 2000. The above four sets of Bs/L showed that: the shipper was Tongliang County Import & Export Co., Ltd., freight prepaid. The freight for the four batches of cargo amounted to RMB 58,679.00. Nevertheless, the defendant didn’t pay it to the plaintiff according to the agreement as yet. The evidence supporting this fact was the plaintiff’s Evidence Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5, against which the defendant had no exception during the court hearing. 3. The plaintiff acted as the defendant’s agent to carry 3×20’ containers of barium chloride from Chongqing to Antwerp against the freight of RMB 58,645.00. This batch of cargo was actually carried by MV “TAIPING YANG03 V. 009” managed by PCS SHIPPING LTD. After the cargo was load on the board, the PCS SHIPPING LTD. issued his own B/L NO. CCQAW310009. The B/L showed: The shipper was KING BRIDGE LTD., the consignee was “to order”; the cargo was barium chloride with the weight of 60,200 kg and measurement of 60 CBM, CY TO CY 3×20’ FCL, freight prepaid. But the freight wasn’t paid yet. The evidence supporting this fact was the plaintiff’s Evidences Nos.3 and 6 through 12 and the defendant’s Evidence No.1. The defendant raised no objection against the above fact, and provided Evidence Nos.2, 3 and 4 to support his opinion which proved that the shipper under B/L NO. CCQAW310009 wasn’t the defendant, so, the freight shouldn’t be paid by the defendant. Moreover, the freight had been paid to the plaintiff, but the defendant didn’t provide any evidence or laws or regulations to support his defense and cross-examination opinion. The defendant’s Evidence Nos.2, 3 and 4 couldn’t prove that the shipper wasn’t the defendant, that the defendant had no obligation to pay the freight, nor the defendant had paid the freight to the plaintiff. Therefore, the defendant’s defense couldn’t be established. This court held that the “Agreement on Containerized Shipment” carriage” between the plaintiff and the defendant was duly concluded and was lawful and valid, which proved that the relationship of contract of carriage of goods by sea between the plaintiff and the defendant was established. As per the Agreement, the plaintiff carried the cargo under Bs/L NO. CSHNG270083, CSHYK270094, CCQAW310009, CSHAYK270001, COSU432811624 to the destination, which proved that the plaintiff had performed the obligation of shipment of goods as per the Agreement completely, the defendant should pay the full freight to the plaintiff in time as scheduled by the Agreement. However, the defendant had not paid the above freight as yet, so, he should bear the relevant civil liability. The plaintiff made the claim to the defendant for freight payment, to which the court should give its support. It was without any legal basis that the defendant refused to pay the freight to the plaintiff because of cargo damage caused by transport of goods. The defendant argued that he refused to pay the freight under the B/L No. CCQAW310009 because he wasn’t the actual shipper on the grounds that the shipper in the B/L No. CCQAW310009 wasn’t the defendant, but he didn’t provide any evidence and legal basis to support his argument. In fact, on 6 January, 2000, the defendant entrusted the plaintiff to carry 3×20’ containers of barium chloride to Antwerp only once , on that day the defendant didn’t entrust the plaintiff to carry the same quantity, same kind of goods to the same destination for the second time, which was mutually proved by the plaintiff’s Evidence Nos.3, 7, 8 and 9 and the cross-examination opinions of the plaintiff and the defendant. The ownership of the goods belonged to the defendant when the defendant delivered the goods to the plaintiff, which was proved by the plaintiff’s Evidence Nos.7 to 11. After the goods were loaded on board, before issuing the original B/L, according to the agreement between the two parties confirmed by the B/L faxed and Article 72.1 of the Maritime Code of the PRC that the carrier should issue the B/L at the shipper’s request, the plaintiff sent to the defendant for confirmation the fair copy of the B/L drafted in accordance with the defendant’s instruction two times successively. Then, the defendant revised the first fair copy of the B/L and confirmed by signature; the defendant confirmed the last fair copy of the B/L by affixing its seal. In view of this, the plaintiff requested the actual carrier to issue the original B/L No. CCQAW310009, and the defendant also signed the original B/L sent by the plaintiff on the same day, which was proved by the plaintiff’s Evidence Nos.6, 11 and 12. So, the defence that the defendant wasn’t the shipper of this batch of goods could not be established, and this court doesn’t give its support to such defence. The defendant alleged that the freight under B/L No. CCQAW310009 had been paid, but the defendant didn’t provide sufficient evidence to support this allegation. Although the defendant submitted Evidence No.4, but there were some problems in that evidence : 1. The date of filling in was uncertain; 2. The freight paid didn’t match; 3. There was record of payment in cash in the transferring cheque ; 4. This evidence couldn’t prove that the freight had been paid because two freight disputes happened respectively on 6 and 26 ,January 2000; 5. The defendant didn’t submit the evidence supporting the payment of freight by installment. Hence, this court doesn’t support the opinion that the defendant alleged that he had paid the freight. The cargo damage alleged by the defendant was another case besides the cargo damage under the B/L concerning this case, which should be handled separately. Even if the damage of one batch of cargo concerning this case had happened, but the defendant didn’t lodge a counterclaim, so it couldn’t be heard by this court. Pursuant to Article 106.1, Article 111 and Article 112.1 of the “General Principles of the Civil Law of the PRC”, Articles 107, 109 of the “Contract Law of the PRC”, Article 72.1 of the “Maritime Code of the PRC”, Articles 64, 128 of the “Civil Procedure Law of the PRC”, the court decided as follows: The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the freight of RMB 117,324.00 plus interest (counting from 1 April, 2000 to the day on which this judgment comes into force as per the interest rate of floating capital loan for the same currency over the same period issued by the People’s Bank of China), which should be paid up within 10 days after the day on which this judgment comes into force. The defendant shall pay the court fee of RMB 3,857.00 and other court costs of RMB 1,157.00, amounting to RMB 5,014.00 totally. The defendant shall also pay the court fee prepaid by the plaintiff when effecting payment of the above sum for compensation. If refuses to accept this judgment, one original appellate petition together with two copies thereof shall be sent to this court for appealing to the Higher Court of Hubei Province within 15 days upon service of this judgment, as well as the acceptance fee for the appeal and other court costs amounting to RMB 5,014.00. Judge: Liu You-Yuan 20 September, 2001 Certified true copy Clerk: Liu Dong
  • P&O NEDLLOYD B.V., P&O NEDLLOYD B.V. China Shipping Company Ltd. v. ADILAN S.A. Corp. Ltd.

    2004-03-16

    HIGHER PEOPLE’S COURT OF SHANDONG PROVINCE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA CIVIL JUDGEMENT No.Lu-Jing-Zhong- 39(2001) Appellant (defendant in the trial of first instance): P&O NEDLLOYD B.V. Address: No.3001 Pangjies, Amsterdam, Holland. Legal Representative: RUTGER PAUL MARIE VAN SLOBBE, Board Chairman. Agent ad litem: Xu Jie, solicitor from Shanghai DUAN & DUAN Law Firm. Agent ad litem: Gao Jun, solicitor from Shanghai DUAN & DUAN Law Firm. Appellant (defendant in the trial of first instance): P&O NEDLLOYD B.V. China Shipping Company Ltd. Address: 20th Floor of Liberation Daily Building, No.300 Hankou Road, Shanghai. Legal Representative: Pan Xiangde, Board Chairman. Agent ad litem: Xu Jie, solicitor from Shanghai DUAN & DUAN Law Firm. Agent ad litem: Cao Fang, clerk of P&O NEDLLOYD B.V. China Shipping Company Ltd. Appellee: (plaintiff in the trial of first instance): ADILAN S.A. Corp. Ltd. Address: No.1321 Saint Nicolas Street, Montevideo, Republic of East Bank Uruguay. Legal Representative: Chunhuilichen, deputy General Manager. Agent ad litem: Sun Fanglong, solicitor from Wincon Law Firm, Shandong Province. Agent ad litem: Zhu Qing, solicitor from Haida Law Firm, Dalian city. The appellant P&O NEDLLOYD B.V. and P&O NEDLLOYD B.V. China Shipping Company Ltd., refusing to accept the civil judgment of Qing-Hai-Fa-Hai-Shang-Chu-223(1999) determined by Qingdao Maritime Court on a dispute over a maritime transportation contract with ADILAN S.A., made an appeal to this court. This court duly organized a collegial bench and held open hearings. The appellant’s agents ad litem Xu Jie, Cao Fang and the appellee’s agent ad litem Sun Fanglong appeared in court. The cases has now been concluded. After the hearing, the following facts were affirmed: on June 10, 1998, ADILAN S.A. and China Textile Material Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as China Textile) entered into two purchase contracts, namely contract No.98RIK—007UY and contract No.98 RIK—008UY. The purchase contract No.98 RIK—007UK stipulated: the name of the goods was greasy mestiza wool (raw wool), the thinness was 27—29 micron, the length was 65—69Hm, the quantity was net-wool weight 19,000 kg (permission +/-15%), unit price was net wool US$2.65/kg, dampness rate was 16% according to IWTO standard, CNF Yantai, China. The purchase contract No.98RIK—008UY stipulated: the name of goods was raw wool, the thinness was 30—32 micron, weight of net wool was 50000kg (permission +/-15%), unit price was net wool US$3/kg, dampness rate was 16% according to IWTO standard, CNF Yantai, China. The purchase contract also stipulated: the place of production of goods was South America, period of shipment was May-June of 1998, the port of destination was Yantai, China. Goods should be press-packed and baled as per export packing instruction (container transportation). In addition, annotation to the two contracts recorded: “according to the shipping route nominated by the seller on which the ship ‘PICTOR CHALLENGER’s voyage No.0006B should sail, the goods under these contract will go through two ports, viz. Singapore and Pusan before they reach Yantai. The seller was responsible for shipping the above mentioned goods to Pusan in 60 days at most, the period of transshipment at Pusan shall not exceed 10 days.” After that, ADILAN S.A. put the raw wool bought from FOWLER Co. (hereinafter referred to as Fowler) into 180 polythene bales which were press-packed according to the contract standard, loaded the goods on to PICTOR CHALLENGER owned by P&O at Buenos Aires port in Argentina, separately packing them into three 40 ft containers. Agencia Maritime Dodero S.A.—the agent of P&O at Montevideo, signed and issued bill of lading No.BUEFR241 on behalf of P&O, and collected US$3450 for freight from ADILAN S.A. The bill of lading indicated: consignor: Fowler; consignee: to order; port of discharge: Yantai, China; goods: raw wool from South America contained in three 40 ft containers separately marked FL 3M 27MC, FL18 29/31MC and FL17 29/31MC; the numbers of the containers were NDLU400240—7, POCU117981—8 and TRIU537178—0. ADILAN S.A. held the bill of lading after Fowler transferred it by means of endorsement in blank, it then handed it over to China Textile. Before the above mentioned goods were loaded on board, ETI Lab Wool Laboratory (an independent wool laboratory in Argentina, member of International Wool Inspection Organization) made a survey of the goods and produced three survey certificates respectively and one certificate of quality. The three survey certificates stated respectively as follows: gross weight of raw wool marked FL 3M 27MC: 22048 kilos, net weight: 21868 kilos, average content: 1.11 percent, average thinness: 27.5 micron, net wool rate: 61.71 percent; gross weight of raw wool marked FL18 29/31MC: 25180 kilos, net weight: 25000 kilos, average content: 1.03 percent, average thinness: 29.8 micron, net wool rate: 59.55 percent; gross weight of raw wool marked FL17 29/31MC: 25180 kilos, net weight: 2500 kilos, average content: 1.26 percent, average thinness: 29.8 micron, net wool rate: 57.97 percent. The quality inspection certificates specified: gross weight of the raw wool: 72408 kilos, net weight: 71868 kilos, fiber average thinness: 29.1 micron, fiber extensity coefficient: minimum 15 grams, maximum 45 grams, average coefficient: 24.5 grams. Inspection of the humidity of raw wool indicated that the commodity was in completely normal condition and conformed to quality standard of raw wool, that there was not any sign of brittleness and mildew. The goods under bill of lading No BUEFR 241 were originally destined for Yantai, China after transshipment at Singapore. Because the employee of P&O at the transshipment port (Singapore) wrote Yantai as Yantian by mistake, the goods were erroneously transported to Yantian, China (in Shenzhen) by P&O’s NEDLLOYD TOKYO voyage No. EN29 on July 20, 1998, and unloaded there on July 21. The office of P&O Nedlloyd B.V. in Shenzhen notified Hua Hong Company--the agent of ADILAN S.A. in China--of the wrong shipment on September 3, 1998. P&O applied to Dapeng Customs of Shenzhen for transshipment. As wool was a commodity subject to import license, Dapeng Customs required checking the duly issued import certificate of the goods. P&O asked ADILAN S.A. to provide the legitimate import certificate. As the goods suffered a long delay before arriving at the port of destination, China Textile and ADILAN S.A. agreed to rescind contracts No 98 RIK—007UY and No. 98 RIK—008UY. ADILAN S.A. agreed to compensate China Textile for the losses arising from the suspension of production and to pay the big difference in purchase prices of raw materials between that paid under purchase contract and the one paid for urgent purchase. As the bill of lading had been returned to ADILAN S.A, ADILAN S.A. could not provide the import license to P&O within the prescribed time. Later, ADILAN S.A. borrowed an import license from some other company, and Dapeng Customs approved the transshipment of the goods at the end of September. On Oct.11, the goods were transported to Yantai by the ship ZIYULAN, voyage No.544. On November 23, 1998, ADILAN S.A. and China Textile signed two new purchase contracts: contract No 98RIK---007 UYB and contract No 98RIK---008 UYA pertaining to the raw wool already arrived at Yantai. The unit price of the goods was amended as: net wool U.S.$ 1/kilo under contract 98RIK----007UYB, net wool U.S.$ 1.23/kilo under contract 98RIK----008UYB. On December 23 and 24, under the authorization of China Textile, the port of Yantai and International Logistics and Cold Storage Co.,Ltd. respectively took delivery of the goods stowed in the three 40ft containers. The containers were unpacked, and the goods were transported to Beijing Nankou railway station by railway. On January 4, 1999, the goods reached Nankou railway station, Beijing. On behalf of China Textile, Beijing Tuo Pu Wool & Textile Co., Ltd. transported the goods to its own warehouse. During the period from unpacking at Yantai to the time of warehousing in Beijing Tuo Pu Co., Ltd., the evidence provided by Yantai port, International Logistics and Cold Storage Co., Beijing Nankou railway station and Beijing Tuo Pu Co., Ltd. indicated that the packing was good, with no sign of damage, not damaged by rain, and ventilation of the warehouse was good. On Jan.20, 1999, Beijing Import and Export Commodity Inspection Bureau made a survey of the goods at the warehouse of Beijing Tuo Pu Co., Ltd., weighed the damaged wool separated and selected from the raw wool, and produced survey report and survey notification sheet. The result of inspection was as follows: net weight of the raw wool under contract No98RIK—007UYB: 22407 kilos; invoice net wool rate: 55.66 percent; net wool rate after inspection and acceptance: 59.22 percent; net wool weight: 13269 kilos, average thinness: 26.8 micron; net weight of the raw wool under contract 98RIK—008UYB: 49183 kilos; invoice net wool rate: 55.65 percent; net wool rate after inspection and acceptance: 60.04 percent; net wool weight: 29529 kilos. The raw wool under the two contracts was damaged by water, the goods were covered tightly and soaked by rain for a long time, so the extensity diminished, and was unfit for normal use. The coefficient of extensity of the raw wool under contracts 98RIK---007UYB and 98RIK---008UYA respectively reduced to 7.7 grams and 8.1 grams (normal extensity should be 23.1 grams at least). 17.54 percent of the raw wool (3836 kilos) and 17.8 percent of the raw wool (8900 kilos) respectively became mildewed and unfit for use. On January 15, 1999, China Textile and ADILAN S.A. entered into a supplement agreement in respect of the two purchase contracts No. 98RIK---007UYB and No.98 RIK---008UYA. The parties agreed: (1) as per the final result of commodity inspection, China Textile should not pay for the mildewed and rotten wool while ADILAN S.A. was to be responsible on its own; (2) as to the remainder, because its extensity was diminished and it was rotten, with no possibility of spinning, and little demand from the customers, also the price was very low. China Textile may help ADILAN S.A. to sell it on the principle of assisting ADILAN S.A. to reduce loss in a friendly way, but China Textile was not responsible for the loss arising from lower selling price than the contract price. Finally the price fixed between China Textile and ADILAN S.A. was in conformity with that at which China Textile sells such wool to the purchasers. As the sale price was calculated in RMB, China Textile would pay ADILAN S.A. US dollars at the exchange rate of 8.3 after deduction of customers duty and value added tax, but the lowest price paid by China Textile to ADILAN S.A. should not be lower than US$ 0.4/kilo; (3) the term of payment was the same as that under the sales contract between China Textile and the users. (4) the freight rate, sorting fee, packing fee, road transport freight, charge for commodity inspection and port charges were all for ADILAN S.A.'s account . On January 18, 1999, China Textile (supplier) and Beijing Ke-Te Industrial Development Company (buyer) signed a purchase contract on industrial and mineral products(No. 99XSHT001). The contract stipulated: for the raw wool to be used to produce low-grade rough textile, quality was subject to the confirmation of the buyer after checking the bulk, the supplier was responsible for the mildewed and rotten wool (subject to result of inspection by Beijing Commodity Inspection Bureau). The price of this portion of wool was fixed on the basis of bulk: RMB 5.2 per kilo (net wool), payment was to be made ten months after taking delivery, the supplier agreed to bear the separation and selection fee, repacking fee and charge for commodity inspection. On March 23, Beijing Ke Te Industrial Development Company received 59132 kilos of wool transported from China Textile. The court also found out that in January 1999, on behalf of ADILAN S.A., with respect to the wool involved in this case, Beijing Sida Wool and Textile Import and Export Company made inquiries to Beijing Qiu Zi Trade company, Beijing Hua Hong Science and Trade Center, Beijing Tuo Pu Wool Textile Co., Ltd., Beijing Ke Te Industrial Development Company respectively. The replies of the above mentioned companies were that they thought that it was impossible for the raw wool to be used for spinning, and it could only be used as waste material. Beijing Qu zi Trade Company was not willing to buy, while Beijing Hua Hong Science and Trade Center offered RMB900---1200 Yuan per ton, Beijing Tuo pu Wool & Textile Co. Ltd. assessed the price of the wool at about RMB3000 per ton, Beijing Ke Te Industrial Development Company showed willingness to buy, but the price was subject to face-to-face talk. The court also found out: The invoices used by the owner of the goods for declaration to the Customs showed the price was fixed on the basis of contract No98RIK----008UYA and net wool rate of 55.65 percent. But RMB7624.42 Yuan for Customs duties was levied by the Customs of Yantai on the owner of the goods on the basis of the price assessed by the Customs (about net wool US$2.3 per kilo) and value added tax of RMB100174.23 Yuan was levied. The following expenses also incurred from the time when the original wool was transported to Yantai port to the time the goods were sold to Beijing Ke Te Industrial Development Company: overdue Customs declaration fee RMB6324 Yuan, various port charges RMB7480.30 Yuan, rail freight RMB15200 Yuan, road freight RNB10800 Yuan, charge for commodity inspection RMB1060 Yuan, sorting fee RMB143736 Yuan, repacking fee RMB43120.80 Yuan. The invoice for sorting fee and repacking fee indicated this expense was paid by Beijing Ke Te Industrial Development Company on April 2, 1999, the invoice for other expenses showed that the payer was China Textile. On December 14,1998, on behalf of P&O Nedlloyd B.V., Shanghai Branch of Hong Kong Shanghai HSBS provided a guarantee of maximum amount of US$350000 to ADILAN S.A. with respect to the compensation for damage to the goods in the three 40ft containers under the bill of lading NoBUEFR241. The term of validity was from December 14, 1998 to December 13,1999. Later the term of validity was extended for one year. The documents provided by Shenzhen Meteorological Service Co. Ltd. proved: in the last 10 day period of July in Shenzhen, the average temperature was 30.7 degrees centigrade, average relative humidity 74 percent; in the first ten day period of August, the average temperature was 30.3 degrees Centigrade, relative humidity 74 percent; in the middle ten day period of August the average temperature was 29 degrees Centigrade, relative humidity 76 percent; in the last ten day period of August, the average temperature was 29 degrees Centigrade, relative humidity 81 percent; in the first ten day period of September, the average temperature was 27.7 degrees Centigrade, relative humidity 84 percent; in the middle ten day period of September, the average temperature was 28.3 degrees Centigrade, relative humidity 74 percent; in the last ten day period of September, the average temperature was 28 degrees Centigrade, relative humidity 66 percent. In addition, ADILAN S.A. claimed that it had paid the attorney fee in the amount of RMB50000 Yuan for the case, but didn’t receive relevant evidence. The existing evidence showed that P&O Nedlloyd B.V. said in a letter sent to Shenzhen Dapeng Customs that the consignor had formally filed a claim. This was the earliest record about the time when ADILAN S.A. lodged a claim. The facts set forth above were proved by the following evidential documents and the court affirmed them: 1. The purchase contracts No.98RIK---007UY and 98 RIK---008UY, agreement on cancellation of these contracts, contracts No.98RIK---007URB and 98RIK---008UYA, and supplement agreement, indicating the contractual relationship between ADILAN S.A. and the buyer of wool; 2. Bill of lading UEFR241, invoice of freight collected by Agencia Maritima Dodero S.A, and the certificate produced by Fowler S.A. showing the contractual relationship between ADILAN S.A. and P&O; 3. Reference and inspection certificate by Etilab Wool Laboratory, notice of commodity inspection by Beijing Import and Export Commodity Inspection Bureau and its report, illustrating the commodity inspection of import and export of the goods. 4. Correspondence and faxes between the two parties, relevant letters of P&O collected by the court of first instance from Dapeng Customs, delivery order, records of delivery and Customs declaration: all showing the fact that the carrier P&O, by mistake, transported the goods to Yantian, rather than Yantai. They also showed the situation regarding declaration at Customs and taking delivery of the goods by the consignee. 5. Evidence provided by the port of Yantai and International logistics and Cold Storage Co., Ltd. proving the situation of the goods from the time of delivery to commodity inspection. 6. Certificate of receipt of the goods by Beijing Ke Te Industrial Development Company and the contract between China Textile and the former, showing the final result of sale of the wool. 7. Reply by Beijing Hua Hong Science and Trade Center to the fax of Beijing Si Da Wool & Textile Import and Export Company, showing the inquiries about the price of the wool after the damage. 8. Customs duty, special V.A.T payment receipt, Customs receipt for penalty for overdue declaration, commodity inspection fee, rail and road transportation fee, invoice for port charges and sundry expenses and invoice for sorting and bale packing fees respectively indicating the payment of duties and expenses. 9. Letter of guarantee issued by Shanghai Branch of Hong Kong Shanghai HSBS evidencing the guarantee provided by P&O shipping company for P&O Nedlloyd B.V.. 10. Relevant meteorological records and documents by Shenzhen Meteorological Service Co., Ltd., indicating the climate conditions from July 21, 1998 to the end of September, 1998. The court of first instance held: This case was about a foreign-related transportation contract dispute. Although the contract was signed abroad and the overleaf clauses of the bill of lading issued by P&O stipulated that settlement of disputes arising from the bill of lading should be under the jurisdiction of English law, the place of destination stated in the contract was in China, and one of the defendants, P&O shipping company as an enterprise, was a Chinese legal person. ADILAN S.A. filed a lawsuit before this court not basing on the bill of lading issued by P&O. Both ADILAN S.A. and P&O Nedlloyd B.V. claimed their rights on the basis of Chinese law during the litigation. So the settlement of dispute under this contract should be under the jurisdiction of the law of China to which the contract was most closely connected. According to the relevant provisions of the Maritime Code of the PRC, ADILAN S.A. booked space with P&O for shipping the goods and paid freight, therefore P&O Nedlloyd B.V. was the carrier and ADILAN S.A. the consignor. The two parties thus established the relationship of the contract of carriage. Fowler Company was no more than the deliverer of the goods to the carrier during the performance of the transportation contract. As the dispute occurred during the performance of the contract, ADILAN S.A. brought an action according to the contract as an appropriate party to this case. During the performance of the contract of carriage, the goods were originally destined for the port of Yantai after transshipment at Singapore. Because of the negligence on the part of P&O, the goods were carried to Yantian after transshipment. The act of carrying the goods to a wrong port of destination by P&O Nedlloyd B.V. constituted the breach of contract. P&O Nedlloyd B.V. should be held liable for the breach of contract. Although P&O Nedlloyd B.V. transported the goods to the port of destination through a good deal of efforts after discovering the mistaken transportation, P&O Nedlloyd B.V. should still be responsible for the loss caused thereby. The allegation of ADILAN S.A. that the act of the carrier constituted an unreasonable deviation was not correct, for in legal sense unreasonable deviation must be an intentional act of the carrier, but in this case, the wrong transportation by the carrier was the result of the negligence of the carrier. ADILAN S.A. provided to the court the reports on export commodity inspection and on import commodity inspection which proved the wrong transportation led to the damage to the goods. From the perspective of evidence the export and import commodity inspection reports were genuine. There was no evidence showing that ADILAN S.A. counterfeited the reports for the sake of litigation, but because of the fact that the goods involved in the case were loaded onto the ship of the carrier on June 10, 1998, and on November 24, 1998, the consignee took delivery of the goods, then the consignee transported the goods to Beijing, and, on January 20, 1999 the goods went through commodity inspection, so the following questions arose which became the focal points of dispute between the two parties: firstly, whether or not the goods under import commodity inspection were the goods transported by the carrier? Secondly, whether or not it was reasonable for the goods to be inspected in Beijing rather than in the port of destination Yantai? Thirdly, after a long time of transportation and storage, whether or not the carrier should be entirely responsible for the damage to the goods? For the first question, the inspection report of the foreign professional wool inspection institution proved the goods (raw wool) were in entirely normal condition, up to quality standards, and had no sign of brittleness and mildew. But after the goods were transported to Yantai from Argentina, the owner of the goods transported it from Yantai to Beijing of his own accord. Beijing Import and Export Commodity Inspection bureau tested and confirmed that the goods were damaged by water and covered tightly and soaked by rain for a long time, their extensity diminished, rendering them unfit for normal use, and a large portion of the wool became mildewed and unfit for use any more. P&O Nedlloyd B.V. thought that either the goods under import inspection were not the goods involved in the case, or they had quality problem. This position was not well-founded: firstly, evidence proved that although the goods transported went through several ports from taking delivery to commodity inspection, yet the raw wool under inspection and that transported by the carrier were the same goods, so there was no change. Secondly, as the inspection of wool was only sample survey, the result of export inspection and import inspection on wool thinness were not totally identical. What was more, the smaller the thinness, the better the quality. Therefore, for the same kind of wool, the fact that the wool proved to be thinner under import inspection than that under export inspection should not be used to explain that the wool under such inspections was not the same, nor could it show that the wool was not up to the requirements under the contract. Thirdly, as the raw wool was primary product of wool unwashed, with various oil stains on it, the findings of survey on one item of wool quality was inherent in normal wool itself, and should not be used to show the goods had serious quality problems. Lastly, the defendant did not provide sufficient proof in respect of the position as he put forward, so the position was only conjectural, and without basis . On the second question, the reason for the goods involved in this case being inspected in Beijing where the owner of the goods was located rather than the port of discharge Yantai, was due to the particular character of the wool: firstly, raw wool must be press-packed for transportation in containers, when the port of discharge was not the place where the consignee was located, and if the bales were unpacked for inspection at the port of discharge, it would cause great inconvenience for later transportation of the goods. Secondly, the goods must be transported to Beijing in original package form and subject to quarantine at the specially designated factory under the approval and examination of National Bureau for Quarantine of Animals and Plants. Thirdly, the goods were registered with the commodity inspection agency, and the agency agreed to have the goods inspected in Beijing . Therefore it was reasonable for the goods to be inspected in Beijing. This was not in violation of the relevant regulations. The result of survey of Beijing Import and Export Commodity Inspection Bureau provided by ADILAN S.A. should be used as the basis on which the case was to be decided. On the third question, although the report didn’t indicate what caused the damage to the goods, yet, considering wool’s nature of absorbing moisture and hosting a lot of microbes in raw wool (unwashed wool), the raw wool began to deteriorate after it was transported to Yantian by mistake. Because the wool stowed in containers was put in open air at Yantian for 80 days when it was just in the season of high temperature and high humidity, and under such climate conditions, wool absorbed moisture from the air easily, and promoted reproduction of microbes, and so the wool began to deteriorate. The carrier should be responsible entirely for the loss. The reasons were as follows: The transportation of the goods to wrong port of destination and the failure to notify ADILAN S.A. of the situation in time by the carrier compelled ADILAN S.A. to cancel the contract with the buyer, as a result, ADILAN S.A. could not provide the wool import license to the Customs in time after it had known of the wrong shipment. So the carrier should be held liable from the time the goods were shipped to Yantian by mistake (July 7, 1998) to the time of carrying them from Yantian to Yantai (October 11). Based on the fact of long period of transportation and storage of the goods, professional people could presume by common sense that the goods had deteriorated. In addition, import license was required in order to purchase the wool, and this resulted in ADILAN S.A.’s failure to find new buyers soon after canceling the contract. So the carrier should be responsible for what happened durig the time from which the goods arrived at Yantai till the signing of the new trade contract between ADILAN S.A. and China Textile (November 23). On November 24, ADILAN S.A. applied to the Customs for declaration. ADILAN S.A. didn't get permission to take delivery of the goods until December 23. There was no evidence that the delay attributed to the owner of the goods occurred during that period, so this was a reasonable and necessary period for which the carrier should also be responsible. As stated above, it was reasonable to transport the goods to Beijing for inspection. Furthermore, there was evidence that the goods were not obviously delayed, the packing of the goods was unchanged, and there was no damage to the goods from the time of delivery, transportation by rail and road to the packing up of the damaged wool and inspection. Therefore the carrier should be responsible for the final consequence of damage. Of course, damage to the wool was related to its properties to some extent, but if the goods had not been wrongly transported and placed and stored for a long time (mostly under high temperature and high humidity), the damage wouldn't have occurred under normal transportation and standard of packing required.Therefore, legally speaking there existed a causation between the damage to the goods and the act of wrong transportation by the carrier, but not between the damage to the goods and the inherent nature of wool. According to article 55 of the Maritime Code of the RPC, the carrier, P&O Nedlloyd B.V. should compensate ADILAN S.A. for the loss of the goods pursuant to the difference between the actual values of the goods before and after the damage, where the actual value of the goods before damage was US$1157243 calculated on the basis of the trade contract between ADILAN S.A. and China Textile as well as net wool rate of 55.65 percent quoted by ADILAN S.A. As the goods were damaged during the course of transportation, part of it suffered total loss, the rest had to be sold at a reduced price. The damaged wool was sold at the price of RMB307,486.40 based on the agreement reached between ADILAN S.A. and China Textile on January 15, 1999 and the sales contract between China Textile and Beijing Ke Te Industrial Development Company. Considering this portion of the wool had virtually become wasted wool after serious damage, the court held that it was reasonable that the wool should have been sold at the price of RMB5.2 per kilo at last, the amount sold could be taken as the basis on which the actual value of the goods after damage was to be calculated, so the difference between the actual values before and after the damage was RMB650699.23. ADILAN S.A. requested to calculate the loss in RMB after investigation, and, on August 18, 2000, the mean rate of exchange between US$ dollars and RMB promulgated by State Foreign Exchange Administration was US$100 to RMB827.99 Yuan. The actual value of the goods before the damage was RMB958185.63 Yuan. The carrier P&O Nedlloyd B.V. should be liable for the loss and interest (starting from September 21, 1998). As damage happened to the wool, it was necessary to separate and sort out the mildewed and rotten wool and repack the bales, only by doing so could the wool be sold out, so RMB143736 Yuan for separating and sorting fees and RMB43120. 80 Yuan for repacking fee were also the losses resulting from the wrong transportation by the carrier. Although the invoices for separating and sorting fees and repacking fee indicated that the payer was Beijing Ke Te Industrial Development Company, ADILAN S.A. already undertook the expenses based on the agreement on January15, 1999 between ADILAN S.A. and China Textile and the sale contract on Jan.18, 1999 between China Textile and Beijing Ke Te Industrial Development Company. According to the relevant provisions of 《the General Principles of the Civil Law of the PRC》, P&O Nedlloyd B.V. should pay the expenses and interest (starting from April 3, 1997). ADILAN S.A.'s request for the compensation for the attorney fee was reasonable according to the relevant provisions of the 《Administrative Regulations for Charging Fees by Lawyers and the Rates Thereof》and the 《General Principles of the Civil Law of the PRC》. P&O should pay RMB30000 Yuan for attorney fee. As to ADILAN S.A.’s other requests, this court does not give its support. First, as wool was an item of import commodity subject to inspection under law, commodity inspection should be carried out, and inspection fee should be paid whether damage happened or not. Secondly, Customs duty, value added tax, port charges, rail and road freight arising from the wool had no cause and effect relationship with the carrier’s wrong transportation. Although ADILAN S.A. and the owner of the goods agreed that these expenses should ultimately be for ADILAN S.A.’s own account, this was nothing more than an undertaking by ADILAN S.A. to the buyer, while the carrier did not have the obligation to pay. Thirdly, the overdue Customs declaration fee was related to the wrong transportation by the carrier, the fee was paid by China Textile, not by ADILAN S.A.. Therefore ADILAN S.A had no right to request the fee. Lastly, as to the loss caused by the suspension of production, ADILAN S.A. did not provide evidence in support of its request, and, on the other hand, a maritime cargo carrier was not in a position to foresee that damage would happen to ADILAN S.A., so the carrier should not pay for such loss. In the course of settling the dispute, with respect to ADILAN S.A.’s claim, P&O Shipping Company provided a guarantee to ADILAN S.A. through the bank. Therefore, within the valid term of the guarantee, the defendants P&O Shipping Company and P&O Nedlloyd B.V. undertook joint and several liability for the loss. Pursuant to article 269 and article 55 of the Maritime Code of the PRC and article 111 of the General Principles of the Civil Law of the PRC, this court decides as follows: (1) P&O (NEDLLOYD B. V.) should compensate ADILAN S.A. for the following losses within 15 days after the judgment becomes effective: RMB650,699.23 Yuan for cargo damage, together with interest calculated on the basis of the loan interest rate of the corresponding period issued by the People’s Bank of China;attorney fee in the amount of RMB30000 Yuan; separation and sorting fees, plus packing fee in the total amount of RMB 186856.80 Yuan; (2)P&O China Shipping Company and P&O NEDLLOYD B. V. should undertake joint and several liability within the valid term of the guarantee for ADILAN S.A.’s losses; (3) dismiss the other claims of ADILAN S.A. The legal cost in respect of this case being RMB20384 Yuan, of which P&O Shipping Company should pay RMB 9886 Yuan, while ADILAN S.A. should pay RMB10498 Yuan. P&O Nedlloyd B.V. refused to accept the decision of the first instance trial, and made an appellate alleging: (1) ADILAN S.A. was not the consignor under the contract of carriage. The bill of lading evidencing the contract of carriage involved in this case specified clearly that the consignor was FOWLER Company, the place of issue was Buenos Aires. The facts affirmed by the court of first instance that ADILAN S.A. bought the raw wool from FOWER company, that the place of issue of bill of lading was Montevideo, and that ADILAN S.A. had already paid freight when China Textile handed the bill of lading back to ADILAN S.A., were all allegations without being supported by evidence. The bill of lading had only the endorsement of FOWLER company. The consignor should be FOWLER company, rather than ADILAN S.A.. The court should dismiss the appellate or dismiss its claims. (2) ADILAN S.A. counterfeited the contracts No98RIK---007UY and 98RIK---088UY between ADILAN S.A. and China textile for the sake of bringing an action. (3) It was the consignee rather than the consignor who had the right to lodge the claim against the carrier for the damage occurred in the course of carriage of goods by sea, and China Textile was the consignee. If the consignor wished to assign its rights and obligations to ADILAN S.A., it should first obtain the consent of the carrier, otherwise the assignment should not be binding on the carrier. (4) The wrong shipment of the goods in this case delayed the time of transportation but the delayed time was not the sole and necessary cause of loss of goods, the immediate cause of the damage to the goods was the particular nature and inherent defects of the goods. Pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Maritime Code, the carrier is not responsible for the loss of the goods arising from its particular nature and inherent defects. Moreover, the fact that the consignee’s delay in submitting import license to the Customs prevented the goods from being transported out of Shenzhen in good time. The delay of the consignee in getting the goods inspected and properly handled was also one of reasons causing the damage to the goods. (5) The consignee did not give a notice of claim to P&O Nedlloyd B.V. in time after receiving the goods. (6) The judgment of the court of first instance ordering P&O Nedlloyd B.V. to pay the attorney fee of the opposing party was not supported by strong evidence. P&O Nedlloyd B.V. requested the court of second instance to vacate that judgment, dismiss ADILAN S.A.’s appellate or its claims. P&O Shipping Company refused to accept the judgment of the court of first instance, P&O Nedlloyd B.V. made an appellate and alleged: P&O Shipping Co. was the agent of the carrier P&O in China, ADILAN S.A. ought to take legal action against the carrier whose name was indicated in the contract, and to sue P&O Shipping was obviously incorrect. In addition, before the lawsuit, ADILAN S.A. wanted P&O Shipping to provide bank guarantee in order to avoid further losses, P&O Shipping provided a guarantee to ADILAN S.A. but the provider of the guarantee was a bank. The court of first instance regarded P&O Shipping as the guarantor and decided that P&O Shipping undertake joint and several liability. This was mistaken. The court of second instance was requested to vacate the judgment of the court of first instance, dismiss ADILAN S.A.’s appeal or dismiss its claims. The Respondent ADILAN S.A. argued: (1) ADILAN S.A. was the consignor of the goods in this case, and gave P&O Nedlloyd B.V. an instruction to book space, stating ADILAN S.A.’s requirements with regard to the contents of the bill of lading and paid freight right. The listing of FOWLER as a consignor was at the request of ADILAN S.A., which did not affect the status of ADILAN S.A. as the consignor to book space. ADILAN S.A. became the consignee after the goods were wrongly transported. The bill of lading in this case was one endorsed in blank, thus it could be negotiated after endorsement. This meant that the holder of the bill of lading was the consignee. In this case, after the goods had left the port of shipment, FOWLER handed the bill of lading over to ADILAN S.A., ADILAN S.A. delivered the bill of lading to China Textile. As the goods could not arrive at the port in time, China Textile and ADILAN S.A. cancelled the contract, the bill of lading was returned to ADILAN S.A. Thereafter ADILAN S.A. was all along the holder of this bill of lading, until ADILAN S.A. once again handed the bill of lading to China Textile in order to go through the formalities for delivery. After P&O Nedlloyd B.V. had transported the goods to a wrong destination port, it was ADILAN S.A. who had gone to Shenzhen with the original bill of lading and coordinated with the Customs and carried on negotiations with P&O. Nedlloyd B.V. The selling of the damaged goods to China Textile by ADILAN S.A. was an act of the holder of bill of lading to dispose of the damaged goods. So ADILAN S.A. should not be deprived of the right to lodge claims against the carrier. (3) the action of wrong transportation by P&O Nedlloyd B.V. was the fundamental cause of the damage to the goods. After such erroneous transportation, P&O Nedlloyd B.V. didn't rectify the mistake in time, so the goods were held up at Yantian port for over 70 days exposing to strong sunshine and high temperature, finally resulting in the damage. Inspection of the goods in Beijing was entirely in conformity with the provisions of law. (4) the negligence of the carrier was gross which was not within the scope of exemption from the liability of the carrier as prescribed by law. ADILAN S.A. requested the court of appeal to uphold the judgment of the court of first instance. This court held that the case was a dispute arising from a claim of damage to goods carried by sea resulting from the carrier’s wrong shipment. Although the overleaf clauses of the bill of lading issued by P&O Nedlloyd B.V. stipulated that the Law of the U.K. shall apply to the settlement of disputes arising from the bill of lading, yet the port of destination stated in the contract was in China. One of the appellants, P&O Shipping Company, was a Chinese legal person, ADILAN S.A. and P&O Nedlloyd B.V. claimed their rights on the basis of Chinese law. Therefore, the court of first instance’s finding that Chinese law was applicable to this case was correct in that the contract was most closely connected with the law of China. The main issues of dispute in this case were as follows: whether or not ADILAN S.A. was the consignor under the contract of carriage? Whether or not there was a contractual relationship between ADILAN S.A. and FOWLER arising from the sales contract? Whether or not ADILAN S.A. was the legal holder of the bill of lading and had right to claim damages against the carrier? What was the reason of the damage to the goods? Whether or not ADILAN S.A. had notified P&O Nedlloyd B.V. in time of the situation of the damaged goods, and whether P&O Shipping Company should take joint and several liability with P&O Nedlloyd B.V. for the losses of ADILAN S.A.? On the issue of whether ADILAN S.A. was the consignor under the contract of carriage and its relationship with FOWLER, the fact was that the consignor under the bill of lading in this case was FOWLER, the consignee was to order, ADILAN S.A. held the bill of lading after FOWLER's endorsement in blank. FOWLER and ADILAN S.A. both recognized that there was a contractual relationship on the sale of raw wool between them. Judging from the purchase contract signed by ADILAN S.A. and China Textile, ADILAN S.A. was the supplier to China Textile, rather than FOWLER. The freight was paid to the carrier by ADILAN S.A. directly, FOWLER did not pay the freight. In the box for inserting the name of the actual consignor under the Bill of Lading, the carrier wrote the name of FOWLER with the consent of ADILAN S.A. The letter sent by FOWLER to ADILAN S.A. on June 15, 2000 proved that FOWLER had sold the wool involved in this case to ADILAN S.A. on F.O.B. term, and proved that matters regarding booking space for the wool involved in this case were arranged by ADILAN S.A., not FOWLER.i According to the relevant provisions in the Maritime Code of the PRC, consignor was not limited to the one inserted in the B/L. ADILAN S.A. booked space with P&O Nedlloyd B.V. and transported the goods and paid freight. P&O Nedlloyd B.V. transported the goods from Argentina to China and collected the freight from ADILAN S.A., the two sides had established contractual relationship of carriage of goods by sea. ADILAN S.A. was the consignor of the contract. Its bringing an action against the carrier P&O Nedlloyd B.V. was legally well-founded. P&O Nedlloyd B.V.’s denial of the existence of contractual relationship between ADILAN S.A. and FOWLER was not in conformity with fact, so this court does not support its view. On the issue of whether ADILAN S.A. was the legal holder of the bill of lading and had the right to claim against the carrier, as the holder of the bill of lading endorsed in blank, the buyer in the contract ADILAN S.A. gave the bill to China Textile. Because China Textile could not receive the goods under the bill of lading in time (due to shipment to wrong port of destination by P&O Nedlloyd B.V.), it had to cancel the contract with ADILAN S.A. after the holding of bill of lading, and return the bill of lading to ADILAN S.A. According to the nature of the bill of lading, once the bill of lading endorsed in blank was negotiated through endorsement, any one legally in possession of such bill of lading was the legal holder of and has the right to take delivery of the goods against presentation of the bill of lading. Under the circumstances where China Textile could not receive the goods in time, China Textile's act of returning the bill of lading to ADILAN S.A. was not in breach of the provisions of law. Even judging from the nature of an endorsed bill of lading, China Textile didn’t have the obligation to notify the carrier of its returning the bill of lading to ADILAN S.A. before doing so. The view of P&O Nedlloyd B.V. that the returning of the bill of lading to ADILAN S.A. by China Textile was null and void was in lack of proper legal basis. ADILAN S.A. was the legal holder of the bill of lading, so it had the right to claim against the carrier with respect to the damage happened to the goods under the bill of lading it possessed. On the issue of the reason for the damage to the goods and whether ADILAN S.A. had notified P&O Nedlloyd B.V. of the damage in time, P&O Nedlloyd B.V. attributed the primary reason for the damage of the goods to the inherent defects of wool. P&O Nedlloyd B.V. did not think the damage was due to the delay caused by the shipment to the wrong port of destination. In addition, after the carriage to the wrong port of destination, ADILAN S.A. didn’t provide the import license to the Customs in due time and delayed in carrying the goods back, so P&O Nedlloyd B.V. should be exempt from liability. Objectively wool is apt to absorb moisture by nature, therefore slight change of quality may occur under certain conditions. But the wool under this case was surveyed by the inspection agency which showed part of the wool was completely damaged, the rest deteriorated. According to the established fact, because of the wrong transportation to Yantian by the carrier P&O Nedlloyd B.V., the wool hitherto stowed in the containers was placed in the open air for about 80 days at Yantian, and it was just the season of high temperature and high humidity. Under such climate conditions, wool absorbed moisture from the air and promoted its reproduction of microbes, so the wool began to deteriorate. The transportation to a wrong port of destination and failure to notify ADILAN S.A. of the situation in time by the carrier compelled ADILAN S.A. to cancel the contract with the buyer. This resulted in ADILAN S.A.’s inability to provide the wool import license to the Customs in time, so the carrier should be held liable for the losses incurred during this period of time. On the issue of whether P&O Shipping Company should take joint and several liability with P&O Nedlloyd B.V. for ADILAN S.A.’s losses, at the request of P&O Shipping Company, Shanghai Branch of HSBS Hong Kong provided a guarantee of a maximum amount of US$350000 to ADILAN S.A. The guarantee was clear in that P&O Shipping Co. and P&O Nedlloyd B.V. should be jointly and severally liable to ADILAN S.A. for compensation within the term of the said guarantee. This court does not accept the argument of P&O Shipping that it should not be a party to this case, as the said argument was not well- founded. In summery, during the performance of the contract, P&O Nedlloyd B.V., because of its negligence, transported the goods to a wrong destination by mistake, as a result the goods was seriously damaged. P&O Nedlloyd B.V. should be responsible for all losses. The argument of P&O Nedlloyd B.V. that the main reason for damage to the goods was caused by the nature of the product and that it should not undertake the responsibility was without merit. This court doesn’t give its support to such argument. The arguments of the appellant made at this appeal were without merit. In the judgment of the court of first instance the finding of facts was clear, and the application of law was correct. According to Clause 1 of Article 153 of the Civil Procedure law of the PRC, this court decides as follows: The judgment of the court of first instance is affirmed, and the appeal of the appellant is rejected. The cost for this appeal, in the amount of RMB20384, shall be borne by P&O Nedlloyd B.V. and P&O Shipping Company. This judgment is final. Presiding judge: Sun Danyi Acting judge: Zhao Tong Acting judge: YU Quan Nov.27, 2001 Certified true copy Acting Clerk: Zhao Man
  • Ye Hai-Guo v. Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau

    2004-03-16

    SHANGHAI MARITIME COURT PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGMENT No.hu hai fa xing chu 1(2001) Plaintiff: Ye Hai-Guo, born on March16,1963, of Han nationality, ID No:330921196303160015, Domicile: Village No.1, Gaoting Town, Daishan County, Zhejiang Province, China. Agent ad litem: Ma Guo-Hai, attorney-at-law of Zhejiang Minhong Law Office Agent ad litem: Shi Feng, attorney-at-law of Shanghai Shangda Law Office. Defendant: Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau, the People’s Republic of China Domicile: No. 190, Si Ping Road, Shanghai Legal Representative: Wang Zhi-Yi, Head of Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau Agent ad litem: Li Lin-Jie, officer of Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau Agent ad litem: Li Da-Ze, officer of Shanghai Maritime Affaires Bureau The Plaintiff, Ye Hai-Guo sued the Defendant before this court on November 26, 2001 on the grounds that he did not agree with Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau about the Maritime Administrative Penalty Decision (No. gang jian fa 1002016 (2001) ) made by the said Bureau on September 6, 2001. This court, after examining the case, registered it on November 29, 2001 and served copy Plaint and Notice to Reaction to the Defendant on November 29, 2001. The Defendant submitted to this court a Defense Statement and part of the evidence on December 11, 2001. This court then formed a collegial bench, and on December 26, 2001 the collegial bench gave a pre-trial directive to both parties and instructed the parties to exchange evidence and to cross-examine the evidence that had been submitted by each party. On January 23, 2002, this cases was publicly tried and those who appeared in court were: the Plaintiff, Ye Hai-Guo and his Agents ad litem, Ma Guo-Hai and Shi Feng; the Defendant, Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau and its Agents ad litem, Li Lin-Jie and Li Da-Zhe. Now the trial of the case has been concluded. The Maritime Administrative Penalty Decision (No.gang jian fa 1002016 (2001) ) made by the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau on September 6, 2001 thus decided: The Plaintiff Ye Hai-Guo steered a ship named “ZHE ZHOU 606” in the sea area near the floating light at the mouth of Yangtze River at 2020 hours on November 30, 2000. He did not steer in due course and failed to do what he could to rescue and command the ship in danger, causing the ship to sink and resulting in a grave accident. The Plaintiff should take full responsibility for this grave accident. The Defendant decided that the Plaintiff’s negligent steering had violated the stipulations of Article 9 of “the Law on Safety of Transportation at Sea of the PRC ”. The Defendant thus decided to impose an administrative penalty on the Plaintiff and to withdraw the Plaintiff’s Certificate of Qualification in accordance with the stipulations of Article 12 Item 2 and Article 58 Item 1 of “the Regulations on Administrative Penalty on Safety Supervision at Sea of the PRC”. The Plaintiff alleged: At 1130 hours on November 28, 2000, m/v ZHE ZHOU 606 was bound for Wenzhou from Dalian with 5,593 tons of cargo on board. At around 2000 hours on November 30, when she was being steered to the sea area near the floating light at the mouth of Yangtze River, she was sunk because of the bad weather and poor sea conditions. The Plaintiff alleged that the shipping company and its executives were liable for the sinking of the ship and this was the fundamental cause of the accident. The Maritime Administrative Penalty Decision (No. gang jian fa 1002016(2001)) made by the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau on September 6, 2001 was groundless and wrong not only in the findings of facts but also in its application of the relevant regulations. Therefore, the Plaintiff claimed to this court to withdraw the said Maritime Administrative Penalty Decision (No. gang jian fa 1002016 (2001) ) made by the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau and to order the Defendant to bear the legal cost. The Defendant argued thus: The Plaintiff as the captain was not a fully qualified one under such bad sea conditions. His capability of being prepared for the emergency was inadequate and the ship under his command was in a state of chaos. Besides, he couldn’t properly foresee the danger and it was too late when he became aware of the imminent danger. Also the poor self-rescue operations and bad command of the ship in danger had contributed to render the ship losing its floatage, thus resulting in its sinking, with nine crew members died and five missing, constituting a grave transportation disaster at sea. What testified to the breach of the relevant regulations by the plaintiff were:a Letter on Forwarding the Investigation Report on the Sinking of m/v.ZHE ZHOU 606 ” by the Maritime Affairs Bureau of the PRC; “Report on Transportation Accident at Sea” by the Plaintiff Ye Hai-Guo; Relevant Data Calculation Report on m/v.ZHE ZHOU 606 and Maritime Accident Investigation Notes. It was only after a series of effort-making, comprehensive, and careful investigations and analyses, that the Defendant made its penalty decision, taking into full consideration of the wrong-doing of the Plaintiff and judging by the principles of law. The Defendant’s decision on penalty was made on the basis of clear facts, conclusive evidence and correct application of law. Therefore, the Defendant claimed to affirm the original Maritime Administrative Penalty Decision made by Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau. During the hearing, the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau submitted the following evidence to substantiate the facts based on which their administrative action was taken: 1. “Weather report on a gale along the sea coast of Shanghai ” on November 11, 2000 by Shanghai Central Observatory on December 6, 2000 and “wind-force record at Dajishan Station” on November 30, 2000 by Shanghai Ocean Conditions Forecast Center under the National Bureau of Oceanography to indicate that there was no force majeure, nor any causation between the climate, sea conditions and the accident; 2. The maritime investigation inquiry notes by an investigation group on the sinking of m/v.ZHE ZHOU 606 on January 3, 2001, to prove that during the course of the accident, the sinking ship was under the control of the Plaintiff Ye Hua-Guo, and the Plaintiff should take full responsibility therefor; 3. A technical data calculation report on m/v.ZHE ZHOU 606 by Zhejiang Ship Surveyors Bureau on February 14, 2001; a “Report on Transportation Accident of ‘ZHE ZHOU 606’ at Sea” submitted to Shanghai Harbour Superintendency by the Plaintiff Ye Hai-Guo on 1400 hours of December 28, 2000; the investigation notes made by the investigation group on the sinking of m/vZHE ZHOU 606 on the basis of the inquiries made to the 4th engineer Jin Yang-Huan, able-body seaman Li Jia-Kai on the said ship on January 4, 2000, January 5, 2000 and December 2, 2000; investigation notes on Ye Hai-Guo at 2046 hours of December 2, 2000 at Chensi Supervision Station under Ninbo Harbour Superintendency, to prove that the Plaintiff, as the captain of the ship, made a wrong judgment, commanded the ship badly, inadequately assessed the danger impending, and lost the chances for rescue operations, thus causing such a grave accident of ship-sinking and loss of lives; 4. On September 4, 2001 the Maritime Affairs Bureau of the PRC issued a “Letter forwarding the Investigation Report on the Sinking of m/v ZHE ZHOU 606”, which was a conclusive report on this accident and was legally binding. The Report testified to the cause of the accident and stated what kind of responsibility the Plaintiff should take; 5. On July13, 2001, the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau made a report on the “Investigation on the sinking of m/v ZHE ZHOU 606” (No.hu hai tong hang 330 (2001) ), showing the process of the investigation. However, this was a confidential report to its senior leadership and should be signed and issued after the confirmation by the senior leadership; 6. The crew list and the Certificate of Minimal Safety Manning Scale of the m/vZHE ZHOU 606, showing the number of crew on board m/v ZHE ZHOU 606 and the actual casualty, and that the manning of the said ship did not come up to the standard laid down in the Certificate of Minimal Safety Manning Scale of the ship; 7. Visa report of m/v ZHE ZHOU 606, showing that the captain was Ye Hai-Guo, chief mate was Mao Wen-Lin, second mate was Wang Jian-Jun, third mate was Xu Da, operator was Xu Da, chief engineer was Zhang Yun-da, second engineer was Fu Zhong-Guo, third engineer was Zhang Ping-Bo and fourth engineer was Jin Yang-Huan, altogether being nine persons, who were not the same as the officers and engineers actually on board. This showed that the Plaintiff did not truthfully make the declaration of the crew list in Dalian. 8. The 24-hour ship communication log on November 30, 2000, to prove that the Plaintiff did not take proper preventive measures when m/v ZHE ZHOU 606 was in danger. 9. The Ship Safety Examination Report at Zhoushan Harbour, Zhejiang on October 30, 2000, to indicate that m/v ZHE ZHOU 606 had safety defects. To the above evidence, the Plaintiff Ye Hai-Guo made his cross-examination as follows: Evidence No.1 . No objection to its authenticity, but it was not relevant, and could not prove that the Plaintiff shall take full responsibility. Evidence No.2. No objection to its authenticity, but the inquiry notes could only serve as a statement of the Plaintiff on the happening of the accident, and could not be treated as the report or conclusion of the supervisory authorities, nor could it be deemed as a foundation to be based on. Besides, such inquiry notes could not prove that the Plaintiff shall take full responsibility. Evidence No.3. No objection to the authenticity of the technical data calculation report for m/vZHE ZHOU 606, but it could not prove that the Plaintiff shall take full responsibility; and no objection to the “Report on Transportation Accident of ‘ZHE ZHOU 606’ at Sea”, but the main points of this report could boil down to a statement of the ship’s condition and a description of the accident. Thus, it could not take the place of accident investigation report, nor could it prove that the Plaintiff shall take full responsibility. There was no objection to the authenticity of the inquiry notes on Jin Yang-Huan, Li Jia-Kai, Huang Song-Guo and the Plaintiff himself, but the contents of these evidence could not prove that the Plaintiff shall take full responsibility, either. Evidence No.4. No objection to the authenticity of the “Letter on Forwarding an Investigation Report on the Sinking of m/vZHE ZHOU 606” issued by the Maritime Affairs Bureau of the PRC. However, the penalty imposed on the Plaintiff shall be based on the report from the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau. The Defendant’s report said this accident was caused by various reasons. Since the investigation and penalty was initiated by the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau, the report made by the initiator shall be taken as the basis. Even so, the penalty imposed by the Maritime Affairs Bureau of the PRC was not justified. The report by the Maritime Affairs Bureau of the PRC decided that the Plaintiff should take direct responsibility instead of full responsibility. In this regard, the Maritime Administrative Penalty Decision was wrong, Evidence No.5. No objection to the authenticity of the report on “Investigation on the sinking of m/v ZHE ZHOU 606” (No.hu hai tong hang 330(2001)) made by the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau on July13, 2001. However, the Penalty shall be based on the causes ascertained in the same report. This report asserted that the said accident was caused by a number of different reasons. The decision made by the Defendant in its Maritime Administrative Penalty Decision was self-contradictory to the causes established by itself. Evidence No.6. No objection to the authenticity, but it was irrelevant. Evidence No.7-9. No objection to the authenticity, but they were irrelevant to this case and could not prove that the Plaintiff shall take full responsibility. The Defendant provided the following ex-officio evidence: Evidence No.10. “Notice on Setting-up Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau of the PRC” by the Ministry of Communications on June 15, 1999 (No.jiao lao fa 292[1999]) Evidence No.11.“Letter of December 26, 2000 by the Ministry of Communications of the PRC on the Investigation Group Heading for Zhoushan to make an Investigation on the Sinking of m/v ZHE ZHOU 606 . Evidence No.12.Articles 3, 42 and 43 of “the Law of the PRC on Transportation Safety at Sea ”. Evidence No.13.Articles 2 and 17 of the “Ordinance on Investigation and Settlement of Transportation Accidents at Sea”, effective from March 3, 1990. Evidence No.14.Article 4 of the “Regulations of the PRC on Administrative Penalties regarding Supervision of Safety on Water (provisional)” issued by the Ministry of Communications of the PRC on September 2, 1998. The Plaintiff had no objection neither to the authenticity of all the above evidence, nor to the qualifications of the Defendant in implementing the law. However, as to Evidence No.11, he alleged that it could not prove that the investigation group was dispatched by the Maritime Affairs Bureau of the PRC, as the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau itself was competent enough to conduct such kind of investigation. The Defendant listed the following laws and regulations that they applied in its penalty decision: Evidence No.15. Article 9 of the “Law of the PRC on Transportation Safety at Sea”. Evidence No.16. Article 12 Item 2 and Article 58 Item 1 of the “ Regulations of the PRC on Administrative Penalties(provisional) regarding Supervision of Safety on Water” issued by the Ministry of Communications on September 2, 1998. Evidence No.17. Article 32 of the Regulations on Statistics on Transportation Accidents of Ships ” issued by the Ministry of Communications on June 16, 1990 concerning accidents involving liability. Evidence No.18. Articles 35 and 38 of the “Maritime Law” of the PRC on the duties of shipmasters in maritime accidents. Evidence No.19. Articles 13 and 14 of the “Regulations of the PRC on Seamen-On-Duty on Sea-Going Vessels” issued by the Ministry of Communications on October 20, 1997 concerning the requirements on seamen when on duty. Evidence No.20. Article 17 of the “Regulations of the PRC on Ship Visa Administration” issued by the Ministry of Communications on May 17, 1993, requiring faithful reports to the authorities in charge thereof. Evidence No.21.“Regulations of the PRC on Ship’s Minimal Safe Manning Scale” issued by the Ministry of Communications on September 24, 1997, stipulating that minimum manning should be guaranteed for the seaworthiness of vessels. The Plaintiff had no objection to the authenticity of the above evidence. However, he alleged that none of the above could prove that the Plaintiff should take full responsibility. The Plaintiff alleged that evidence 16 dealt with combined punishment, i.e. not only to withdraw the certificate of qualification, but also to fine the Plaintiff. However, in fact, the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau only withdrew the Plaintiff’s qualification certificate, but no fine was imposed on him. Thus, the Plaintiff alleged that the Penalty Decision was wrong and it should be withdrawn. The Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau defended that they had the authority to make a proper Penalty decision within the statutory framework. Apart from that, to withdraw the Plaintiff’s qualification certificate indicated the principle of “combining punishment with education”. The Penalty on the Plaintiff was a lenient one. Therefore, the alleged Penalty was lawful and justified. The Defendant provided the following evidence to prove that the procedures for their implementation of law were legally sound : Evidence No.22. A letter from the Plaintiff on July 23, 2001 to request an evidence hearing. Evidence No.23 Notice on Evidence Hearing by the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau on August 10, 2001. Evidence No.24. Maritime Administrative Penalty Decision (No.gang jian fa 1002008[2001]) by the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau on July 12, 2001. Evidence No.25. Withdrawal of Administrative Penalty Decision (No. hu haI che 001 (2001) ) by the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau on August 10, 2001. Evidence No.26. “Receipt of the Service of Maritime Administrative Penalty Decision” signed by Ye Hai-Guo on August 15, 2001. Evidence No.27.An administrative penalty hearing record made by the Defendant on August21, 2001 while the Plaintiff Ye Hai-Guo was absent from the court. Evidence No.28. Maritime Administrative Penalty Decision (No.gang jian fa 1002016(2001)) by the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau on September 6, 2001. Evidence No.29. Receipts signed by the Plaintiff Ye Hai-Guo on September 19, 2001 on “Receipt for Maritime Administrative Penalty Decision”. Evidence No.30. “Letter of September 28, 2001 on Withdrawal of Qualification Certificate of Ye Hai-Guo” sent by the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau to Zhejiang Maritime Affairs Bureau. Evidence No.31. The “to be kept by the Sender” of EMS receipt about service of notice of evidence hearing by the Defendant submitted at court. The Plaintiff made his cross-examination as follows: Evidence No.22. No objection. Evidence No.23. No objection to its authenticity, but it was irrelevant. Evidence No.24. It was withdrawn being irrelevant to this case. Evidence No.25. No objection to its authenticity, but irrelevant. Evidence No.26-29. No objection. Evidence No.30. Objection to its legality. Evidence No.31. Denied. The issuing date of notice of evidence hearing was August 10, 2001. However, the date when the Plaintiff received the notice was August 15, 2001,while the date of evidence hearing shall be the date on which the Plaintiff received the notice, instead of the date when the notice was sent out. Besides, the Plaintiff alleged that in accordance with Article 42 of the “Law of the PRC on Administrative Penalty” that “Administrative authorities shall hold evidence hearing with a 7-day prior notice to the party involved”, thus the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau should have held the evidence hearing on August 22, 2001. However, in fact, the Defendant held the evidence hearing on August 21, 2001, which was obviously in breach of the said stipulation, and was an illegal administrative execution. Therefore, it should be withdrawn. The Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau argued that they sent out the notice for evidence hearing on August 10, 2001 and notified the Plaintiff that the evidence hearing was on August 21, 2001 . The procedures for sending the notice conformed with the stipulation that the parties shall be given a 7-day prior notice before the evidence hearing is held. However, the Plaintiff was absent during the evidence hearing without any justified reason, which should be deemed as a waiver. In this regard, the procedure was legal. Apart from the above allegation, the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau alleged that the Maritime Administrative Penalty Decision (No. gang jian fa 1002016(2001)) was served to the Plaintiff on September 19, 2001, while the Plaintiff Ye Hai-Guo sued to this court on November 26, 2001. His plaint was beyond the litigation limitation set forth in Article 45 of the “Law of the PRC on Transportation Safety at Sea” reading: “Should the parties involved be not satisfied with administrative penalty of fine or withdrawal of career certificates, they shall sue to court within 15 days after they receive the notice on penalty”. Thus, the Defendant pleaded to this court to revoke the Plaintiff’s claims. To this allegation, the Plaintiff argued that the Defendant only told him of the time for administrative review and he was not informed of the time for bringing a suit to court. As an administrative authority, when they imposed a penalty on a relevant party, they were not only obliged to clearly inform the parties involved of the time for administrative review, but the time of litigation as well. For this reason, the Plaintiff alleged that Article 39 of the “ Administrative Procedural Law of the PRC” instead of Article 45 of the “Law of the PRC on Transportation Safety at Sea” should be applicable. In order to support his claims, the Plaintiff submitted to this court the following evidence: 1.The original Maritime Administrative Penalty Decision (No. gang jian fa 1002016 (2001)) made by the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affaires Bureau on September 6, 2001 to prove the specific administrative action. 2.“Notice on Clarification on Issues regarding Imposition of Administrative Penalties on Those Involved in an Accident and Liable Therefor” issued by Maritime Affairs Bureau of the PRC on December 30, 1999, to prove that the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau should make its decision on the basis of the investigation report and its findings. The Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau admitted Evidence No.1 above. As to Evidence No.2, it had no objection to its authenticity, but alleged that the said document was only an internal regulatory document, so it was very suspicious about the way by which such document had been procured by the Plaintiff. Besides, the Defendant itself did decide on the penalty in accordance with this Regulation. Based on all the above evidence submitted to this court by both parties involved, this court asserted: With respect to Evidence Nos. 1-9 submitted by the Defendant, they were objective, authentic, and relevant to the facts found by the Defendant. They were collected through legal procedures, and the Plaintiff had no objection to their authenticity, so they were accepted by this court. The Defendant’s Evidence No.1 proved that this accident was not a force majeure. The Defendant’s Evidence Nos.2-9 proved that at 2020hrs on November 30, 2000, the Plaintiff Ye Hai-Guo steered m/v ZHE ZHOU 606 on the sea area near the light ship at the mouth of Yangtze River. During the accident, when the Plaintiff Ye Hai-Guo was aware of the slopleft of the ship, the Plaintiff ordered to inject water into the second and fourth starboard holds without a clear knowledge of the causes thereof. This not only wasted time but increased the ship’s load. Under such strong gale, the Plaintiff did not order to checked the holds sealing. When water was found in the holds , the Plaintiff did not know that the ship was in danger of sinking. He did not organize an effective self-rescue. The ship was not ordered to get into a state of emergency. Before the ship sank, the Plaintiff ordered wrong steering by making two full-steers to starboard and portside, which made the ship sink faster when the ship was submerged in water. The Plaintiff thus should take full responsibility in this accident due to his improper operation, poor command in danger and bad rescue operation. Besides, the Plaintiff did not fulfill his legal responsibilities as a captain, as he concealed the fact of insufficient manning of the ship, and untruthfully went through the the ship visa process. So he should definitely be fully liable for the sinking of the ship. Regarding Evidence Nos.10-14 submitted by the Defendant in support of its authority in collecting the evidence, the Plaintiff admitted them, so they were accepted by this court. Regarding Evidence Nos.15-21 submitted by the Defendant to prove the applicable law, the Plaintiff had no objection to their authenticity. Since Evidence Nos. 15-21 submitted by the Defendant were the same applicable regulations applied by the Defendant when they made the said decision, they were accepted by this court. As to Evidence Nos.22-31 submitted by the Defendant to prove the legality of the procedures under which the said Maritime Administrative Penalty Decision was made, after the cross-examination by the Plaintiff and the Defendant respectively, this court found out that the process of working out the procedures for the Maritime Administrative Penalty in this case was as follows: On July 12, 2001, the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau made a “Maritime Administrative Penalty Decision” (No. gang jian fa 1002008 (2001) ). On July 23, 2001, the Plaintiff Ye Hai-Guo sent a letter to request for an evidence hearing. On August10, 2001, the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau issued an order of withdrawal to withdraw the Administrative Penalty Decision (No. hu hai che 001 (2001) ). On the same day, the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau sent out a notice for evidence hearing to notify the Plaintiff thereof . On August 15, 2001, the Plaintiff signed on the receipt of the Maritime Administrative Penalty Decision. On August 21, 2001, the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau held the evidence hearing on Maritime Administrative Penalty. The Plaintiff was absent from court, and the Defendant made a hearing record. On September 6, 2001, the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau made a Maritime Administrative Penalty Decision (No. gang jian fa 1002016(2001)) to withdraw the Qualification Certificate of Captain Ye Hai-Guo. On September 19, 2001, the Plaintiff Ye Hai-Guo received the Maritime Administrative Penalty Decision and signed on the Service Receipt of Maritime Administrative Penalty Decision. On September 28, 2001, the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau sent a “Letter on Withdrawl of the Qualification Certificate of Ye Hai-Guo” to Zhejiang Maritime Affairs Bureau, showing that an action of administrative penalty to withdraw the Plaintiff’s Qualification Certificate was already taken. It was the view of this court that: The Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau was qualified to impose an administrative penalty on the Plaintiff Ye Hai-Guo for m/v ZHE ZHOU 606’s accident. It was stated in the said decision that at 2220hrs on November 30, 2000, the Plaintiff Ye Hai-Guo steered m/v ZHE ZHOU 606 in the sea area near the light ship at the mouth of Yangtze River. Because of his improper operation, poor rescue effort and bad command of the ship in danger, the ship sank. These facts were supported by the Defendant’s Evidence Nos.1-9. The Defendant made the penalty decision on the basis of clear facts and sufficient evidence. The Plaintiff’s allegation that the determination of the liability for the accident was wrong had no supporting facts and the evidence submitted by the Plaintiff was not strong enough to substantiate his allegation, thus it was not accepted by this court. The Defendant, as the entity to impose administrative penalty, shall strictly abide by the procedures set forth by law. In accordance with Article 41 of the “ Explanations on Several Issues in implementing Administrative Procedural Law of the PRC by the Supreme People’s Court”, the Defendant should clearly notify the Plaintiff of his right to litigation or the time limitation for litigation. However, the Defendant’s notice that the Plaintiff “may apply for administrative review within 60 days after receipt of this Decision on Penalty or bring a suit to the people’s court directly” in its Decision on Penalty was not clear enough to indicate that the Defendant had clearly notified the Plaintiff of his right to litigation or the time limitation for the right to litigation. The Plaintiff, as the relevant party subject to an administrative penalty, brought a suit against the Defendant in accordance with the “Administrative Procedural Law of the PRC” under such circumstances. His action was affirmed. The allegation of the Defendant that the Plaintiff had brought a suit against the Defendant beyond the time limitation allowed was not acceptable to this court. In serving the notice for evidence hearing to the Plaintiff in accordance with Article 42 of the “Administrative Penalty Law of the PRC”, the Defendant should notify the Plaintiff 7 days before the evidence hearing. The Plaintiff received the notice on August 15, 2001, while the Defendant held the evidence hearing on August 21, 2001. The calculation of the time of service shall start from the day when the party involved received the notice and the days on the way shall not count. The point held by the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau that the time of service shall start from the day when they sent the notice was not acceptable. The way to hold an evidence hearing without a 7-day prior notice to the Plaintiff obviously ran counter to the relevant requirements. The penalty on the Plaintiff in withdrawing his Qualification Certificate by the Defendant violated the provisions of Article 58 of the “Regulations of the PRC on On-Water Safety Supervision Administrative Penalty”. The Defendant was wrong in that they withdrew the Plaintiff’s Qualification Certificate only, instead of imposing fine on the Plaintiff as well. This did not conform to the statutory requirements for imposing penalty. In applying the principle of “combining punishment with education” to make a relatively lenient punishment decision, the Defendent should do so within the framework of the same kind of punishment as set forth by law, instead of reducing one kind of punishment or the other. The Defendant’s allegation that its maritime administrative penalty was in line with the principle of “combining punishment with education”, that it was a lenient punishment, and that its punishment was legal and suitable, was not acceptable. Based on all the above, the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau was qualified to make a maritime administrative penalty decision against the Plaintiff Ye Hai-Guo. The Maritime Administrative Penalty Decision (No. gang jian fa 1002016(2001).) made by the Defendant against the Plaintiff was done on the basis of clear facts and sufficient evidence. However, the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau was wrong in respect of the administrative procedures for implementation in holding the evidence hearing and the substance of the maritime administrative penalty was not in conformity with the relevant legal stipulations. Thus, in accordance with Article 54 Item 2 of the “Administrative Procedural Law of the PRC”, Article 42 Item 2 of the “Administrative Penalty Law of the PRC” and Article 58 Item 1 of the “Regulations of the PRC on Administrative Penalties regarding Supervision on Safety On-Water”, this court decides as follows: To cancel the Maritime Administrative Penalty Decision (No. gang jian fa 1002016 (2001) ) made by the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau of the People’s Republic of China on September 6, 2001. The court fee of RMB100.00 yuan shall be borne by the Defendant Shanghai Maritime Affairs Bureau of the People’s Republic of China. Should any party be not satisfied with this judgment, it may submit to this court a request for an appeal to the Higher People’s Court of Shanghai within 15 days of the service of this judgment, together with a copy for each of the opposing party. Presiding Judge: Kang Wei-Qi Judge : Lv Xiao-Hua Deputy Judge : Tian-Wei Zheng March 26, 2002 Certified true copy Clerk : Jie Zhu
  • Shanxi Industrial Products Import & Export Co. v. Huanlian Marine (China) Co.,Huanlian International Consulting Service (Tianjin) Co.,Ltd, COSCO Container Lines

    2004-03-16

    TIANJIN MARITIME COURT PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA CIVIL JUDGMENT No. HSC 59 (2001) Plaintiff: Shanxi Industrial Products Import & Export Co. Domicile: No.133 Xinjian Road,Taiyuan,Shanxi Legal Representative: Yan Wenjing, general manager Agent ad Litem: Shi Chuan, lawyer of Tianjin Liren Law Office Agent ad Litem: Li Xin ,lawyer of Tianjin Liren Law Office Defandant: Huanlian Marine (China) Co. Domicile: Suite 6, Section A, Wanlong Central Mansion, No.85 Liuwei Road, Hedong District, Tianjin Legal Representative: Zhang Zhijian, Borad Chairman Agent ad Litem: Wang Hong, lawyer of Tianjin Dawei Law Office Defendant: Huanlian International Consulting Service (Tianjin) Co.,Ltd Domicile: Suite 6, Section A, Wanlong Central Mansion, No.85 Liuwei Road, Hedong District, Tianjin Legal Representative: Shen Jinfu, Borad Chairman Agent ad Litem: Wang Hong, lawyer of Tianjin Dawei Law Office Defendant: COSCO Container Lines Domicile: No.1555 Changyang Road, Shanghai Legal Representative: Wei Jiafu, Borad Chairman Agent ad Litem: Liu Zuoming, lawyer of Beijing Haitong Law Office Third Party: COSCO International Forwarding Co., Ltd., Tianjin Domicile: 19-21 Flooor, Section A, COSCO Building, Hebei District, Tianjin Legal Representative: Ye Weilong, Borad Chairman Agent ad Litem: Shao Zhong, staff of the Company With respect to the cases of dispute over contract of carriage of good by sea filed by the Plaintiff Shanxi Industrial Products Import & Export Co. against the Defendant Huanlian Marine (China) Co. (hereinafter referred to as the first Defendant), the Defendant Huanlian International Consulting Services (Tianjin) Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the second Defendant), the Defendant COSCO Container Lines (Hereinafter referred to as the third Defendant) and the third party COSCO International Forwarding Co., Ltd., Tianjin, a collegial panel was constituted in accordance with law to hear the case in open sessions after this Court entertained the case. The agents ad litem of the Plaintiff Shi Chuan, and Li Xin, the agent ad litem of the first and second Defendants Wang Hong, the agent ad litem of the third Defendant Liu Zuoming and the agent ad litem of the third party Shao Zhong attended the Court hearing. The case has now been concluded. It was claimed by the Plaintiff that they entrusted the Defendants to ship the goods in June, 2000 in accordance with the sales contract concluded between the Plaintiff and the Canadian buyer R&G ,a party irrelevant to this case. As the agent of the first Defendant, the second Defendant signed and issued the Bill of Lading No.HF21Hl008, in which it was stated that the name of vessel was m/v “Feng He”, description of the goods was stainless coupler, port of loading was Tianjin and port of destination was Vancouver. Originally, the quantity of goods entrusted by the Plaintiff for shipment was two metal cases, but actually it was three metal cases shipped on board the vessel. In this aspect, the Plaintiff had notified the second Defendant to alter the quantity of goods shipped on 28 June, 2000. In the letter of reply, the second Defandant responded that there was no time to make such alteration as the goods had reached the port, thus two metal cases out of the three at the warehouse were bounded together as one packing for shipment. Further, the second Defendant promised that the foregoing act would not affect the taking delivery of the goods in question at the destination port. After arrival of the goods at the destination port, the consignee took delivery of two metal cases only as there was one case short delivered. The consignee immediately contacted the carrier’s agent at Vancouver, requesting them to look for the missing goods, but in vain. Therefore, the consignee requested the Plaintiff to make up the missing goods. As the Plaintiff had requested the Defendant and their agents to look for the goods on several occasions but in vain, the Plaintiff had to make up the missing goods to the Canadian buyer R&G on 30 October, 2000 and to pay 20% damages for breach of contract according to the sales contract. On 26 December, 2000, R&C informed the Plaintiff that the carrier’s agent notified them that the missing metal case had been found and that the goods was not delivered at Vancouver because it was miscarried to Toronto. As the Plaintiff had made up the missing goods, R&G no longer needed such goods and requested the Plaintiff to dispose of the goods themselves. Under the repeated requests of the Plaintiff, R&G finally agreed to accept the goods at only 60% of the contract price. As a result, the Plaintiff suffered a loss of RMB58,423.43 for the reduced price, the freight for the making-up goods, Customs duties and the damages for breach of contract. The Plaintiff held that the three Defendants and the third party should be under the absolute liability for such delay in delivery of goods, which resulted in the economic losses of the Plaintiff. Therefore, the Plaintiff requested the court to order the three Defendants and the third party to indemnify them against the above mentioned economic losses. During the hearing of the case, the first Defendant contended that: 1) After delivering the goods in accordance with the sales contract, the Plaintiff had fulfilled all its obligations thereunder and should be under no obligation to bear the risks and liabilities of the consignee. The Plaintiff’s making up the missing goods should fall within the scope of another legal relationship. Therefore, the Plaintiff was not entitled to sue the carrier. 2) The goods in question had never been under the management and control of the first Defendant. If the court were to support the matters of fact as alleged by the Plaintiff, it was those actually responsible for the management and control of such shipment that should be held liable for the delay in delivery. 3) The first Defendant had fulfilled their obligation to deliver the goods and had never received the Letter of Claim from the Plaintiff. Therefore, the claim of the Plaintiff had been time barred. The second Defendant contended that, as the first Defendant’s agent, they should not undertake the liability for delay in delivery of the goods at issue. The third Defendant contended that: 1) As the Bill of Lading in question had been transferred to the consignee, who had accepted such transfer and taken delivery of the goods against the same through endorsement, the Plaintiff was not entitled to file a lawsuit against the carrier. 2) Judging from the Bill of lading issued by the third Defendant, the Plaintiff, who was neither the shipper, nor the consignee and had no legal relationship of any sort with the third Defendant, was not entitled to sue the third Defendant. 3) Since the Plaintiff failed to adduce positive evidence to prove that it was three metal cases that the Plaintiff actually shipped, the lawsuit raised by the Plaintiff lacked the support of evidence and the basis of facts. 4) As the cargo received and delivered by the third Defendant was full container load cargo and the seal was intact upon delivery, the third Defendant had fulfilled the obligation of delivery. 5) Even if the Plaintiff could establish that it was three metal cases of goods actually shipped, it was due to insufficient mark and improper declaration of the goods on the part of the Plaintiff that one case of the goods was not timely taken delivery of at the destination port. There was not any fault or negligence on the part of the carrier. Therefore, the carrier should not be held liable for damages. 6) The constitution of delay in delivery of goods must satisfy two legal requirements, that is, definite time of delivery a agreed on one hand and definite place of delivery on the other. In this case, there was no such specification as to the period of delivery in the two Bills of Lading at issue. Therefore, no delay in delivery had ever occurred, as alleged by the Plaintiff. 7) Even if delay in delivery did exist and such delay was caused by the carrier, under such circumstances for which the carrier shall not be exempted from his responsibility, the liability of the carrier for the damages shall be limited to the amount of freight. 8) Since there was not any direct or positive causal relationship between the losses of the Plaintiff and the delay in delivery of the goods, the Plaintiff should not claim for damages against the carrier in accordance with law. The third party contended that: 1) After the transfer of B/L through endorsement, the title to the goods was transferred to the consignee. The Plaintiff, being neither the B/L holder nor the consignee under the order of the B/L, was not entitled to file the lawsuit against the third party. 2) The prerequisite for constituting delay in delivery was that the carrier and the shipper clearly provided the period of delivery. Where there was no such provision, delay in delivery shall not exist. Even if there had been delay in delivery in this case, the consignee or the Plaintiff should have provided taking-over record to prove that the goods in question was delivered to the consignee six months after the vessel arrived at the destination port. Otherwise, it could only indicate that, after signing for the receipt of the goods, the consignee failed to take delivery of the goods timely or to checked the goods carefully and resulted in shortage in taking delivery. Hence, it was the consignee who should be held liable and it was irrelevant to the carrier. 3) The evidence submitted by the third party was sufficient to prove that, during the whole business operation, the cargo condition as stated in all papers and documents showed that there were only two cases of stainless products. In the meantime, it was stated in the delivery order that the goods delivered were in apparent good order and condition. Therefore, there was no delay in delivery or shortage at all. 4) From the day when the consignee signed for the receipt of the goods, the B/Lheld by the consignee had fulfilled its function for taking delivery of the goods contained therein and no longer served as the document of title to the goods. The liability for breach of contract, the making-up of goods and the disposal of goods by reducing its price, were all disputes over matters of trade between the Plaintiff and the consignee and were of no relevance to the carrier. 5) The evidence of the Plaintiff could not prove the genuine economic losses suffered thereby so far. As the third party did not see the bank account transfer vouchers for payment for damages for breach of contract, the freight for the making up goods by the Plaintiff and payment for the reduced price goods, the evidence provided by the Plaintiff was seriously insufficient. In summary, the third party requested the court to dismiss the litigation requests of the Plaintiff. During the hearing of the case, it was not disputed by the parties as to the following facts: On June, 2000, the Plaintiff entrusted the second Defendant to carry originally two metal cases of goods, but actually three cases were loaded into the container. For this, the Plaintiff notified the second Defendant to alter the quantity of goods shipped on 28 June, 2000. As there was no time to revise the Customs Declaration, the second Defendant instructed the operator of the third party at container loading station to bind two cases together according to earlier practice and to make the three cases into two for the convenience of carriage .In the meantime ,the second Defendant notified the Plaintiff of what was done with the cases and advised them that the Plaintiff had made it clear to the agent and the Plaintiff should take it easy. Being unable to load full container goods, the second Defendant , as the agent , signed the bill of lading of the first Defendant to the Plaintiff. As the container-loading carrier ,the third party loaded twelve shipments of goods including the goods in question in one container and then delivered to the third Defendant for carriage to Vancouver ,the port of destination . the consignee took delivery of the goods on 27 July, 2000. The facts disputed by both parties were as follows: 1)The Plaintiff alleged that after the goods in question were carried to the port of destination Vancouver , the consignee only received two cases and there was a shortage of one case. The Plaintiff requested the Defendant and their agent to look for this case on several occasions. On 26 December, 2000,R&G informed the Plaintiff that the carrier’s agent just notified them that the missing case had been found and that the case was not delivered at Vancouver because it was miscarried to Toronto ,Canada and thus resulted in the delay in delivery. The third party alleged that , judging from the evidence they submitted, it was two cases of goods on all documents from receipt of the goods to delivery thereof and there was no short delivery at all, that up to this time ,the third party hadn’t seen the documents issued by the agent of the warehouse at the destination port, EUROASIA Company and the third party’s agent at the destination port SEAGO , evidencing that they lost the goods and then delivered to the consignee after finding the same . Nor did the third party see the agency agreement between O.T.S and SEAGO. Upon examination ,it was found that the second Defendant actually received three metal cases with 2,981 kilograms in weight and 2.2cubic meters in volume. Although there only two cases specified in the Bill of Lading issued by the third party , they were 2,981 kilograms in weight and 2.2cubic meters in volume. After taking delivery of the goods and discovering the short delivery, the consignee immediately notified the Plaintiff of the same, the Plaintiff then checked with the second efendant .Both the second and the third Defendants had contacted and checked with SEAGO, the third Party’s agent in Canada. The foregoing matters of fact could be proved by the correspondence exchanged between the Plaintiff and the buyer and the correspondence exchanged between the second and the third Defendants and SEAGO. As to whose agent was O.T.S., Canadian telecom system Co., Ltd. in the letter addressed to R&G from O.T.S. submitted by the Plaintiff ,O.T.S. alleged that they had just received the notice from the agent company of the warehouse EUROASIA that the missing goods of the buyer had been found. In the meantime ,O.T.S. declared that they were no longer the agent of SEAGO and hoped that R&G would contact SEAGO directly. Both the address and fax in Vancouver in the letterhead of SEAGO as submitted by the second Defendant and the address and fax of the third party’s agent at the destination port as stated in the Bill of Lading were the same as the address and fax of O.T.S. On the basis of the foregoing facts and evidence , this court held that although the third party denied receiving three cases of goods , the volume and the weight measured at the time of loading the container were those of three cases. Further ,when checking with their agent at the destination port ,the third party also alleged that the shipments in question were two packings(holding three metal cases).However , the consignee only received two cases of goods .Therefore, it was not a matter of fact in this case that the third party only received two cases of goods according to the specification in the Bill of Lading . Evidenced by the address and fax of the third party’s agent SEAGO at the destination port Vancouver as stated in the Bill of Lading and acknowledged by the third party ,O.T.S was the agent of SEAGO ,which was the third party’s agent. 2)The making-up goods by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff submitted to this court the Bill of Lading of m/v“Lin Xing”V.0037E to prove that they did make up 17 cases of goods to the Canadian buyer on 1 October, 2000. In light of the foregoing Bill of Lading and the invoices No.0372547 and 0372548 issued by Yake International Transportation( China )Co., Ltd. , the court supported the face that the Plaintiff made up the goods. 3)Damages for breach of contract paid by the Plaintiff to the Canadian buyer. The Plaintiff did not provide to this court any direct evidence with respect to their payment of damages for breach of contract to the buyer. According to the sales contract , the conditions for breach on the part of the seller were that the shipment was more than fifteen days late as stipulated in the contract , or that the cargo shortage was higher than10%. In this case , the Plaintiff was not in breach of the provisions of the contract and should not pay damages. Therefore, this court does not sustain what was alleged by the Plaintiff in this respect. In light of the above mentioned matters of fact , it was held by this count that: 1)Now that the Defendants had received three cases of goods and specified two cases in the Bill of Lading only , the Defendants should make it clear to the third party and their agent at the destination port so as to avoid short delivery . Obviously ,the first Defendant failed to assume the foregoing obligation and should be held partly liable for the delay in receiving the goods by the consignee. 2)As the first Defendant’s agent , the second Defendant should act within the scope of responsibility authorized by the first Defendant. In accordance with the relevant provisions on agency business under Chinese law, it was the first Defendant who should take the legal consequences arising from the acts of the second Defendant and the second Defendant should not be held liable. 3)Although the third Defendant was the actual carrier of the goods in question ,the period of responsibility thereof was from container yard(CY/CY) in consideration that what they carried was full container load cargo .As the seal of the container was sound and intact at the container yard when delivered and that it was not the obligation and act of the Defendant to deliver the goods to the ultimate consignee , the third Defendant should not be held liable for the litigation requests of the Plaintiff. 4)As the party responsible for the delivery of the goods to the consignee as stated in the Bill of Lading , the third party ,who actually received three cases of goods but specified only two cases in the Bill of Lading , failed to timely notify their agent at the destination port of such . When checked by the consignee upon discovering the short delivery of goods ,the third party’s agent failed to find the short delivered goods either .As a result ,the goods were delivered six months later .It was obvious that the third party and their agent failed to exercise due diligence to fulfill their obligations of delivery of goods .There fore the third party should also be held partly liable for delivery of goods beyond the reasonable period. 5)It was after the Customs clearance of the goods had been made, that the Plaintiff altered the number of cases. As a result , the second Defendant had to specify two cases in the Bill of Lading even though actually receiving three cases, so as to make the contents of the documents conform to those of the Customs declaration , which was the hidden trouble for possible short delivery . Therefore ,the Plaintiff should have notified the consignee timely as to the foregoing circumstances. However the Plaintiff did not make such notice in time , resulting in the short taking delivery by the consignee , for which the Plaintiff should be held partly liable. 6)Seen from the items of the Plaintiff ‘s claim, the conditions for payment for damages for breach of contract were that the shipment period was more than fifteen days late as specified in the contract ,or that the cargo shortage was higher than 10%. In this case ,the shipment was within the period as stipulated in the contract and there was no cargo shortage shipped by the Plaintiff . According to the trade term in the contract , i.e., CIF , the obligation of the seller as regards delivery should have been completed once the goods were delivered to the carrier . As to the cargo shortage thereafter, the buyer should undertake such risk . the Plaintiff should not be under the obligation to pay damages in accordance with the sales contract . Hence, the loss for damages raised by the Plaintiff was not reasonable and positive and was not sustained by this court . With respect to the loss from reduced price ,as the goods in question were neither seasonal nor damaged, such item of loss was not positive loss resulting from the delay in delivery ,but form the trade activities between the buyer and the seller and was irrelevant to the carrier. Therefore , the court does not support such item of claim. 7)Being the shipper of the goods under the Bill of Lading at issue, the Plaintiff had transferred the Bill of Lading through endorsement. With the transfer of the said Bill of Lading, the right of claim against the carrier under the contract of carriage was transferred from the shipper to the consignee as well. In this case, as far as the shipper in the Bill of Lading was concerned, the Plaintiff was not entitled to file the claim against the carrier. 8)The Plaintiff submitted to this court a letter of subrogation made by the Canadian buyer R&G to the effect that the Plaintiff was subrogated to the right of claim, through which the Plaintiff obtained the right of claim against the carrier under the contract of carriage. However, the right to be subrogated could only be that of the transferor according to the contract of carriage. As far as this case was concerned, it was only the right of claim arising from the losses suffered due to the breach of contract on the part of the carrier that R&G could transfer to the Plaintiff, i.e., the basis for the right of claim was losses suffered by R&G. The court noted that the losses claimed by the Plaintiff(the damages for breach of sales contract, freight for making up goods, loss from reduced price of goods were all the losses of the Plaintiff rather than R&G. Therefore, with respect to the litigation requests for the foregoing losses of the Plaintiff against the Defendant on the basis of the letter of subrogation, this court does not sustain. To sum up the above, in accordance with Article 84,112 of the General Principles of Civil Law of the PRC, Article 79,402 of the Contract Law of the PRC and Article 64 (1) of the the Civil Procedure Law of the PRC, this court hereby renders the judgment as follows: The litigation requests of the Plaintiff the Industrial Products Import & Export Co.of Shanxi Province shall be diamissed. The acceptance fee of this case in the sum of RMB2,263 shall be born by the Plaintiff. Any party who is not satisfied with this judgment may file a Statement of Appeal in quintuplicate within 30 days for the first Defendant and within 15 days for other parties concerned upon the day of service of this judgment for appealing to the Higher People’s Court of Tianjin, and shall pay the appeal fee RMB2,263 to the Higher People’s Court of Tianjin within 7 days of filing the Statement of Appeal (Bank Account: Agricultural Bank of China, New Technology Product Zone Sub-branch Office 394-9887000390). Any delay beyond the foregoing prescribed time limit shall be deemed as a waiver of the appeal. Presiding judge :Chen Xianzhang Judge :He Yiru Deputy judge :Jia Ming 18 September, 2001 Certified true copy Clerk: Lee Zhen
  • Cheng Fengying,Pi Shuangkun,Tian Mingzhen,Pi Yueyu,Pi Yuelin,Wang Shuhua,Wang Panpan,etc. v. ICL Shipping Limited

    2004-03-16

    TIANJIN MARITIME COURT PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA CIVIL MEDIATION AWARD No. HSC 20-27(2000) Plaintiff 1 : Cheng Fengying, (spouse of the decedent Pi Zhongrong) Female; born on 11 April 1960; Nationality: Han; Occupation: fishing; Domicile: Qiantang Village, Nanpaihe Town, Huanghua, Hebei Province. Plaintiff 2 : Pi Shuangkun, (father of the decedent Pi Zhongrong) Male; born on 10 May 1932; Nationality: Han; Occupation: fishing; Domicile: Qiantang Village, Nanpaihe Town, Huanghua, Hebei Province. Plaintiff 3 : Tian Mingzhen, (mother of the decedent Pi Zhongrong) Female; born on 6 September 1934; Nationality: Han; Occupation: fishing; Domicile: Qiantang Village, Nanpaihe Town, Huanghua, Hebei Province. Plaintiff 4 : Pi Yueyu, (daughter of the decedent Pi Zhongrong, whose guardian is Plaintiff 1 Cheng Fengying) Female; born on 10 March 1992; Nationality: Han; Occupation: Student; Domicile: Qiantang Village, Nanpaihe Town, Huanghua, Hebei Province. Plaintiff 5 : Pi Yuelin, (son of the decedent Pi Zhongrong, whose guardian is Plaintiff 1 Cheng Fengying) Male; born on 17 May 1984; Nationality: Han; Occupation: Student; Domicile: Qiantang Village, Nanpaihe Town, Huanghua, Hebei Province. Plaintiff 6 : Wang Shuhua, (spouse of the decedent Wang Zhizhen) Female; born on 7 October 1967; Nationality: Han; Occupation: fishing; Domicile: Zhangjuhe Village, Nanpaihe Town, Huanghua, Hebei Province. Plaintiff 7 : Wang Panpan, (daughter of the decedent Wang Zhizhen, whose guardian is Plaintiff 6 Wang Shuhua) Female; born on 9 July 1993; Nationality: Han; Occupation: student; Domicile: Zhangjuhe Village, Nanpaihe Town, Huanghua, Hebei Province. Plaintiff 8 : Wang Longqi, (son of the decedent Wang Zhizhen, whose guardian is Plaintiff 6 Wang Shuhua) Male; born on 4 April 2000; Nationality: Han; Child; Domicile: Zhangjuhe Village, Nanpaihe Town, Huanghua, Hebei Province. Plaintiff 9 : (father of the decedent Wang Zhizhen) Male; born on 1 October 1938; Nationality: Han; Occupation: Fishing; Domicile: Zhangjuhe Village, Nanpaihe Town, Huanghua, Hebei Province. Plaintiff 10 : Liu Shuzhen, (mother of the decedent Wang Zhizhen) Female; born on 1 October 1938; Nationality: Han; Occupation: Fishing; Domicile: Zhangjuhe Village, Nanpaihe Town, Huanghua, Hebei Province. Plaintiff 11 : Wang Shumian, (spouse of the decedent Chen Xiuqiang) Female; born on 17 March 1975; Nationality: Han; Occupation: Fishing; Domicile: Shenjiabao Village, Nanpaihe Town, Huanghua, Hebei Province. Plaintiff 12 : Chen Jie, (daughter of the decedent Chen Xiuqiang, whose guardian is Plaintiff 11 Wang Shumian) Female; born on 12 December 1998; Nationality: Han; Child; Domicile: Shenjiabao Village, Nanpaihe Town, Huanghua, Hebei Province. Plaintiff 13 : Chen Lianyi, (father of the decedent Chen Xiuliang) Male; born on 27 February 1945; Nationality: Han; Occupation: fishing; Domicile: Shenjiabao Village, Nanpaihe Town, Huanghua, Hebei Province. Plaintiff 14 : Wang Shulan, (mother of the decedent Chen Xiuliang) Female; born on 6 June 1945; Nationality: Han; Occupation: fishing; Domicile: Shenjiabao Village, Nanpaihe Town, Huanghua, Hebei Province. Plaintiff 15 : Liu Xiufang, (spouse of the decedent Chen Zhixia) Female; born on 7 March 1959; Nationality: Han; Occupation: farming; Domicile: Fengzhuang Village, Zhangdazhuang Township, Ningjin County, Shandong Province. Plaintiff 16 : Chen Kai, (son of the decedent Chen Zhixia) Male; born on 21 October 1983; Nationality: Han; Occupation: student; Domicile: Fengzhuang Village, Zhangdazhuang Township, Ningjin County, Shandong Province. Plaintiff 17 : Chen Shuling, (daughter of the decedent Chen Zhixia, whose guardian is Plaintiff 15 Liu Xiufang) Female; born on 16 April 1988; Nationality: Han; Occupation: student; Domicile: Fengzhuang Village, Zhangdazhuang Township, Ningjin County, Shandong Province. Plaintiff 18 : Wang Fangyun, (mother of the decedent Chen Zhixia) Female; born on 3 November 1932; Nationality: Han; Occupation: farming; Domicile: Fengzhuang Village, Zhangdazhuang Township, Ningjin County, Shandong Province. Plaintiff 19 : Pi Zhonglan, (spouse of the decedent Chen Lianke) Female; born on 21 May 1949; Nationality: Han; Occupation: fishing; Domicile: Shenjiabao Village, Nanpaihe Town, Huanghua, Hebei Province. Plaintiff 20 : Chen Hongqiao,(daughter of the decedent Chen Lianke, whose guardian is Plaintiff 19 Pi Zhonglan) Female; born on 5 March 1988; Nationality: Han; Occupation: student; Domicile: Shenjiabao Village, Nanpaihe Town, Huanghua, Hebei Province. Plaintiff 21 : Zhang Xiurong, (spouse of the decedent Chen Lianhe) Female; born on 17 November 1955; Nationality: Han; Occupation: fishing; Domicile: Shenjiabao Village, Nanpaihe Town, Huanghua, Hebei Province. Plaintiff 22 : Chen Xiuming, (son of the decedent Chen Lianhe) Male; born on 13 March 1983; Nationality: Han; Occupation: fishing; Domicile: Shenjiabao Village, Nanpaihe Town, Huanghua, Hebei Province. Plaintiff 23 : Chen Hongxia, (daughter of the decedent Chen Lianhe, whose guardian is Plaintiff 21 Zhang Xiurong) Female; born on 28 September 1987; Nationality: Han; Occupation: student; Domicile: Shenjiabao Village, Nanpaihe Town, Huanghua, Hebei Province. Plaintiff 24 : Zhang Xiu’an, (mother of the decedent Chen Lianhe) Female; born on 1 November 1924; Nationality: Han; Occupation: fishing; Domicile: Shenjiabao Village, Nanpaihe Town, Huanghua, Hebei Province. Plaintiff 25 : Chen Lianyi, (owner of the ship “Ji Huang Yu 0824”) Male; born on 27 February 1945; Nationality: Han; Occupation: fishing; Domicile: Shenjiabao Village, Nanpaihe Town, Huanghua, Hebei Province. Agents ad litem for the above 25 Plaintiffs: Fang Guoqin and Chen Biao, lawyers of Jiade Law Office. Defendant : ICL Shipping Limited, shipowner of m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” Domicile : Dhun building 827, Anna Salai, Madras, India Legal Rep. : Rekkunyatath Kumar Das, Director Agent ad litem: Wang Hongyu, Lawyer of Wang Jing & Co. Tianjin Office Agent ad litem: Chen Xiangyong, Lawyer of Wang Jing & Co. The above 25 Plaintiffs brought a suit for compensation for damages resulting from ship collision (case No. HSC 27 [2000]) and seven suits for compensations for death (cases Nos. HSC 20-26[2000]) against ICL Shipping Limited, the owners of m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” before this Court and filed the Application for Deferment in Paying Court Fees on 11 May 2000. After accepting the cases, this Court formed a collegial bench in accordance with law. After deliberations, the collegial bench made a verbal ruling allowing the Application. This Court summoned the agents ad litem for the Plaintiffs and the Defendant to exchange evidence on 25 April and 18 June, 2001 before the court hearing. Court hearings were held respectively on 10 July and 14 August, 2001 for the eight cases in a consolidated way. Fang Guoqing and Chen Biao, the agents ad litem for the 25 Plaintiffs, Wang Hong Yu and Chen Xiangyong, agents ad litem for the Defendant attended the court hearings. Fan Binghai, Xia Wenxi and Zhang Tangqing appeared before the court as witnesses. Sun Qing from Tianjin Maritime Safety Administration and Yang Jiarong from Nanpaihe Fishing Harbour Superintendency and Fishing Boat Inspection Station appeared as surveyors and Zheng Yufeng from Tianjin Public Security Bureau appeared as expert appraiser. Now the trial for the eight cases has been concluded. Prior to litigation, on 16 April 2000, this Court made a ruling in accordance with law to arrest the Indian-registered m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” on the application of the Plaintiffs and asked the owners of “ICL Raja Rajan” to provide a security in an amount of USD1,000,000. On 18 April, 2000, China Re-insurance Company provided a credit security in an amount of USD1,000,000 to this Court on behalf the Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Limited for the owners of “ICL Raja Rajan”. The order for arrest of “ICL Raja Rajan” was lifted on the same day by this Court. It was pleaded by the 25 Plaintiffs that: The fishing boat “Ji Huang Yu 0824” set sail for No.7 Sub-district of No.36 Fishing District of Bohai Sea for fishing operation at about 1100 hours on 10 April, 2000. At around 0030 hours on 12 April, 2000, after casting net, “Ji Huang Yu 0824” rode at anchor in the position 38°39’.7N, 118°37’.2E. At about 1500 hours on 10 April, 2000, m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” owned by the Defendant departed from Rizhao Port for Tianjin Port in ballast. At about 0330 hours on 12 April, m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” sailing from east to west collided and sank “Ji Huang Yu 0824” lying in the position of 38°39’.7N, 118°37’.2E, whereby the fishing boat was cut into two halves. Her bow sank and then re-floated and her stern sank. Consequently, “Ji Huang Yu 0824” suffered total loss, and all the seven crewmembers were dead. What the Defendant did constituted a tortious act against the owners of the fishing boat “Ji Huang Yu 0824” as well as the 7 deceased crew members and their families, i.e. the 25 Plaintiffs. Therefore, the Plaintiffs brought the lawsuits before this Court, requesting the court to hold the Defendant fully liable for the sinking of “Ji Huang Yu 0824” and the death of the 7 crew members and to compensate for all the losses inflicted upon the Plaintiffs. In Case No. HSC 20(2000), for the death of Pi Zhongrong, Plaintiff 1, Plaintiff 2, Plaintiff 3, Plaintiff 4 and Plaintiff 5 claimed: (1) RMB 302,500 for the loss of income of the decedent; (2) RMB 13,000 as funeral expenses; (3) RMB 500,000 as pacification cost; and (4) the Defendant shall bear all the litigation costs. In Case No. HSC 21(2000), for the death of Wang Zhizhen, Plaintiff 6, Plaintiff 7, Plaintiff 8, Plaintiff 9 and Plaintiff 10 claimed: (1) RMB 424,000 for the loss of income of the decedent; (2) RMB 13,000 as funeral expenses; (3) RMB 500,000 as pacification cost; and (4) the Defendant shall bear all the litigation costs. In Case No. HSC 22(2000), for the death of Chen Xiuqiang, Plaintiff 11 and Plaintiff 12 claimed: (1) RMB 1,294,16 0.66 for the loss of income of the decedent; (2) RMB 450 for medical expense of the decedent; (3) RMB 13,000 as funeral expenses; (4) RMB 200,000 as pacification cost; and (5) the Defendant shall bear all the litigation costs. In Case No. HSC23 (2000), for the death of Chen Xiuliang, Plaintiff 13 and Plaintiff 14 claimed (1) RMB 1,401,910.13 for the loss of income of the decedent; (2) RMB 700 for medical expense; (3) RMB 13,000 as funeral expenses; (4) RMB 200,000 as pacification cost; and (5) the Defendant shall bear all the litigation costs. In Case No. HSC 24(2000), for the death of Chen Zhixia, Plaintiff 15, Plaintiff 16, Plaintiff 17 and Plaintiff 18 claimed: (1) RMB 289,000 for the loss of income of the decedent; (2) RMB 16,000 as funeral expenses; (3) RMB 400,000 as pacification cost; (4) RMB 8,100 as other relevant expenses and (5) the Defendant shall bear all the litigation costs. In Case No.25 HSC (2000), for the death of Chen Lianke, Plaintiff 19 and Plaintiff 20 claimed: (1) RMB 647,663.80 for the loss of income of the decedent; (2) RMB 2,200 as medical expense; (3) RMB 13,000 as funeral expenses; (4) RMB 200,000 as pacification cost; and (5) the Defendant shall bear all the litigation costs. In Case No. HSC 26(2000), for the death of Chen Lianhe, Plaintiff 21, Plaintiff 22, Plaintiff 23 and Plaintiff 24 claimed: (1) RMB 1,006,828.74 for the loss of income of the decedent; (2) RMB 2,270 as medical expense; (3) RMB 13,000 as funeral expenses; (4) RMB 400,000 as pacification cost; (5) RMB 900 for other related expenses; and (6) the Defendant shall bear all the litigation costs. In Case No. HSC 27(2000), as one of the owners of “Ji Huang Yu 0824”, Plaintiff 25 claimed that (1) the Defendant shall bear the full liability for the ship collision between “ICL Raja Rajan” and “Ji Huang Yu 0824”; (2) the Defendant shall compensate Plaintiff 25 RMB 2,395,334.99 plus interest at the interest rate of 6.825‰ per month for the damage of the fishing boat and the salvage expense; and (3) the Defendant shall bear all the litigation costs. The Defendant ICL Shipping Limited defended that: The registered owner of m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” was Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services Limited in India who entered into a Bareboat Charter Party with the Defendant on 18 February, 1998. Under the Bareboat Charter Party “ICL Raja Rajan” was demise-chartered to the Defendant. In the present cases the Defendant was in charge of operation and safety management of the “ICL Raja Rajan” and in charge of manning her with the Master and the crewmembers. In accordance with the provisions of Article 144 of the Maritime Code of the P.R.C. and Article 6.8 of the Bareboat Charter Party, ICL Shipping Limited considered that the result of lawsuit brought by the Plaintiffs in respect of the personal injury and loss of lives arising from the alleged collision between m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” and “Ji Huang Yu 0824” should be borne by the Defendant. Thus ICL Shipping Limited was in a right position to respond to the actions initiated by the 25 Plaintiffs. ICL Shipping Limited held that the cause of action of the eight cases was tort by nature and agreed that the cases should be governed by the law of the PRC. Under Chinese law, the Plaintiff should bear the burden of proof on the basis of the four essential conditions for constituting a tort action. Upon perusal of the evidential documents pertaining to the alleged collision submitted by the Plaintiffs to the court, ICL Shipping Limited was of the opinion that the Plaintiffs were unable to prove that “Ji Huang Yu 0824” was collided by “ICL Raja Rajan” insomuch as not a single evidence adduced by the Plaintiffs relating the collision position, collision time, collided parts and scratches resulting from the alleged collision could support such allegation, despite the fact that those factors were indispensable for analyzing and handling the collision case. ICL Shipping Limited maintained that the sinking of “Ji Huang Yu 0824” had nothing to do with “ICL Raja Rajan”. Even if it were established that m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” had collided “Ji Huang Yu 0824” (to which the Defendant did not admit), yet in accordance with the relevant provisions of the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law with respect to Collision Between Vessels 1910, the liability for loss of the Plaintiffs should be borne by the Plaintiffs themselves or should be apportioned equally between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant. Without prejudice to the foregoing arguments with regard to the facts of collision, ICL Shipping Limited contended that the amount claimed by the Plaintiffs had exceeded the reasonable limit and were legally baseless. Therefore it should not be admitted. Two court hearings were held, during which the collegial bench made an emphatic investigation of the following core issues of the disputes between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant: (1) capacity of the Defendant; (2) whether the collision between “ICL Raja Rajan” and “Ji Huang Yu 0824” did occur, who the cause of collision and the damage; and (3) how the losses of the Plaintiff should be ascertained. At the court hearings, the Plaintiffs and the Defendant adduced ample evidence to support their respective arguments around the said core issues of dispute. With permission of the court, the Plaintiffs downloaded the data of the registered ship and its members from the website of The Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Limited before the court. In order to verify the truthfulness and legality of the evidence to which the two parties contravened, this Court summoned the witnesses Fan Binghai, Xia Wenxi and Zhang Tangqing, the surveyor Su Qing from Tianjin Maritime Safety Administration and Yang Jiarong from Nanpaihe Fishing Harbour Superintendency and Fishing Boat Inspection Station and the expert appraiser Zheng Yufeng from Tianjin Public Security Bureau to appear before the court. At the court hearings, they gave detailed accounts of the sources of evidence as to how they were obtained and what were sought to prove by such evidence. They also answered the questions by the agents ad litem for the Plaintiffs and the Defendant and the collegial bench. During the course of cross-examination of evidence, the video tapes on the inspection of “ICL Raja Rajan” by Tianjin Maritime Safety Administration and that of the salvage of “Ji Huang Yu 0824” presented by the Plaintiffs were played before the court. To all the evidence before the court, both the agents ad litem for the Plaintiffs and the agents ad litem for the Defendant presented fully their comments and arguments and also made their final presentations. The following were the evidence presented by the Plaintiffs and the Defendant to support their cases and the comment of this Court: Ⅰ. Evidence regarding the capacity of the Defendant and the court’s ascertainment of facts: The Plaintiffs presented 4 items of evidence with regard to the capacity of the Defendant. Evidence 1: Ship’s particulars of “ICL Raja Rajan”, to prove that ICL Shipping Limited called itself “owner” of “ICL Raja Rajan” during the operations of the ship. Evidence 2: Certificate of Nationality of “ICL Raja Rajan”. Being a statutory evidence to substantiate who was the shipowner, the Certificate did not show who was the owner of “ICL Raja Rajan”. Evidence 3: Names of the operator, manager and owner of “ICL Raja Rajan” provided by the Master of “ICL Raja Rajan”. Being contradictory to Evidence 1, this evidence just proved what the Plaintiffs maintained that in ocean shipping industry, shipowner in the broad sense included the owner, operator and charterer of the ship. Evidence 4: Data of the ships and members registered in website of The Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Limited, proving that ICL Shipping Limited joined the Mutual Underwriting Association in the name of the “owner” of “ICL Raja Rajan” and that it was for ICL Shipping Limited that China Re-insurance Company provided a credit security in the amount of USD1,000,000 to Tianjin Maritime Court on behalf of The Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Limited. The Defendant also presented 4 items of evidence in respect of capacity of the Defendant. Evidence 1: Certificate of Registry of “ICL Raja Rajan”, in which the owner of the vessel was not stated. Evidence 2:Bariboat Charter Party, to prove that ICL Shipping Limited was the demise charterer of “ICL Raja Rajan” and that the owner of the vessel was Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services Limited in India. Evidence 3:Classification Certificate of “ICL Raja Rajan”, to prove that the owner of the vessel was Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services Limited in India. Evidence 4: Certificate of the Registered Owner of “ICL Raja Rajan”, to prove that the owner of the vessel was Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services Limited in India. The Plaintiffs submitted that: firstly, in accordance with the relevant provisions in Maritime Procedure Law of P.R.C., the claimant can directly apply for arrest of the offending ship for the claims arising from collision, irrespective of who is the owner of the ship or who has demise-chartered the ship. Such measure can force the person or company liable for the maritime claims to respond to the action. Therefore, it was consistent with the provisions of the Maritime Procedure Law of P.R.C. for the Plaintiffs to bring the suits against the owner of “ICL Raja Rajan”. In the present cases, from the information in the website of Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association which the vessel “ICL Raja Rajan” had entered, the Plaintiffs found out that ICL Shipping Limited joined the Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association in the name of the “owner” of “ICL Raja Rajan”. Thus it could be seen that the credit security in the amount of USD1,000,000 issued by China Re-insurance Company under the entrustment of the Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association for the owner of “ICL Raja Rajan” to Tianjin Maritime Court was issued for ICL Shipping Limited. The fact that ICL Shipping Limited voluntarily responded to the action showed that ICL Shipping Limited itself acknowledged that it shall be liable for the 8 cases. Therefore, it was correct for the Plaintiffs to bring the suits against the Defendant. Secondly, the term “shipowner” is a rather broad and informal term. An exact definition has not been given to “shipowner” under Chinese civil law. “Shipowner” was generally regarded as the owner of a ship. But according to Article 204 and Article 207 of Maritime Code of P.R.C., shipower also includes charterer and operator of a ship. Since ICL Shipping Limited admitted itself as a demise charterer of “ICL Raja Rajan”, obviously, it shall be the eligible Defendant in the eight cases. Thirdly, ICL Shipping Limited operated in the name of the “owner” of “ICL Raja Rajan”. However, when an accident occurred in the course of operation, it claimed to be the demise charterer of the vessel. Such an act to operate in two capacities was actually an act to evade the binding force of law, which is forbidden under Chinese law. To sum up, the Plaintiffs considered that ICL Shipping Limited was the right Defendant in the eight cases on the grounds that the Plaintiffs brought the suits against the shipowner of “ICL Raja Rajan”, which, although was generally understood as owner of the ship, included also the charterer and operator of the ship under the Maritime Code of the P.R.C., and that ICL Shipping Limited admitted that it was the demise charterer of “ICL Raja Rajan” and that it had joined the Mutual Underwriting Association and agreed to be bound by the judgment of the lawsuits, that the Mutual Underwriting Association provided security for ICL Shipping Limited and that ICL Shipping Limited voluntarily responded to the action. The Defendant ICL Shipping Limited argued that the registered owner of m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” was Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services Limited in India who entered into a Bareboat Charter Party with the Defendant on 18 February 1998. Under the Bareboat Charter Party, the “ICL Raja Rajan” was demise-chartered to the Defendant. In the present cases the Defendant was in charge of operation and safety management of the “ICL Raja Rajan” and manned her with the Master and the crewmembers. In accordance with the provisions of Article 144 of Maritime Code of P.R.C. and Clause 6.8 of the Bareboat Charter Party, ICL Shipping Limited considered that the outcome of the lawsuit brought by the Plaintiffs in respect of the loss of “Ji Huang Yu 0824” and personal injury and loss of lives arising from the alleged collision between m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” and “Ji Huang Yu 0824” should be borne by the Defendant, i.e. the Charterer. Thus ICL Shipping Limited was in a right position to respond to the actions initiated by the 25 Plaintiffs. This Court held that the Certificate of Registry of “ICL Raja Rajan” only stated that the nationality of “ICL Raja Rajan” was India, but did not mention who was the owner of the vessel. It was unable to ascertain who was the owner of “ICL Raja Rajan” by the Certificate of Registry. Therefore, this Certificate could not serve as the evidence to ascertain who was the owner of “ICL Raja Rajan”. The information downloaded by the Plaintiffs from the website of the Mutual Underwriting Association before the court stated that the owner of “ICL Raja Rajan” was ICL Shipping Limited. The defendant did not object to the truthfulness of the information, and admitted at the court hearing that ICL Shipping Limited was a member of the Mutual Underwriting Association, thus further verifying the truthfulness of the information downloaded from the website. Therefore, this Court admitted the documentary evidence downloaded from the website of the Mutual Underwriting Association. This Court also admitted other evidence to the truthfulness of which the two parties did not raise objection and which was not self-contradictory in substance. The above evidence proved that the owner of ‘ICL RAJA RAJAN” was Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services Limited and ICL Shipping Limited was the demise charterer of “ICL Raja Rajan”. But ICL Shipping Limited sometimes acted in the name of the owner of “ICL Raja Rajan” in its course of business and joined the Mutual Underwriting Association also in the name of the owner of “ICL Raja Rajan”. And it was ascertained that ICL Shipping Limited asserted that it was the demise charterer of “ICL Raja Rajan” only in the course of litigation. Ⅱ. Ascertainment of evidence regarding the facts, causes of collision, damage resulted and analysis of facts: The plaintiffs presented 26 items of evidence to support their cases. All the evidence was collected from Tianjin Maritime Safety Administration by this Court on application of the Plaintiffs. The evidence included: Evidence 1. Deck Log Book of m/v “ICL Raja Rajan”; Evidence 2. Engine Log Book of M/V “ICL Raja Rajan”; Evidence 3. Record of Movement of M/V “ICL Raja Rajan”; Evidence 4. GPS Record of M/V “ICL Raja Rajan” and the Navigation Course of m/v “ICL Raja Rajan”; Evidence 5. Copies of Sea Charts of M/V “ICL Raja Rajan” used between 11-12 April; Evidence 6. Written Records of Inquiries to the Master, the Second Officer and Duty Officer of m/v “ICL Raja Rajan”; Evidence 7. Reports given by the Master and the Second Officer of m/v “ICL Raja Rajan”; Evidence 8. Ship’s Particulars, Data of Circling, Address of Shipowner’s Company, Certificate of Ship’s Nationality, Weather Forecast, Crew List, Certificate of Competence of the Master, and of the Second Officer, Calculation of Blind Area of Radar; Evidence 9. Distress Report on “Ji Huang Yu 0824” given by Fishery Superintendency Administration of Nanpaihe Port; Evidence 10. Report on Distress and Salvage of “Ji Huang Yu 0824” given by Shenjiabao Villagers’ Committee of Nanpaihe Town; Evidence 11. Inspection Certificate of Fishing Boat “Ji Huang Yu 0824”; Evidence 12. List of Deceased Crew Members of “Ji Huang Yu 0824” and Conditions of their Families; Evidence 13. Report given by the Witness Fan Binghai– the Master of the Fishing Boat “JI CANG 611”; Evidence 14. Written Record of Inquiries to Xia Wenxi, the Master of “Ji Huang Yu 0831”; Evidence 15. Written Record of Inquiries to Zhang Tangqing, the Master of “Ji Huang Yu 0320”; Evidence 16. Written Record of Inquiries to Xia Wenxing, the Secretary of Communist Party Shenjiabao Village Branch; Evidence 17. Written Record of Inquiries to Yang Jiarong of Nanpaihe Fishery Superintendence Administration Evidence 18. Survey Report on Damage to Fishing Boat given by Nanpaihe Fishery Superintendency Administration; Evidence 19. Information on Evidence collection and Survey Drawings dated 12 April (night); Evidence 20. Inspection and Appraisal Report issued by Department No.5 of Tianjin Public Security Bureau; Evidence 21. Weather Information provided by the meteorological service; Evidence 22. Information on inbound vessels calling at Tianjin via Changshan Channels provided by Changshan Supervision Station of Yantai Harbor Superintendency; Evidence 23. Documents furnished by China Offshore Oil North Shipping Company; Evidence 24. Information of inquiry on other vessels calling at Tianjin; Evidence 25. Videotapes on collection of evidence from m/v “ICL Raja Rajan”; Evidence 26. Videotapes on the Wreck of the Fishing Boat. The Defendant also presented 14 items of evidence respecting core issue No.2: Evidence 1. Crew List; Evidence 2. Sea Chart of “ICL Raja Rajan”; Evidence 3. Deck Log Book of “ICL Raja Rajan”; Evidence 4. Engine Log Book of “ICL Raja Rajan”; Evidence 5. GPS Record of “ICL Raja Rajan”; Evidence 6. Weather Forecast; Evidence 7. Passage Plan of “ICL Raja Rajan”; Evidence 8. Master’s Night Orders; Evidence 9. Statement of the Master of “ICL Raja Rajan”; Evidence 10. Statement of the Second Officer of “ICL Raja Rajan”; Evidence 11. Master’s Comments on the Alleged Collision; Evidence 12. Test record of Circling of “ICL Raja Rajan”; Evidence 13. Test record of Crash Stopping distance; Evidence 14. Photos of the hull of “ICL Raja Rajan”. This Court collected two items of evidence: Evidence 1. Investigation Report issued by Tianjin Maritime Safety Administration; Evidence 2. Certificate of the Position of Platform A, Station 646. The Plaintiffs contended that the above evidence sufficed to prove that “ICL Raja Rajan” had collided “Ji Huang Yu 0824”, resulting in the death of the seven crewmembers including Pi Zhongrong, and escaped from the spot. The Defendant shall bear the full liability for the collision and compensate for the losses of the Plaintiffs in the eight cases, “ICL Raja Rajan” shall not be exempted from liability since she deliberately ran away from the spot of accident. The Plaintiffs pleaded that: there was irrefutable evidence to support the fact that “ICL Raja Rajan” collided “Ji Huang Yu 0824”. From the video tape played before the court with regard to collection of evidence by Tianjin Maritime Safety Administration from the bulbous bow of “ICL Raja Rajan”, it could be seen clearly that there was a piece of blue paint on the bulbous bow of “ICL Raja Rajan”, which was obviously different from the color of the bow of “ICL Raja Rajan”. Anyone without achromatopsia could distinguish the difference between such blue paint and the paint of “ICL Raja Rajan”: the paint was not of “ICL Raja Rajan” but from outside. The evidence was collected by Tianjin Maritime Safety Administration in company with the Master of “ICL Raja Rajan” and the correspondent of the P& I Club of “ICL Raja Rajan” in a boat. The paint, wood splinters and rope fibers were collected and bagged in the presence of the Master and the P& I correspondent. The bags were then sealed. The Master of “ICL Raja Rajan” signed on the mouths of the bags. It could be said that the whole process of evidence collection by Tianjin Maritime Safety Administration was open and just. During the court hearings, the Defendant did not raise any objection to the fairness of the process adopted by Tianjin Maritime Safety Administration in collecting evidence, or, to put it in another way, the Defendant itself also thought the evidence collection process was fair. The materials such as blue paint did come from the other ship. The samples taken by Tianjin Maritime Safety Administration were sent to Tianjin Public Security Bureau for inspection. The conclusions of criminal technical inspection and test were: (1) the color of the paint found on, but foreign to, “ICL Raja Rajan” was the same as the color of paint of “Ji Huang Yu 0824”; (2) the thickness of the paint coating found on, but foreign to, “ICL Raja Rajan” was the same as that of “Ji Huang Yu 0824”; (3) Inspected with cracked-gas chromatography, the chromatogram of the paint found on, but foreign to, “ICL Raja Rajan” was the same as that of the paint of “Ji Huang Yu 0824”; (4) the type of fiber structure of the wood splinters found on, but foreign to, “ICL Raja Rajan” was the same as that of fiber structure of the wood of “Ji Huang Yu 0824”; (5) the nature of rope fiber found on, but foreign to, “ICL Raja Rajan” was the same as the rope fiber of “Ji Huang Yu 0824”. The above evidence, in particular the identity of the color, thickness and chromatogram of the paint, the type of rope fiber and wood splinters to those of “Ji Huang Yu 0824”, sufficed to prove that “ICL Raja Rajan” did collide with “Ji Huang Yu 0824”. The Plaintiffs wish to draw the attention of the court that during the whole course of court hearings, the Defendant just stuck to and got entangled in some minor points but failed to adduce any evidence to rebut the crucial evidence, i.e., the appraised material evidence sufficient to prove the occurrence of collision between “ICL Raja Rajan” and “Ji Huang Yu 0824”. Besides the Defendant did not raise any objection to the fairness of the two important links: sample-taking and appraisal. In fact, the Defendant himself acquiesced in the occurrence of the collision. After the Plaintiffs had submitted the above evidence, their burden of proof under Chinese law had been discharged. The evidence collected by Tianjin Maritime Safety Administration and the appraisal conclusion based on the material evidence of Tianjin Public Security Bureau could sufficiently prove that “ICL Raja Rajan” did collide with “Ji Huang Yu 0824”. Thus the Plaintiffs had fulfilled their obligations to adduce evidence. The Defendant shall adduce evidence to prove that the collision between “ICL Raja Rajan” and “Ji Huang Yu 0824” did not take place, if the Defendant contended so. But so far the Defendant did not present any evidence to prove that no collision ever occurred. Therefore, the fact that the two ships did come into collision was undeniable. So far as the position of the collision was concerned, the Defendant submitted that: Had “ICL Raja Rajan”, a ship of 50,000 D.W. T. sailing at a speed of 12.5 knots, indeed collided “Ji Huang Yu 0824”, a wooden fishing boat whose LOA was 24.6 meters, the collision would create a force much stronger than the holding power of the fishing boat’s anchor. Thus the anchor of the fishing boat would have been pulled up. The Plaintiffs took the view that such views of the Defendant were groundless. It was because m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” was a ship of 50,000 D.W. sailing at a speed of 12.5 knots, while the velocity of “Ji Huang Yu 0824” was zero, that m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” cut instantly through “Ji Huang Yu 0824” in the middle at an angle of blow of almost 90°. By the time her anchor chain was not fully under stress, “Ji Huang Yu 0824” had been cut up in the middle. Therefore, the stress exerted upon the anchor chain of “Ji Huang Yu 0824” was the inertial force exerted on the bow of “Ji Huang Yu 0824”. That was why the anchor chain of “Ji Huang Yu 0824” would not have been pulled up or broken. Hence, the views of the Defendant were baseless. In the second place, the Defendant alleged that “In the light of the customs of the fishermen, they usually report their positions by indicating a certain fishing area. Even if the fishing boats were equipped with GPS devices, the fishermen, unless required for special reason, would not record the positions in longitude and latitude of scores of digits”. The Plaintiffs had no idea from where the Defendant gained such information regarding the customs of the fishermen, but the Plaintiffs could be certain that what the Defendant alleged was entirely incorrect so far as the present conditions were concerned. Actually, given that nowadays the fishing boats are generally equipped with GPS, it is a common sense that fishermen fix positions with the aid of GPS, which are not only the means for recording the position, but more importantly for recording time and production, so as to be used as a guidance for production in the future. This was already a customary practice among the fishermen. The Defendant, who was utterly unaware of the customs of the fishermen in production, groundlessly alleged that fishermen fixed positions without the aid of GPS. Such an allegation was basically wrong. Therefore, the dubious allegation of the Defendant formed on groundless basis had no evidential effect in this case. With regard to the time of the collision, the sole basis on which the Defendant purported that the time of collision was not 0330 hrs was the statement of Tianjin Maritime Safety Administration that the time of collision was 0300 hrs. However, the Defendant failed to produce any proof to show that Tianjin Maritime Safety Administration had ascertained that the time of collision was 0300 hrs. The Plaintiffs noted that the Defendant based all his views on groundless assumption. Under such premise, the views of the Defendant could not have been correct. For instance, the Defendant submitted first of all that the visibility of the anchor light was 1.6 nautical miles. Nevertheless, quite a number of fishermen attested at the court hearing that the visibility of an anchor light of fishing should range from 2 to 3 nautical miles under normal conditions. Thus it would be groundless for the Defendant to hold that “Ji Cang 611” and “Ji Huang Yu 0824”, which were 2 nautical miles apart, could catch sight of each other. Secondly, the Defendant’s view that the “Ji Cang 611” was unlikely to have noticed “Ji Huang Yu 0824” ex ante facto was a even more groundless assumption. At the court hearing, the master of “Ji Cang 611” clearly indicated that the reason why he had noticed “Ji Huang Yu 0824” was that the two boats were quite close, and that he was afraid that their fishing nets would be twisted together and resulted in an accident. In fishing, fishermen were usually attentive to the direction in which nets of the fishing boats nearby were cast, so as to avoid entangling of nets. It could be said that it was the common sense in terms of fishing operation. The allegation of the Defendant was essentially running counter to the customs of production of fishermen, and was thus meaningless. Furthermore, the Defendant took the view that “Ji Cang 611” was almost at the same latitude as “Ji Huang Yu 0824” and the “611” was to the east of the “0824”. While “ICL Raja Rajan” was steering a course of 270°; had “ICL Raja Rajan” indeed collided the “0824”, then she would certainly have collided with the “611” first. Such views were also entirely untenable. In the Statement of Second Officer of m/v “ICL Raja Rajan”, the Second Officer admitted that auto piloting was changed to manual piloting at 0315 hrs. Besides, the Second Officer also professed that there were approximately 150 fishing boats scattering at this area during that period, and that he kept altering courses to steer clear of the fishing boats. The Statement of the Master and the Engine Log Book of m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” also proved that the main engine of m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” did not reduce speed at 0100-0400 hrs on 12 April, 2000. Nor was the sailing speed reduced. According to calculation, the sailing speed of m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” was 12 knots at 0200-0300 hrs, 11.67 knots at 0300-0336 hrs, 12.67 knots at 0336-0345 hrs, and 12.6 knots at 0345-0400 hrs. Apparently, given that the number of revolution of the main engine was not reduced, m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” kept steering clear of those fishing boats by constantly altering her course. Under such circumstances, it was unlikely that m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” would always remain at a course of 270°, but kept altering courses instead. Therefore, m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” would not have collided with the “611”, but collided “Ji Huang Yu 0824” directly. With respect to the Certificate of Fishing Boat, the expert examiner Yang Jiarong explicitly indicated at the court hearing that he made the inspection of “Ji Huang Yu 0824” whilst her aft part was towed to shallow water on the morning of 20 April, and gave an inspection report on the same day. The Plaintiffs were of the view that the statement of Yang Jiarong was absolutely true and reliable. The Plaintiffs would like to remind the court of a fact that although the Defendant kept attempting to find fault with this inspection report, he had also sent his personnel to inspect the fishing boat, but he had not adduced any evidence to deny one major fact proved therein, i.e., “Ji Huang Yu 0824” had been cut into two halves by a ship coming up from her port side at an angle of almost 90°. Alternatively, it may be said that the Defendant admitted that “Ji Huang Yu 0824” had been collided and caused to sink by a vessel sailing from east to west at an angle of almost 90°. It could well be proved that the boat had been collided and caused to sink by m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” in light of the specific circumstances in this case. The Plaintiffs reminded the court that the Defendant had never produced any proof in repudiation of the occurrence of the collision, but merely cast doubt over the evidence adduced by the Plaintiffs by recourse to the purported customs or practice, the source of which was known to nobody. The Defendant could not afford any persuasive basis for the doubts raised by him. Therefore, the Plaintiffs maintained that the views of the Defendant were groundless and worthless to this case. The Plaintiffs also held that m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” had not only collided with “Ji Huang Yu 0824” and caused her to sink, but there were sufficient facts indicating that m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” deliberately escaped from the scene after contacting “Ji Huang Yu 0824”, thus “m/v ICL Raja Rajan” should be held fully responsible for the serious consequences resulting therefrom and should not be entitled to the benefit of limitation of liability. Based on the sea chart of m/v “ICL Raja Rajan”, her master had fixed the course and set down various points for altering courses. However, m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” turned to starboard sharply at 0336 hrs, about 10 nautical miles in advance of the point fixed by the master for altering course. Besides, the vessel’s alteration of course without the prior consent of her master was obviously very abnormal. It was particularly noteworthy that m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” passed a position less than half a mile from the dangerous obstacles marked on the sea chart of m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” after altering the course to starboard at about 0336 hrs. Furthermore, it could be clearly seen from the video tape on the inspection carried out by Tianjin Maritime Safety Administration that there were quite a number of fresh scrape marks on the bow of m/v “ICL Raja Rajan”, and the scrape marks were rather deep. It would be unlikely that the duty officer of m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” did not feel such serious collision as cutting “Ji Huang Yu 0824” into halves in the middle. Moreover, it was attested in the Statement of the Master of the “611” that m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” suddenly switched the lights on after the collision with “Ji Huang Yu 0824”, then switched them off and continued her voyage. This was the irrefutable evidence to verify the fact that m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” did become aware of the collision after contacting “Ji Huang Yu 0824”. Based on the foregoing evidence, it was certain that m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” deliberately escaped from the scene after colliding with “Ji Huang Yu 0824”, and it was after m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” collided with “Ji Huang Yu 0824” that the Second Officer switched the lights on, then switched them off and continued the voyage, and later turned to starboard 10 nautical miles in advance without sticking to the course fixed by the master, so that the vessel passed the position less than half a mile from the dangerous obstacles, then he called on the master to the bridge. The Plaintiffs were of the view that such act of the Defendant amounted to violation of the most fundamental principle of international law. Criminal punishment should be imposed on those committing such act. The acts of the crew of the Defendant did also aggravate the harmful consequences. They were punishable by law for their deliberate act of escape after they created the disturbance. From the Plaintiffs’ perspective, the Defendant should be fully answerable for the collision. “Ji Huang Yu 0824” was at anchor at the material time, which had been corroborated by the statements of the “611” and the “0831”. Moreover, “Ji Huang Yu 0824” had exhibited her navigation lights in pursuance with the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions. What’s more, “Ji Huang Yu 0824” maintained a good lookout, which could be proved by the fact that six out of seven crew members on board were found dead in the cabin, while the captain Chen Lianhe fell into the sea afterwards. It was certain that the master Chen Lianhe was keeping a lookout at the material time, and was caused to fall into the sea as a result of the collision. However, m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” collided “Ji Huang Yu 0824”, which exhibited her navigation lights pursuant to the Regulations for Preventing Collisions, and caused the latter to sink in obvious violation of the relevant provisions of International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972. Thus m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” should be held fully liable for making compensation in this case. The fact that after colliding with “Ji Huang Yu 0824” and causing the latter to sink, m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” escaped without performing the obligation for salvage as prescribed in the international convention was an important cause attributable to serious consequence in this case. As “Ji Huang Yu 0824” was operated by a family, the accident brought about almost extermination of an entire family of the Plaintiffs. Seven people, namely, Chen Lianhe, Chen Lianke, Chen Xiuqiang, Chen Xiuliang, Wang Zhizhen, Chen Zhixia and Pi Zhongrong, were all dead. The Plaintiff Zhang Xiu’an lost four relatives (two sons and two grandsons) in this accident. Pi Zhonglan, the wife of Chen Lianke, lost her husband Chen Lianke, her son Chen Xiuqiang and her younger brother Pi Zhongrong. Wang Shulan, the mother of Chen Xiuliang, lost her son Chen Xiuliang and her younger sister's husband Wang Zhizhen. Among the male citizens of the whole Chen’s family, only Chen Lianyi, aged 55, and Chen Xiuming, aged 17, were left. This accident had brought about a disastrous extermination of an entire family of Chen. Such severe consequence was just a result of the escape of m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” after she created a disturbance. Had m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” rescued the fishermen in time after the collision pursuant to the international convention, the harmful consequences would not have become so serious as in this case. Chen Lianhe, who fell over board from the boat, would not have been killed if he had been rescued without delay at the material time. Moreover, after “Ji Huang Yu 0824” was split into halves by the collision, the forward half of the boat, instead of being sunk, was still floating on the sea surface. If m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” had rendered a salvage immediately at that time, the three crew members in the wreckage of forward half, where there was still air in the cabin, would hopefully have been rescued. However, it was just because m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” escaped after causing the accident, the best opportunity of rescue was lost. As a result seven fishermen on board “Ji Huang Yu 0824” were all doomed to death, resulting in the most mournful tragedy in the world and inflicting irretrievable damage upon the Plaintiffs. Therefore, the Defendant should be held fully answerable for compensation for all losses in this accident. The Defendant held the view that none of the aforementioned evidence could prove that “Ji Huang Yu 0824” was indeed collided by “ICL Raja Rajan”, inasmuch as none of the evidence adduced by the Defendent relating to the collision position, collision time, collided parts and the scratches of the alleged collision may support such allegation. Nevertheless, those factors were indispensable for analyzing and handling the collision case. With respect to the position of collision, the Plaintiffs maintained that after the fishing boat “Ji Huang Yu 0824” was collided and split into two parts, the forward half capsized but was still linked with her anchor cable and kept floating at the collision position -38°39’.7N/118°37’.2E, and the aft part was discovered over 30 meters from the forward parts, the forward half capsized but was still linked with her anchor cable and kept floating at the position (i.e. 38°39’.7N/118°37’.2E). The aft half of the wreckage was found at the place more than 30 meters away from the forward half. In accordance with the statement of the witness of the Master of “Ji Huang Yu 0831”, he had ever communicated through VHF with “Ji Huang Yu 0824” at 0040 advising the anchor position of the wreckage. Thus it could be certain that the collision position was just where the wreckage of “Ji Huang Yu 0824” was found, i.e. 38°39’.7N/118°37’.2E . The foregoing allegations of the Plaintiffs did not correspond to the fact. Firstly, as far as the navigation experience and common knowledge were concerned, had “ICL Raja Rajan” indeed contacted “Ji Huang Yu 0824”, in consideration of a wide difference between “ICL Raja Rajan” and “Ji Huang Yu 0824” in respect of the building material, quality and velocity (“ICL Raja Rajan”: 50,000 D.W., velocity: 12.5 knots; “Ji Huang Yu 0824”: LOA: 24.6 meters, quality: wood, velocity: 0), the wide difference would create a force which would much stronger than the holding power of the fishing boat’s anchor (calculation showed the holding power of the anchor was approximately 1.7 tons). Under such circumstances, the anchor of the fishing boat would have been pulled up, or the anchor cable would have been broken off. It was hard to believe that the forward part of “Ji Huang Yu 0824” could remain at the anchor position. Besides, a wooden fishing boat would not sink right after the collision but would be drifting with the winds and waves for some time. Therefore, even if the Plaintiffs could fix the positions of the forward and aft parts of the fishing boat, those positions at most could show where the wrecks were found, but could not be used as the proof in support of the first scene of the alleged collision. Therefore, even if it was found that “ICL Raja Rajan” had passed or had been close to the position where the wreck of the fishing boat was found, it was uncertain that “ICL Raja Rajan” had collided with “Ji Huang Yu 0824”. Secondly, the Plaintiffs insisted the anchor position of “Ji Huang Yu 0824” prior to the accident was the position where the forward part of the boat’s wreck was found. The direct proof that the plaintiff relied on was the witness statement of the master of “Ji Huang Yu 0831”. The master’s witness statement was a fabrication basing on the following analysis: (1) Plotting made in accordance with the accurate anchor positions described by the master of “Ji Huang Yu 0831” showing the “Ji Huang Yu 0824” should have been anchored at 2.0 nautical miles northwest of “Ji Huang Yu 0831”. Whereas the two boats were 2.0 nautical miles apart, it would be difficult for them to clearly identify each other in consideration of the visibility and background lights at that material time. (2) In the light of the customs of the fishermen, they usually report their positions by indicating a certain fishing area. Even if the fishing boats were equipped with GPS devices, the fishermen, unless required for special reason, would not record the positions in longitude/latitude composed of scores of digits. What is more, when “Ji Huang Yu 0824” exchanged her information about position with “Ji Huang Yu 0831”, they were chatting in a usual and causal way. Even if the “0824” had reported to “0831” the accurate latitude and longitude position composed of 15 digits, under the circumstance that no evidence showed “Ji Huang Yu 0831” had taken record of the reported position in writing, it was unbelievable that the “0831” could recollect the digits accurately after the accident. As far as the navigation experience was concerned, in order to precisely keep the accurate latitude and longitude in mind in a short time, repeated training over a long period of time would be required. The Defendant did not think that the master of “Ji Huang Yu 0831” had undergone such special training. (3) If the master of “Ji Huang Yu 0831” had a clear memory of the latitude and longitude of the “0824”, he would not have wrongly assessed the distance between the two fishing boats to be only more than one mile while he was aware of the exact position of “Ji Huang Yu 0824”. (4) If the master of “Ji Huang Yu 0831” could remember the accurate latitude and longitude of the “0824” by heart, he would not have been indifferent and unconcerned upon hearing early in the morning a report from the master of “Ji Cang 611” that a wreck was found at the position of 38°39’.7N /118°37’.2E. He would not have arrived at that position until 1140 hrs. It was only after he had seen the boat’s name written in red paint on the foamed box rising from the wreck that he began to realize that the wreck was “Ji Huang Yu 0824”. His series of statements were self-contradictory. (5) The Defendants cited the witness statement of the master of “0831” in an attempt to prove the anchor position of “Ji Huang Yu 0824” before the alleged collision took place. But it could be seen apparently from the foregoing analysis that the alleged position of the “0824” witnessed by “0831” was fabricated after the accident. Such a statement could not be taken as a basis for ascertaining a fact. Therefore, given that the position of ship collision could not be ascertained, it was baseless for the Plaintiffs to allege “ICL Raja Rajan” had contacted the “Ji Huang Yu 0824”. In regard to the time of the alleged collision, the Plaintiffs alleged the time of collision was 0330 hrs of 12 April, 2000. The major reason to say so was based on the witness statement of the master of “Ji Cang 611” (Evidence 1-13), who alleged that he saw a large vessel passing by at 0330 hrs and the anchor lights of “Ji Huang Yu 0824” went off later. Such witness statement was also fabricated. (1) Plotting shows the anchor position of “Ji Cang 611” (38°39’.8N /118°39’.17E) was almost at the same latitude as the alleged position of “Ji Huang Yu 0824” (38°39’.7N /118°37’.20E). That is, the distance between these two positions should be only 0.1 mile N-S and 1.6 miles W-E. Accordingly, the master’s statement was incorrect and obviously misleading in saying that the “0824” was at starboard bow of “Ji Cang 611”. (2) The anchor lights of fishing boats were usually powered by storage battery after the boats dropped anchor. So the anchor lights were usually very dim. At that time, there were numerous fishing boats operating in the vicinity, and the lights (mostly the net hauling operation lights) displayed by them would form very bright background. Under such circumstances it would be very difficult to catch sight of a dim anchor light from a distance of 1.6 nautical miles. It was impossible for “Ji Cang 611” to have observed the time when the anchor light of the “0824” went off. In practice, it was not necessary at all for the master of the “611” to keep watching the anchor light of a fishing boat in a far distance which was neither from the same village nor acquainted with each other. (3) As mentioned earlier, “Ji Cang 611” was almost at the same latitude as “Ji Huang Yu 0824” and the “611” was to the east of the “0824”, while “ICL Raja Rajan” was steering a course of 270° and proceeding at 12.5 knots (0.21 nautical miles/minute). Had “ICL Raja Rajan” indeed collided the “0824”, as determined by the Plaintiffs, then she would certainly have collided with the “611” first. But according to the master of the “611”, the vessel passed ahead of his boat safely. Suppose the “vessel” was “ICL Raja Rajan”, it was unlikely that she had collided the “0824”. Furthermore, the master of “611” said in his statement that the vessel did not pose any danger of collision to “611”, and the “611” did not give any signal warning the vessel of the danger of collision. This showed the witness statement of the master of “Ji Cang 611” was unbelievable. (4) Had the master of “611” noticed the anchor light displayed by “Ji Huang Yu 0824” disappeared after the vessel passed, he ought to have realized that the “0824” could have encountered an accident, and should have taken necessary action to rescue and called for rescue for the boat in distress instead of remaining idle until 0530 when he heaved up and reached the place where the anchor light disappeared and to rescue. (5) It was alleged in the witness statement of the “611” that the cargo vessel had “switched on all her lights, then all the lights went off, and the vessel continued proceeding”. This was even more unbelievable. In consideration of the relative positions of “Ji Huang Yu 0824” and “Ji Cang 611”, had “ICL Raja Rajan” indeed contacted the “0824” and caused disappearance of the latter’s anchor light, then “ICL Raja Rajan” would have been to due west of the “611” before altering her course. In other words, the “611” would only be able to see the right stern of “ICL Raja Rajan”. “ICL Raja Rajan” was an aft-engine bulk carrier. Her bridge was in the aft part. Cranes were equipped for cargo holds in front of the bridge. The ship had no big mast. Therefore, the lights on the deck were generally low. If those deck lights were switched on, the bridge would block off the light. On the other hand, the deck lights were set to illuminate the deck and her cargo holds. So it was impossible to see at the rear of the bridge if the deck lights were on. Therefore, it was not true that the “611” had sighted various lights displayed from the vessel. Moreover, the switch control panel of the deck lights of “ICL Raja Rajan” was not on the bridge but in each mast house on deck. It took approximately 10 minutes to switch on all the deck lights. Although the two mercurial lights on both wings of the bridge could be switched on and off from the bridge, it would take at least 6 minutes for them to warm up and work well. “ICL Raja Rajan” would have sailed 2-3 miles in the 10-more minutes. Under this circumstance, it was impossible that the master of “Ji Cang 611” could see the deck lights of “ICL Raja Rajan”. (6) According to the master of “Ji Cang 611”, he found the “Ji Huang Yu 0824” capsized when heaving up her anchor at 0530 hours on April 12. This was unlikely to happen, either. The “611” alleged that at 0330 hrs he saw the anchor light of “Ji Huang Yu 0824” going off, but he “did not think much about that”. It did not make any sense that the “611” should pay attention to the disappearance of anchor light and started searching even before dawn. When Tianjin Harbor Master boarded “ICL Raja Rajan” for the first time to carry out investigation into the marine accident, they told the master that the collision occurred at 0300 hrs on 12 April, and focused on inquiring and gathering information from the master and the second officer about the navigation of the ship between 0220 hrs and 0330 hrs on 12 April. Tianjin Daily News Report of 24 April, 2000 reported that the collision occurred at 0300 hrs on 12 April. The Written Record of Inquiry of Yang Jiarong of Nanpaihe Fishery Port Superintendency Administration and Report of Collision of “0824” furnished by the Plaintiffs revealed that the initial report time of collision was about 0300 hrs. In the Report on the Casualty and Salvage of “Ji Huang Yu 0824” furnished by the Plaintiffs, it was clarified that the professed collision occurred at 0300 hrs. The aforesaid on-site Report was more reliable than the statement of the master of “Ji Cang 611” made 6 days after the accident, and also proved from another angle that the master’s witness statement was a fabrication while he said that he saw the anchor lights of “Ji Huang Yu 0824” go off at 0330 hrs. On the other hand, at 0300 hrs, “ICL Raja Rajan” was at the position of 38°39’.50N /118°45’.50E, being 6.8 nautical miles away from the alleged anchor position of the “0824”. It was absolutely unlikely that “ICL Raja Rajan” had collided with “Ji Huang Yu 0824”. Tianjin Maritime Safety Administration admitted that it determined the time of collision to be 0330 hours based on the fact that the position of “ICL Raj Rajan” recorded in the Deck Log Book and Sea Charts at 0330 hours was nearest to the postion of the wreckage of the fishing boat. This was obviously a practice “of determining the result first and then look for a reason for it”, and was totally unfair to “ICL Raja Rajan”. In brief, the Plaintiffs failed to adduce effective evidence to show the time of the alleged collision and it was groundless for them to claim that “ICL Raja Rajan” was the collision maker. With regard to the alleged parts collided, the Plaintiffs furnished an Inspection Report on the wreck of “Ji Huang Yu 0824” worked out by the Survey Society of Fishing vessels under the Ministry of Agriculture of the PRC, its conclusion was that the fishing boat was collided and cut off on her port side from 90° abeam. In the statement of the master of “Ji Huang Yu 0320”, it was asserted that the “Ji Huang Yu 0824” was heading southwards when anchored. In the Defendant’s opinion, neither of the aforesaid items of evidence the Plaintiffs relied on was authentic. Firstly, with reference to the Inspection Report the Defendant noted that the inspection date was 20 April, 2000. Nevertheless, the Report on the Casualty and Salvage of “Ji Huang Yu 0824” furnished by the Plaintiffs showed the fore part of the wreck of the fishing boat was towed back to Nanpaihe on the evening ofApril 14, and the aft part was towed to Nanpaihe on the morning of April 21. Under such circumstances, how could the survey Society of Fishing vessels inspect the two parts of wrecks and give a report on 20 April? Apparently, it was a fabricated document. Therefore, there was no valid evidence to show that the port side of “JI Huang Yu 0824” was struck and accordingly it was groundless to determine that “ICL Raja Rajan” sailing westward was the offending vessel. Under the circumstance that the possibility that the starboard side of “JI Huang Yu 0824” was struck could not be excluded, the possibility that a ship sailing eastward could be the offending ship could not be excluded either. In fact, according to the result of inspection conducted by our surveyors, the possibility that the starboard side of the fishing boat was struck was higher. Secondly, the witness statement of “Ji Huang Yu 0320” was untrue: (1) By the anchor position provided by “0320”, plotting showed the boat’s position was 4.0 nautical miles east of the alleged anchor position of the “0824”. Then there was an apparent difference of 4-5 nautical miles distance purported by the master of “0320”. Generally speaking, the range of anchor lights of a fishing boat does not exceed 2 nautical miles. Thus it was impossible that the “0320” could see the “0824” and told her heading, which was 4.0 nautical miles away from “0320”, especially in consideration of the numerous fishing boats in the vicinity and the background of bright light. (2) If the vessel sighted by the master of “0320” were m/v “ICL Raja Rajan”, he should have sighted the vessel while being 3-5 nautical miles away under the prevailing circumstances, rather than discovering the vessel at a distance of 0.5 nautical mile. This at least showed that “0320” did not keep a regular lookout and thus the statement of the master of “0320” was not trustworthy. (3) The anchor position of “Ji Huang Yu 0320” was almost on the same latitude as “Ji Huang Yu 0824”. If m/v “ICL Raja Rajan”, which was sailing due west had contacted “Ji Huang Yu 0824” (to which the Defendant did not admit), then it would at least have brought about a serious danger of collision to “0320”. In the Statment of the Master of “0320”, the large vessel (m/v “ICL Raja Rajan”), passed clear at 0.5 nautical mile to her south without giving rise to any danger of collision. Thus m/v “ICL Raja Rajan” would not have given rise to any danger of colliding with “Ji Huang Yu 0824” which was on the same latitude with “0320”. With respect to the alleged expert evaluation of material evidence, the Defendant raised the following objections to the On-Site Survey Report made by Tianjin Harbor Master and the Report on Analysis and Expert Evaluation of Material Evidence issued by Tianjin Public Security Bureau: (1) The Defendant still dissented from the legality of the source of the samples drawn for analysis and expert evaluation, as follows: a. When Tianjin Harbor Master made an inspection of and drew samples from the bow of “ICL Raja Rajan”, they refused to leave a sample to the ship. Therefore, the Defendant was of the view that there was scanty evidence to verify that the samples were taken from “ICL Raja Rajan” as claimed in the said report. b. Tianjin Harbor Master indicated in its On-Site Survey Report that 13 samples were taken from the bulbous bow of “ICL Raja Rajan” above the water
  • Cai Guimu v. Guigang Office of PICC

    2004-03-16

    BEIHAI MARITIME COURT PEOPLE’ S REPUBLIC OF CHINA CIVIL JUDGMENT No.Hai-Shang-Chu 022 (2001) Plaintiff: Cai Guimu, male, Han nationnality, shareholder of Nanyue Sugar Company, Lufeng City, Guangdong Province Domicile: Donghai Town, Lufeng City, Guangdong Province Agent ad Litem: Cai Shaofeng, attorney-at-law of Renheng Law Firm, Guangdong Province Agent ad Litem: Lin Setai, male, 50 years old, legal adviser to Sugar & Biscuits Factory of Lufeng City, Guangdong Province Domicile: Donghai Town, Lufeng City, Guangdong Province Defendant: Guigang Office of PICC Domicile: Kou’an Block, Zhongshan Road, Guigang City Legal Representative: Mai Guocheng, vice president Agent ad Litem: Qin Dongming , attorney-at-law of Zhixin Law Firm, Guangzhou City Agent ad Litem: Yu Wenqiu, male, 72 years old, vice president of Xingbao Consultation Service Company of Guangxi Domicile: No. 16, Xinghu Road, Xincheng District, Nanning City This court accepted the cases of dispute over insurance contract of carriage of goods by water on March 27, 2000, and organized a collegial bench to hold open court hearing. The litigants of the case were as follows: the plaintiff Cai Guimu; the defendant Guigang Office of PICC and third parties Jiangbei Auto Team of Gangbei District, Guigang City; United Transport Company of Guigang City, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region; Jiangkou No.1 Water Transport Company of Guiping City. This case was transferred to this court by Guigang Intermediate People’s Court. The bench held a public hearing on September 11. On account of the fact that the aforementioned third parties were not the parties to the insurance contract in this case, the collegial bench made an oral ruling that the third parties should quit this suit. The hearing was held with the presence of the defendant Cai Guimu, agents ad litem Cai Shaofang and Lin Cetai, the principal leader of the defendant Mai Guocheng, agents ad litem Qin Dongming and Yu Wenqiu. The hearing has now been concluded. The plaintiff alleged: on December 7, 1998 the plaintiff authorized the Jiangbei Auto Team of Gangbei District of Guigang City ( hereinafter called Jiangbei Team) to deliver 180 tons of red sugar worth RMB ¥455,400 from No.2 Sugar Factory of Tiandong County in Guangxi to Qunxing Dock in Xintang of Zengcheng City, Guangdong province. Jiangbei Team was also entrusted to apply for insurance of inland carriage of goods by water and land. On October 9, Jiangbei Team contacted the United Transport Company of Guigang City of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region (hereinafter called “ United Co.”) who then hired the ship No. 014 of Jiangkou No.1 Water Transport Company of Guiping City (hereinafter called “Water Transport”) as the carrying vessel. On October10, having confirmed the goods and the ship, the defendant issued insurance certificates of inland carriage of goods by water and land with 180 tons of red sugar as subject-matter insured. The contract of insurance was thereby concluded and took effect. The red sugar, however, was lost when it was carried by the Ship 014 run by Water Transport. Such non-delivery of the goods should be the risk covered by the transportation insurance. The plaintiff claimed to the defendant but was refused. The plaintiff thus made the litigant request to this court that the defendant should pay the indemnity in an amount of RMB ¥455,400. The defendant argued: Due to the fact that the plaintiff had no insurable interest in the 180 tons of red sugar worth RMB ¥455,400, the contract of insurance should be void. The subject-matter insured by Guigang Office of PICC was white sugar instead of red sugar as the plaintiff claimed. The 180 tons of red sugar that the plaintiff named as subject-matter insured in his pleading was shipped not on the carrying vessel agreed in the insurance policy, i.e. the Ship 014 managed by Water Transport, but on a “black” ship. As a consequence, the insurance liability had not commenced. The unregistered “black” ship used by the defrauders could not act against a third party i.e. the defendant. The loss of goods arising from fraud was beyond the scope of coverage. The issuance of insurance policy should be invalid because (1) the insurance agent Xian Xueyan was trapped to issue the insurance policy and (2) Xian Xueyan,as the insurance agent of the defendant, was entrusted by the plaintiff to get a carrying vessel, which resulted in her act as the agent for both sides. The loss of the plaintiff should come under the jurisdiction of the department of public security and be recovered after the defrauders were caught. Therefore, the defendant requested that the plaintiff’s litigant requests be rejected and the plaintiff bear the court fees. The following facts were affirmed. On December 7, 1998, the plaintiff authorized Jiangbei Team by telephone to deliver 180 tons of Donghailing Brand red sugar from No.2 Sugar Factory of Tiandong County in Guangxi, through Guigang where the sugar was shipped, to Qunxing Dock of Xintang Town, Zengcheng City of Guangdong province. Jiangbei Team was also entrusted to apply for the insurance of inland carriage of goods by water and land. On December 8 Jiangbei Team authorized United Co. to hire a carrying vessel. The assistant director of water transport department of United Co., Xian Xueyan contacted a woman who claimed to be the owner of the Ship 014 managed by Water Transport. They orally agreed that on the morning of December 10, the Ship 014 should be loaded with 180 tons of red sugar in Guitang Dock and be delivered to Zengcheng City of Guangdong against the freight of RMB ¥39 per metric ton. At about 11 a.m. on December 9, Xian Xueyan checked the transport license of the Ship 014 and was convinced of the legality of the transport license of the Ship 014 presented by the “woman shipowner”. At about 3:30 p.m. Xian Xueyan phoned Water Transport to confirm the Ship 014. Xu Haiyan, working in the office of Water Transport, confirmed that there was a ship 014 in Water Transport and the owner was Huang Zhineng, which was consistent with the name left to Xian Xueyan by the “woman shipowner”. Xian Xueyan then paid the “Woman shipowner” the freight RMB ¥5,000. On December 10, Xian Xueyan, as the insurance agent of the defendant, issued two premium certificates of inland carriage of goods by water and land with serial numbers of Gui-Ding-Chou No.0012251 and Gui-Ding-Chou No.0012252 under Insurance Clause of Inland Carriage of Goods by Water and Land. The following items were recorded in the certificates: the insured and applicant for insurance Cai Guimu; name of goods: white sugar; transshipment place: Guigang; destination: Neihe; carrying vessel: “Jiang-Yi-Si 014”; shipping date: December 10,1998; insurance premium rate 3‰ against all risks. One of the two certificates recorded: weight of goods: 40 tons; amount insured: RMB ¥60,000; insurance premium ¥180; while those in the other certificate were: weight of goods 140 tons, amount insured ¥60,000, insurance premium: RMB ¥630. Both of the two certificates bore the signature of Xian Xueyan,the seal bearing “Guiping-Jiangkou-Yi-Gongsi-014” and the business seal of the defendant. On the same day, 180 tons of red sugar from Tiandong County of Guangxi was discharged at Guitang Dock of Guigang and loaded on the Ship 014 provided by the “woman shipowner”. On December 11, the Ship 014 set sail. But until December 15, the plaintiff had not received the goods at the port of destination, so the plaintiff inquired Jiangbei Team by phone. The plaintiff reported to the department of public security on December 24 when the plaintiff still had no idea where the goods were. On December 30, the plaintiff sent a notice of claim for loss of the insured shipment to the defendant. On April 29, 1999 the plaintiff submitted the notice of claim on the loss of the shipment covered by the insurance for domestic water and road transport for the indemnity of a total amount of RMB¥455,400, including the loss of cargo (the red sugar) of RMB ¥428,400 and the charge for road transport together with forwarding charge of RMB¥27,000. On June 4,the defendant gave the plaintiff a notice of refusal of indemnity on the grounds that the loss arising from fraud was not recoverable. The plaintiff then brought a suit against the defendant. The following facts were also ascertained: the Ship 014 of the Water Transport was 21.40 meters in LOA, 19.00 meters in LBP, 3.70 meters in moulded width, 1.40 meters in depth moulded, with a gross tonnage of 29 tons, net tonnage of 16 tons and reference dead weight tonnage of 40 tons. Huang Zhineng was the registered owner of the ship, which had been operated by Huang Yongxing’s son of Huang Zhineng, in the name of Water Transport. Around October, 1998, Huang Yongxing returned all certificates of the ship to Water Transport, except the certificate of seaworthiness. He claimed that the ship 014 was sold to Guangdong and the certificate of seaworthiness had been returned to Guiping Harbor Superintendency. However, Water Transport, instead of having the registration of the ship 014 cancelled, sent the certificate of the ship 014 by mail on November 20, 1998 to Li Gui’an, the manager of Shizui Water Transport Company of Guiping City. Afterwards, Li Gui’an took the certificate to the Office of Navigation Administration and Harbor Navigation Superintendency of Guiping City, making up all charges and taxes since the ship ceased running. On November 25 he applied for temporary seaworthiness survey to Guangxi Ship Inspection Bureau who issued temporary certificate for inland water ships expiring on Janurary 15, 1999. On December 8,1999, Li Gui’an delivered the certificate of the ship 014 to a woman who claimed to be “ Li Xiaoqiong”. This woman intended to run a “three-none” ship (i.e. with no ship certificate, no transport license and no certificate of seaworthiness) in the name of Shizui Water Transport Company. It was affirmed that Nanyue Sugar Company in Lufeng City was a private company, which was founded by three shareholders: the plaintiff, Ma Yansheng and Chen Jupu. The registered capital was RMB ¥450,000. The scope of business included edible sugar and non-staple foodstuff, etc. This company had proved that the plaintiff had been entrusted to apply for the insurance of carriage of goods as the applicant for insurance and beneficiary. The aforementioned facts, after cross-examination and being ascertained and verified by the collegial bench, had been entered in the court records and proved by the following evidence:(1) items of evidence presented by the plaintiff: notice at the time of loss; notice of claim; notice of refusing indemnification; certificates from the plaintiff’s Company and Bureau of Administration of Industry & Commerce of Lufeng City; Xian Xueyan’s testimony, and correspondence between the plaintiff and the defendant; (2) evidence presented by the defendant: statement of Jiangbei Team; freight receipt bearing the seal of Ship 014; form of acceptance of the case by the department of public security; certificate from Guiping Harbor Superintendency; temporary certificate for inland water ships; application form of ship nationality; certificate of ownership; tonnage certificate, calculation chart of ship’s reference dead weight tonnage; certificate of load line; photos of the ship 014; certification from Navigation Administration Office of Guiping City, Xu Guorong’s testimony; (3) evidence presented by both of the two parties: certificates of insurance premium; invoice of sale of goods; certificate of products allocation; receipt of 180-ton red sugar with the seal of the ship 014; certification from Guitang Dock of Guigang; shipment invoice of red sugar, and statement of detection of the case by Gangbei Branch, Bureau of Public Security, Guigang City and the testimony of witnesses. This court held: the fact that the plaintiff put forth a proposal for insurance of carriage of goods by water and the defendant accepted the proposal and issued certificates of insurance meant that the insurance contract had been concluded between the two parties. The contract was a bona fide expression of intention on the basis of equality and free will, and the terms of the contract did not violate laws and regulations. Hence the contract shall be legally valid and binding on both parties. As to the subject-matter insured, which the defendant’s agent mistakenly wrote as white sugar, the defendant should have corrected the errors on the insurance certificates, where the defendant had been fully aware that the subject-matter insured should be red sugar when the goods were carried to the Guitang Dock. Therefore, the errors being not corrected had no bearing on the validity of the insurance contract. The Insurance Law of the PRC stipulated that an insurable interest is a legal interest that the assured has in the subject-matter insured. The invoice presented by the plaintiff recorded Nanyue Sugar Company of Lufeng City, Guangdong Province as the buyer. As the company was a private enterprise and the plaintiff was one of the shareholders of the company, the plaintiff was legally interested in the subject-matter insured. What’s more, the company entrusted the plaintiff to apply in his own name for insurance of carriage of goods as an applicant for and the beneficiary of the insurance. It was without a doubt that the plaintiff had the insurable interest in the subject-matter insured. The defendant’s arguments that the plaintiff had no insurable interest in the subject-matter insured and the insurance contract should be void were untenable. Xian Xueyan issued insurance certificates to the plaintiff as the insurance agent of the defendant, thereby establishing the legal relationship pertaining to the insurance at issue. Meanwhile, she was entrusted to hire a carrying vessel for the plaintiff, which was the legal relationship of carriage of goods by water. The act as agent for both parties should occur in the same legal relationship. Thus untenable was the defendant’s argument that the insurance contract was void because of Xian Xueyan’s act as agent for both sides. As to the insurance for carriage of goods by water, the carrying vessel, i.e. the specific ship was an essential factor for the insurance contract and a condition for the insurer to accept the proposal for insurance. The key issue of this case was that the subject-matter insured, viz the 180-ton red sugar, had not been loaded onto the Ship 014 as stated in the certificate of insurance, but onto a three-none ship, the personator of the Ship 014, which resulted in the total loss of the cargo shipped. Therefore, on one hand, the plaintiff did not load the cargo on the ship stated in the insurance certificate, which led to material breach of the insurance contract. On the other hand, the subject-matter insured was not loaded on the Ship 014 as the record on the insurance stated, which means there was no possibility for the subject-matter insured loaded on the ship under the insurance certificates to have perils insured against. The plaintiff had violated the terms of the insurance and perils or casualties covered did not occur. The loss of cargo in this case, not arising from the perils insured against, was excluded from the scope of coverage. Hence, tenable was the defendant’s argument that the defendant should not bear insurance liability because the plaintiff’s cargo was not loaded on the Ship 014. The plaintiff’s claim for insurance compensation, in the absence of evidence and legal basis, shall not be supported. Pursuant to Article 12 of the Insurance Law of the People's Republic of China: “ An insurance contract shall hold after the insured applies for insurance and the insurer agrees to underwrite the insurance and the two sides have reached agreement on the clauses of the contract.”, Article 8 of Contract Law of the People's Republic of China: “As soon as a contract is established in accordance with the law, it shall be legally binding on the parties. The parties shall perform their respective obligations in accordance with the terms of the contract. Neither party may unilaterally modify or rescind the contract”, and Article 106 of General Principle of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China which provides: “Citizens and legal persons who breach a contract or fail to fulfil other obligations shall bear civil liability”, this Court hereby decides as follows: 1. The litigant requests of the plaintiff Cai Guimu shall be dismissed; 2. The plaintiff shall bear the acceptance fee for the case RMB ¥9,340 . If any litigant contests this judgment, it may submit an appeal in writting to this court within 15 days upon the service of this judgment with copies corresponding to the number of the opposing litigants and appeal to the Higher People’s Court of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. The appeal fee of ¥9,340 shall be paid in advance within 7 days upon the date of the expiration of the appeal period(the account: the special account of litigant fee, the Higher People’s Court of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region; the number of the account: 886100010; the deposit bank: Gucheng Road Branch of Nanning City, China Agriculture Bank). If the payment is delayed without application for postponement, the appeal shall be deemed as being withdrawn automatically. Presiding Judge Wu Zaiyang Judge Ni Xuewei Judge Xie hua (Official Chop of Beihai Maritime Court) Date 25 September, 2000 Certified true copy Clerk Huang Juxiu
  • DSR-Senator Lines v. Hero(Tianjin) International Trade Co., Ltd.

    2004-03-16

    HIGHER PEOPLE’S COURT OF TIANJIN PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA CIVIL JUDGMENT No.GJZ229(2001) Appellant(Defendant in the first instance trial): DSR-Senator Lines Domicile : Room 1108, International Building, No. 75 Nanjing Road, Heping District, Tianjin Legal Representative : B. Y. Lee, executive vice president Agent ad litem : Wang Peng, lawyer of Wang Jing & Co. Tianjin Office Appellee(Plaintiff in the first instance trial) :Hero(Tianjin) International Trade Co., Ltd. Domicile: No.28, Datong Road, Heping District, Tianjin Legal Representative : Peng Zhijiang, General Manager Agent ad litem : Fang Guoqing, lawyer of Yuan Hai Law Firm Being not satisfied with the Civil Judgment No.HSC 46(2001) handed down by Tianjin Maritime Court, the Appellant, DSR-Senator Lines, filed an appeal to this court in respect of the cases of dispute over claim for loss of cargo arising from release of cargo without presentation of original bill of lading. This court formed a collegial bench according to law and held public hearings. The agent ad litem of the Appellant, Wang Peng, the legal representative of Hero (Tianjin) International Trade Co., Ltd, Peng Zhijiang and the agent ad litem thereof Fang Guoqing attended the hearing. The case has now been concluded. It was ascertained by the court of first instance that on 28 April, 2000, Hero (Tianjin) International Trade Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Hero Co.”) consigned two TEU containers to DSR-Senator Lines for shipment from Xingang, Tianjin to New York, USA. On 5 May, 2000, DSR-Senator Lines issued B/L No.TSNATTO0872810, in which it was stated that Shipper: Hero (Tianjin) International Trade Co., Ltd.; Consignee: to order of International Chemical Purchasing Inc.; Notify party: International Chemical Purchasing Inc.; Vessel: m/v “E-Cheng”; Voyage: 0398E; Freight: to collect. The cargo arrived at the port of destination on 20 June, 2000. As DSR-Senator Lines released the cargo to the consignee without presentation of the original B/L and as the consignee did not redeem the documents through payment, Hero Co. sustained a loss of USD 36,726.40 for the payment of cargo under the Bs/L and a loss of USD210.05 for the commission charged by the bank. The court of first instance held the view that a bill of lading is a document which serves as an evidence of the contract of carriage of goods by sea as well as the carrier’s reception or loading of the goods, and based on which the carrier undertakes to deliver the cargo against surrendering the same. The carrier’s responsibility under a contract of carriage of goods by sea begins from the time of issuing original bill of lading until the time when the cargo was delivered against surrendering original bill of lading. In the present case, before the cargo was delivered and original Bs/L withdrawn, the cargo was in the charge of DSR-Senator Lines or its agent. It was incumbent on DSR-Senator Lines to excise due diligence to care for the cargo within such period. DSR-Senator Lines shall be liable for the economic loss sustained by Hero Co. arising or resulting from the consignee’s taking delivery of cargo without surrendering original Bs/L within the period when DSR-Senator Lines as the carrier was in charge of the cargo. Pursuant to Article 106, Paragraph 1 of the General Principles of Civil Law of the PRC and Article 71 of the Maritime Code of the PRC, a judgment was entered to the effect that DSR-Senator Lines shall pay to Hero Co. USD36,726.40 for the loss of cargo payment and shall pay the penalty for breach of contract accrued from 5 July, 2000 to the date of actual payment at the annual rate of 4.4375% and USD210.05 for bank commission. The above sums shall be paid up within 15 days from the date the Judgment comes into force. Being not satisfied with the judgment, DSR-Senator Lines filed an appeal to this court, requesting to adjudicate the Appellant not liable for the compensation on the grounds specified below: 1. At the time of initiating the lawsuit, Hero Co. failed to prove that it had the title to the cargo in question. It was stated in the Bs/L that: Consignee should be to the order of International Chemical Purchasing Inc. This revealed that the consignee should be either International Chemical Purchasing Inc. or some other party to its order. In this case, the Appellant delivered the cargo in accordance with the agreement, and thus had performed the contract of carriage of goods by sea as prima facie evidenced by the Bs/L. In accordance with Article 79 of the Maritime Code of the PRC, the said bills of lading could not be transferred unless it had been endorsed by International Chemical Purchasing Inc., but it had not been endorsed in this case. The Appellee could no longer enjoy the rights under the Bs/L after they had been transferred through endorsement, although it did obtain the B/L. Therefore, it was not in a position to enjoy the title to the cargo under the Bs/L. 2. Since the Appellee did not intend to retain the title to the goods, and in accordance with Article 72 of the General principles of Civil Law of the PRC, the property in the cargo in question transferred to to buyer at the time when the cargo was delivered to the carrier, and the Appellee no longer had the rights over the said goods. 3. As a quasi document of title, the bill of lading is the token of the right of possession of the cargo rather than the ownership of the goods. Therefore, the possession of the bill of lading itself does not prove that the bill of lading holder has accordingly obtained the ownership of the cargo under the bill of lading. The fact that “to order of International Chemical Purchasing Inc.” was stated in the “consignee” column of the Bs/L under the present case bore out that the cargo had been transferred to the possession of International Chemical Purchasing Inc. and that International Chemical Purchasing Inc. had thus obtained the right to dispose of the said cargo through endorsement. Or, it can be said that the rights of which the Bs/L were tokens belonged to International Chemical Purchasing Inc., rather than the Appellee. 4. It was legally groundless for the court of first instance to support the Respondent’s claims for penalty for breach of contract and bank commission. The Appellee, Hero Co. answered as follows: 1. The shipper stated in the Bs/L was the Appellee, who held three original Bs/L issued by the Appellant and thus certainly had the title to suit. Even from the angle of the function of the bill of lading as a document of title to the goods, since the Appellant could not deliver the cargo with the three original Bs/L being in possession of the appellee, the Appellant shall be held liable therefor. 2. The Appellee relied upon the three original Bs/L without any endorsement to sue the Appellant. If the Appellant thought that the Bs/L in question had been transferred to a third party, the Appellant shall bear the burden of proof. As for the provisions of Article 72 of the General Principles of Civil Law of the PRC that was quoted by the Appellant, if the Appellant alleged that the title to the goods had been transferred, the Appellant shall adduce relevant evidence to prove so. 3. It was entirely right for the court of first instance to order the Appellant to pay penalty for breach of contract and bank commission. It was because the Appellant released the cargo without being surrendered bills of lading that the Appellee was unable to collect the cargo payment and thus sustained loss of interests, and the foregoing penalty and commission could be anticipated. During the proceedings in second instance trial, the Appellant did not present any evidence, nor did he raise any dissension on the evidence as to the three original Bs/L submitted by the Appellee during the proceedings in first instance, the faxes revealing the Appellant’s approval of the release of the cargo without presentation of Bs/L, the sales contract, invoices, packing lists, and the three Receipts / Debit Notes of the bank commission in the amount of USD 210.05.. The facts of the case investigated by the court of first instancel trial were affirmed by this court after hearing. This court was of the opinion that after the Appellee brought a lawsuit before the court of first instance, the Appellant was legally summoned by the court but refused to attend the hearing without any justified reasons. The Appellant filed an appeal before this court after the court of first instance handed down a judgment in default of the Appellant. Moreover, the Appellant did not put forward any dissension on the matter of jurisdiction. Therefore, the Appellant shall be deemed to have been submitted to the jurisdiction of the court of first instance. During the hearing of second instance, both parties applied the Maritime Code of the PRC and the General Principles of Civil Law of the PRC as the basis for claim and defense. Hence, the both parties shall be deemed as having reached an agreement on the application of the law of the PRC in resolving disputes of this case. Therefore, in accordance with Article 145 of the General Principles of Civil Law of the PRC, this case shall be governed by the law of the PRC. The sales contract for the cargo in question was signed on FOB term, and the charterer should be the buyer of the goods. After the Appellee, as the seller, delivered the cargo to the Appellant at the loading port, the Appellant, as the carrier, issued a full set of original Bs/L stating the shipper was the Appellee, then the relationship of the contract of carriage of goods by sea evidenced by Bs/L was established between the two parties. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 42 (1) of the Maritime Code of the PRC, the Appellee was the person who delivered the cargo to the carrier in connection with the contract of carriage of goods by sea, and was the shipper of the cargo under the bill of lading. The Bs/L in question were “order” Bs/L and the consignee was to the order of International Chemical Purchasing Inc. But by the time the Appellee settled the exchange by way of D/P, the buyer had not effected payment. That was why the collecting bank returned the full set of documents while the Bs/L, instead of being transferred, were controlled by the Appellee and the collecting bank he entrusted. The Appellee was in legal possession of the Bs/L without endorsement of the named party to whose order the cargo under the Bs/L was delivered. The allegation of the Appellant that the Bs/L in question could not be transferred unless they had been endorsed by International Chemical Purchasing Inc., but in fact the Bs/L had not been endorsed was untenable. So was the allegation that the Appellee held the Bs/L but did not have the rights thereunder after transfer by endorsement. Under FOB price term, the loading of goods on board only indicates that the risks shift to the buyer, while the title to the goods does not transfer simultaneously. In this case, since the buyer failed to effect payment in exchange for the documents and the Appellee held the full set of the Bs/L, the Appellee still possessed the title to the cargo under the Bs/L. The allegation of the Appellant that the title to the goods shifted to the buyer when the goods was delivered to the carrier, and that the Appellee no longer possessed the title to the goods in question were legally groundless and thus untenable. As the carrier, the Appellant had the obligation to exercise due diligence to care for the cargo as well as to ensure to deliver the cargo against presentation of original Bs/L during the period he was in charge of the cargo. Due to the Appellant’s fault, the consignee took delivery of the cargo without surrendering the original Bs/L, which resulted in the failure of the Appellee to get the cargo payment and to control the cargo even with the original Bs/L in hand. Hence, the Appellant shall bear the liability for the losses resulting therefrom. The views and findings of the court of first instance trial with respect to the cargo loss and bank commission as well as the amounts thereof were correct and should be maintained. The loss of interests accrued from the loss of cargo shall be supported. However, only the relationship based on contract of carriage of goods by sea evidenced by Bs/L existed between the two parties, but there was no agreement upon any penalty for breach of contract. Hence, the loss of interests should not have been stated as a fine for breach of contract in the judgment of first instance trial, which was erroneous in such presentation. In summary, pursuant to Paragraph 1 of Article 153 of the General Principles of Civil Law of the PRC, the judgment is hereby entered as follows: The major adjudication in Civil Judgment No.HSC 46(2001) shall be rectified to the effect that DSR-Senator Lines shall pay to Hero Co. USD 36,726.40 plus its interest (accruing from 5 July, 2000 to the date of payment decided herein on the basis of the corresponding USD deposit interest rate issued by the People’s Bank of China) as indemnity for the loss of cargo, and pay USD210.05 for bank commission. The above sums shall be paid up within 15 days from the day on which this Judgment comes into force. The Appellant DSR-Senator Lines shall pay RMB 7,431 and RMB 7,431 respectively for court fees of first instance and second instance. This judgment shall be final. Presiding Judge: Xie Lipeng Acting Judge : Zhang Rongli Acting Judge : Li Xuechun Certified true copy Date : January 30th, 2002 Clerk : Yan Zhining
  • Zhao Yangsheng,Liang Hongfang v.Guangzhou Gao Hua Yachts Manufacturing Co., Ltd.

    2004-03-16

    GUANGZHOU MARITIME COURT PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA CIVIL JUDGMENT No.GHFZ 45&50(2000) Plaintiff (defendant in counterclaim): Zhao Yangsheng, male, born on November 19, 1968, of Han nationality, living in Zhaozhai Village, Naozhou Town, Dong Hai Dao Economic Development Zone, Zhanjiang City, China. Plaintiff (defendant in counterclaim): Liang Hongfang, male, born on June 14, 1959, of Han nationality, living in Yingming Village, Naozhou Town, Dong Hai Dao Economic Development Zone, Zhanjiang City, China. Agent ad litem of the above two plaintiffs: Zhong Yonghua, lawyer of Hai Dong Law Firm, Zhanjiang Agent ad litem of the above two plaintiffs: Qin Guanquan, lawyer of Guangdong Yue Hai Law Firm Defendant (plaintiff in counterclaim): Guangzhou Gao Hua Yachts Manufacturing Co., Ltd. Address: Shenjing Village, Changzhou Town, Huangpu District, Guangzhou Legal representative: Qiu Zhanwei, Chairman of the Board Agent ad litem: Zhang Zhaohui, lawyer of Guangzhou Zhong Lian Law Firm Agent ad litem: Chen Leiming, assistant lawyer of Guangzhou Zhong Lian Law Firm With regard to the cases of dispute arising from the contract of boat construction filed by the plaintiffs Zhao Yangsheng and Liang Hongfang against Guangzhou Gao Hua Yachts Manufacturing Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Gao Hua Co.”), this court accepted it on October 18, 2000 and thereafter formed a collegial bench in accordance with law, and organized the parties concerned to exchange evidence on November 14. Gao Hua Co. raised a counterclaim on November 27. This court organized the parties to exchange evidence for the second time on December 14 and held open hearings on the same day. The plaintiffs Zhao Yangsheng and Liang Hongfang and their agents ad litem Zhong Yonghua and Qin Guanquan, as well as the agents ad litem of the Defendant Gao Hua Co. Zhang Zhaohui and Chen Leiming attended the court hearings. The trial of this case has now been finalized. The Plaintiffs Zhao Yangsheng and Liang Hongfang complained that on February 21 and June 25, 1998 respectively they entered into a Contract for Construction of 56-Seat High Speed Reinforced Glass Passenger Boat and a Supplementary Agreement thereto with the Defendant, appointing the Defendant to construct two high speed passenger boats for the Plaintiffs and to deliver the boats to the latter within 100 working days as of the day of signing of the Contract. On January 22, 1999, the Defendant delivered the boats. The Plaintiffs named the two boats “Fei Shun” and “Fei Li” and put them into operation. The average daily revenue of each boat amounted to RMB 5,000. On September 19, 2000, in order to recover the outstanding building costs for the boats, the Defendant detained “Fei Shun” and the diesel oil on board, without being authorized, valuing RMB 1,400, and the electric drills valuing more than RMB 500, as well as the three sets of HF walkie talkie valuing RMB 6,000 onboard the said boat. For the purpose of retrieving the aforesaid property, the Plaintiffs incurred traveling expenses in the amount of RMB 15,000. Furthermore, the Defendant’s unauthorized detainment of the boat had also inflicted the following losses upon the Plaintiffs: RMB 7,500 resulting from idleness in work, RMB 613/month of navigation management fee, RMB 2,100 for berthage, RMB 1,000 for expenses of tax and passengers’ harbor dues, RMB 5,000/day for loss of operating revenue, and RMB 7,500 for wages for the crewmembers. The Plaintiffs requested the court to order the Defendant to: (1) immediately return the passenger boat “Fei Shun” or to make a compensation for the cost of the boat at RMB 880,000; (2) return 372 kilograms of diesel oil, 3 sets of HF walkie talkie, 2 sets of maintenance and repair tools; (3) indemnify direct operational losses in the amount of RMB 150,000, traveling expenses at RMB 15,000, losses due to idleness in work at RMB 7,500, navigation management fees at RMB 613, berthage at RMB 2,100, and expenses for tax and passengers’ harbor dues at RMB 1,000. Within the time limit for adducing evidence, the Plaintiffs submitted the following evidence: (1) Contract for Construction of 56-Seat High Speed Reinforced Glass Passenger Boat and the Supplementary Agreement thereto; (2) Certificates of Delivery and Taking Delivery; (3) Certificate of Survey; (4) Certificate of Nationality; (5) Certificate for Transportation Operations; (6) receipts for building costs of the boats; (7) written notes of answers to inquiries by the local police station of Shalan Town, Taishan City dated September 19, 2000; (8) receipts for passengers’ harbor dues and berthage of “Fei Shun” and “Fei Li” from May to July, 2000; (9) Invoice of Delivery Order for the Diesel Oil issued by Jinda Development Co. under Guangdong Provincial Petroleum Enterprises Group, (Zhenjiang) to Hong Da Co.; (10) payroll of “Fei Shun” from January to September, 2000; (11) Statement of Income and Expenditure of “Fei Shun” from January 1 to September 15, 2000; (12) receipts for navigation management fees of “Fei Shun” and “Fei Li” for December 1999; (13) invoices for wharfage dues of “Fei Shun” and “Fei Li” from October, 1999 to February, 2000; (14) Invoice for purchase of air-conditioners dated July 30, 1999; (15) 6 receipts for maintenance and repair fees incurred by “Fei Shun” and “Fei Li” from March to October, 1999; (16) receipts for harbor dues of “Fei Shun” in August and December, 1999; (17) evidence of sale of oil issued by Xia Hai Petroleum Station to Naozhou fleet; (18) 24 pieces of invoice for traveling expenses; (19) 30 pieces of invoice for costs of accommodation and meals. The Defendant Gao Hua Co. defended and counter-claimed that it was reasonable and legitimate for him to take back one of the two boats in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 2 of Article 7 of the Supplementary Agreement, because the two Plaintiffs had delayed payments for the construction of the two boats for a long time. Therefore, the Plaintiffs were not entitled to demand return of the boat. Besides, the names of the owner of “Fei Shun” stated in different certificates were different from one another, varying from ZhaoYangsheng, Liang Hongfang to Hong Rongliang and so on. Hence, the Plaintiffs’ right to action was not certain. As for losses in operations, which could only incur upon the operator of boats, which was the passenger transport company under the present case, while the Plaintiffs, alleged to be the shipowners, were not entitled to claim for compensation. Moreover, the evidence and materials produced by the Plaintiffs were not directly related to this case. Therefore, the Defendant requested to dismiss the claims of the Plaintiffs. The Defendant, acting in conformity with the above-mentioned construction Contract and the Supplementary Agreement thereto, constructed and delivered two passenger boats to the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs, however, failed to pay, as have been agreed upon, the boat construction costs progressively as scheduled. On January 23, 1999, the two parties set to settle the accounts for building the boats, ascertaining that the Plaintiffs still owed the Defendant RMB 510,000, and mutually agreeing that the Plaintiffs shall pay RMB 150,000 to the Defendant by the end of March 1999, while the remaining sum shall be paid up as provided for in the Contract. However, by May 10, 2000, the Plaintiffs paid only RMB 190,000 to the Defendant, the remaining RMB 320,000 being not paid up until this time. The Defendant requested the court to order the Plaintiffs to: (1) pay the cost of construction of the boats overdue in the amount of RMB 320,000; (2) pay the penalties for overdue payment in the amount of RMB 80,000 (calculating on the basis of 0.03% per day from March 30,1999 up to the date of actual payment); (3) compensate the Defendant for the losses resulting from this litigation in the amount of RMB 20,000. The Defendant Gao Hua Co. submitted the following evidence and materials within the time limit for adducing evidence: (1) Contract for Construction of 56-Seat High Speed Reinforced Glass Passenger Boat and the Supplementary Agreement thereto; (2) Certificates of Delivery and Taking Delivery; (3) the IOU issued by the Plaintiffs on January 23, 1999. Responding to the counterclaim of the Defendant, the Plaintiffs Zhao Yangsheng and Liang Hongfang argued that as the Defendant failed to deliver the boats as scheduled by delaying for 100 working days, nor did he issue the invoices for the payment of the boat building costs as contracted, and,within a period of less than one year after delivery of the two boats, the air-conditioning system and the stern shafts of the two boats broke down and the Defendant failed to bring them back to normal operation. As a consequence, the Plaintiffs had to pay RMB 29,199 for repair. Considering that the Defendant had seriously breached the contract and agreement, the Plaintiffs were therefore entitled to suspend payment for the remainder of the construction costs and to offset the repair costs. The provisions of Paragraph 2 of Article 7 of the Supplementary Agreement were in violation of the relevant provisions of law and the principle of fairness, and should therefore be regarded as invalid. In view of this, it was illegal for the Defendant to detain the boat basing on those provisions. Besides, the request for compensation for penalties and losses resulting from the litigation as claimed by the Defendant were groundless in law and in facts. While being cross-examined in the court hearings, neither party contested the evidential documents such as the Contract for Construction of 56-Seat High Speed Reinforced Glass Passenger Boats and the Supplementary Agreement thereto, the Certificate for Delivery and Taking Delivery, the receipts for payments of the costs of boat construction, the IOU, the various certificates of “Fei Shun” and the written notes of answers to inquiries by the local police station of Shalan Town, Taishan City. Therefore, the collegial bench confirmed the foregoing documents. The following facts were ascertained with the help of the above confirmed evidence: On February 21, 1998, the two Plaintiffs, as Party A, and the Defendant, as Party B, entered into the Contract for the Construction of 56-Seat High Speed Reinforced Glass Passenger Boats. On June 25, the two parties to the Contract further concluded a Supplementary Agreement. According to the Contract and the Agreement, Party B shall construct two high speed passenger boats at the cost of RMB 880,000 each for Party A and shall deliver them to Party A within 100 working days as of the date of signing the Contract. Should Party A fail to effect the payments of construction costs progressively as scheduled in the Contract, he shall have to pay a penalty for delaying payment at 0.05% per day of the sum payable in the corresponding period. The place of delivery of the boats was the wharf of Party B. Party B guaranteed a one-year free maintenance for the boat structure as of the date of going out of the dockyard of the boat and a two-year free maintenance for serious problems with respect to the boat structure. Subparagraphs 2 & 3 of Article 4 (II) of the Supplementary Agreement provided that upon delivery of the boats, Party A shall pay to Party B RMB 1,000,000 and the remaining sum shall be paid off within 6 months as of the date of going into operation of the boats by Party A. Paragraph 2 of Article 7 of the Supplementary Agreement further stipulated that should Party A fail to pay off the remaining sum as agreed on in the Contract 6 months after the commencement of operation, and should such failure remain for another 6 months, Party A shall unconditionally return one of the boats to Party B. On January 22, 1999, the representatives of the Plaintiffs and the Defendant delivered and took delivery of the boats at the wharf of the Defendant, and concluded a Certificate for Delivery and Taking Delivery, which stated that the Plaintiffs had examined and accepted the high speed passenger boats constructed by the Defendant. On 23January, the two parties set to settle the accounts in relation to the costs of construction of the boats. Based on the result of such settlement, the Plaintiffs issued an IOU, stating that they still owed RMB 510,000 as cost of construction to the Defendant and promising to effect the payment in the amount of RMB 150,000 by the end of March, 1999 and to pay the rest as provided for in the Contract. Thereafter, the Plaintiffs named the two boats “Fei Shun” and “Fei Li” and went through formalities for obtaining various papers for operation. The Certificate of Registry of Ownership of “Fei Shun” stated that the owners were Zhao Yangsheng, Liang Hongfang and Hong Rongliang. The Certificate for Transportation Operations stated that the operator of the boats was Zhanjiang Naozhou Passenger Transportation Co. and the date of issuance was February 8, 1999. But in fact, Zhanjiang Naozhou Passenger Transportation Co. was merely the nominal operator of “Fei Shun”. The actual operators of the boat were the Plaintiffs, who paid management fees to the said company. The Plaintiffs paid RMB 10,000 on April 5, 1999, RMB 20,000 on April 14, 1999, RMB 20,000 on May 13, 1999, RMB 100,000 on June 10, 1999, RMB 30,000 on June 18, 1999, and RMB 10,000 on May 10, 2000, totaling RMB 190,000 to the Defendant. In order to recover the remaining sum, the Defendant detained “Fei Shun” at Shanzui Wharf, Shalan Town, Taishan City on September 19. Reacting to such detainment, Qiu Zhanwei, Board Chairman of the Defendant, and the Plaintiff Zhao Yangsheng respectively went to the police station of Shalan Town to report the case, requesting the local police station to handle it. The police station considered the Defendant’s detaining the boat in reliance upon the provisions of their Agreement, namely, “Party B is entitled to take back one boat should Party A fail to effect payment of the construction costs in due course”, to be a civil dispute. Also taking into account that Zhao Yangsheng hoped to settle the dispute between himself and the Defendant, the police station dismissed the case. Thereafter, the Defendant steered “Fei Shun” back to his wharf and kept it afloat there under his custody. With respect to the disputes between the two parties over the facts of this case, the collegial bench ascertained as follows: I. Whether there were diesel oil, electric drills and walkie talkies onboard The Plaintiffs furnished the Delivery Order for the Diesel Oil issued by Jinda Development Co. under Guangdong Provincial Petroleum Enterprises Group, (Zhanjiang) to Hong Da Co. and the evidence for sale of oil issued by Xia Hai Petroleum Station to Naozhou fleet on August 1, 2000 to prove the existence of diesel oil, electric drills and walkie talkies onboard. The Defendant contended that there was no sign whatsoever on the Delivery Order for the Diesel Oil or the evidence for the sale indicating that it was relevant to this case. The collegial bench accepted the Defendant’s argument and held that such evidence had no connection with and no effect in support of this case, thus refused such evidence. II. With regard to losses in operation and in charges and dues For the purpose of proving that the detainment of “Fei Shun” had incurred losses in operation and in charges and dues totaling RMB 161,213, the Plaintiffs produced the following evidence and documents: receipts of passengers’ harbor dues and berthage of “Fei Shun” and “Fei Li” from May to July, 2000; payroll of “Fei Shun” from January to September, 2000; Statement of Income and Expenditure of “Fei Shun” from January 1 to September 15, 2000; receipts of navigation management fees of “Fei Shun” and “Fei Li” in December, 1999; invoices for wharfage of “Fei Shun” and “Fei Li” from October, 1999 to February, 2000; and receipts for harbor dues of “Fei Shun” in August and December 1999. The Defendant held that as the payroll and the Statement of Income and Expenditure were made by the Plaintiffs themselves, without being authenticated by relevant legal authorities, they could not reflect the real situation and were thus without any evidential force. Moreover, none of the items of charges such as passengers’ harbor dues, berthage of the boat, navigation management fees, wharf dues and harbor charges as shown on the receipts and evidence occurred during the period when “Fei Shun” was taken back and, therefore, they all had no connection with this case. The collegial bench accepted the view of the Defendant and held that the evidence produced by the Plaintiffs was not directly connected with this case. Hence, the collegial bench shall not accept such evidence from the Plaintiffs. III. Regarding the cost of the air-conditioners and the charges for repairs The Plaintiffs submitted the Invoice for purchase of air-conditioners dated July 30, 1999 and 6 receipts of repair charges of “Fei Shun” and “Fei Li” on slipway incurred during March-October, 1999 to support their claim that the relevant expenses in the amount of RMB 29,199 should be deducted from the construction costs. The Defendant refuted that the cost for air-conditioners and the charges of repairs of the boats did not fall within the agreed scope of guaranteed free maintenance for the boat structure, and therefore should be borne by the Plaintiffs themselves. The collegial bench held that although the Defendant’s name and address were written on the invoice for purchase of air-conditioners, which seemingly indicated that this sum was paid for and on behalf of the Defendant, yet, the Plaintiffs failed to adduce evidence to prove that the Defendant approved of or authorised the plaintiffs for such purchase on the Defendant’s behalf. Even though the air-conditioners in question were actually used by “Fei Shun” or “Fei Li”, they were beyond the scope of free maintenance as they were beyond the scope of free maintenance of the boat structure as mutually agreed upon. The Items of Charges on the receipts of up-to-slipway repairs respectively noted “Individual repair charges” or “up-to-slipway repair charges” for “Fei Shun” or “Fei Li”, which were not sufficient to prove that the repairs fell within the scope of guaranteed free maintenance for boat structure as previously agreed upon. Therefore, the Defendant’s confutation was tenable and the collegial bench shall not accept the relevant evidential documents produced by the Plaintiffs, as they were irrelevant to this case. IV. About the transportation expenses and the accommodation costs The Plaintiffs submitted 24 invoices of transportation expenses and 30 invoices of costs of accommodation and meals to prove that they had incurred expenses for transportation, accommodation and meals amounting to RMB 15,000 in their attempts to get back their boat under detainment. The Defendant held that there were no records on the above receipts showing the time and purposes for which the charges actually incurred, so the said receipts were irrelevant to this case. The collegial bench held that the Defendant’s point of view was tenable, and did not accept such untenable evidence submitted by the Plaintiffs. Hong Rongliang declared to waive his substantive rights and declined to attend the court hearings of this case. Therefore, the collegial bench shall not summon him to the hearing. In summary, the collegial bench unanimously held that: This was about a dispute over the contracts for construction of boats. Although the Plaintiffs initiated this litigation on the grounds of dispute over damages resulting from the detainment of a boat, yet the essential nature of this dispute over the detainment of the boat was about the effectiveness of the clause regarding the terms of payment of construction costs in the contract of construction, which belonged to a dispute over contract rather than a controversy over act of tort. Hong Rongliang, though registered as one of the owners of the boats in question, was not a party to the contract of construction or the Supplementary Agreement. In addition, he had declined to attend the hearings of this case, and had also declared to waive his substantive rights with respect to this case. Hence, his absence from the court hearings did not affect the rights and obligations of the parties to this case and the normal handling of this case. The substantive clauses of the construction contract and its Supplementary Agreement were eligible and their contents were legitimate. They should be deemed to have reflected the true intents of the parties to them, and were thus ascertained as effective. The provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 7 of the Supplementary Agreement to the effect that should the Plaintiffs fail to pay off the boat-construction costs within the time limit, they should unconditionally return one of the boats to the Defendant, was a clause in respect of liabilities for breach of contract. The wording of such clause was definite and specific and was binding upon both parties to the Contract. The Plaintiffs’ allegation that such clause was in violation of the provisions of law was neither valid nor tenable. In the course of the performance of the contract, the Plaintiffs took delivery of the boats, obtained various certificates for the boats, and legally obtained the ownership thereof. However, this did not affect the Defendant’s contractual rights to take back one of the boats to compensate for the remaining and outstanding sum of the construction costs and the Penalty for the payment overdue under the circumstances the Plaintiffs failed to effect payment for the rest of the construction costs in time in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 7 of the Supplementary Agreement. Thereafter, the Plaintiffs refused to pay the remaining sum of the construction costs on the grounds that the Defendant failed to issue invoice for their payments. Such allegation of the Plaintiffs was not well founded, and the Plaintiffs’ act had constituted a violation of the Contract. In view of the Plaintiffs’ failure to pay off the construction costs, the Defendant detained “Fei Shun” and kept it in his dockyard without permission. Such action of the Defendant was not appropriate. However, this did not affect the Defendant’s substantive rights on the detained boat. Therefore, the Defendant was entitled to keep “Fei Shun” in custody as a means of compensation for the yet-to-be-paid construction costs and the penalty for overdue payment thereof. The Plaintiffs had no right to demand the Defendant to release the detained boat or to compensate for their losses resulting from the detainment. Meanwhile, the Plaintiffs’ obligation to pay the remainder of the construction costs and the penalty for overdue payment to the Defendant should be deemed to have been fulfilled. All of the relevant claims requests of the Plaintiffs and the relevant counterclaims of the Defendant were not tenable and shall all be dismissed. The Defendant should have undertaken certain liabilities for compensation for his inappropriate and unauthorized detainment of the boat. However, as the Plaintiffs failed to convincingly prove their losses in operations and the expenditure they incurred resulting from the Defendant’s detaining the boat, the Plaintiffs’ claim in this respect should be dismissed. With regard to the Plaintiffs’ requests that the Defendant return the diesel oil, walkie talkies and the maintenance and repair tools onboard, as well as to offset the costs of purchasing air-conditioners and the charges for repair from the remaining sum of the construction costs payable by the Plaintiffs, they should be dismissed as not well-supported by evidence. The Defendant’s request to order the Plaintiffs to compensate for his losses resulting from this litigation in the amount of RMB 20,000 had no factual and legal basis, and is thus dismissed. Summing up the above and in accordance with the provisions of Article 111 of the General Principles of Civil Law of the PRC, the judgment is hereby rendered as follows: I. The litigation requests of the Plaintiffs Zhao Yangsheng and Liang Hongfang are dismissed; II. The counterclaims of the Defendant Guagnzhou Gao Hua Yachts Manufacturing Co., Ltd. are dismissed. The fee for acceptance of the case amounting to RMB 19,268 shall be borne by the Plaintiffs, while that for acceptance of the counterclaim totaling RMB 11,030 shall be paid by the Defendant. Should there be any objection to this Judgment, a statement of appeal with copies in the number of the opponent party can be submitted to this court within 15 days upon service of this Judgment. The court of appeal shall be the Higher People’s Court of Guangdong. Presiding Judge: Xiong Shaohui Judge: Xiang Minghua Acting Judge: Li Yichuan (chop of Guangzhou Maritime Court) January 10, 2001 Certified True Copy Clerk: Mo Fei
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